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INTRODUCTION: THE MISAPPROPRIATION EXPLOSION 
E VERY day someone invests time, labor, or money in creating a valuable intangible. Someone collects information, creates an 
idea, designs a boat hull, writes a book, or comes up with a new way 
to market a product that someone else developed. Judicial treatment 
of these and other cognate occurrences has shifted dramatically in 
recent years. 
For significant periods, epitomized by the decisions in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 1 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,2 
courts resisted common law intellectual property. 3 The courts were 
conscious of their limited institutional capacities for measuring the 
1 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding state unfair competition law that prohibited the copying of 
unpatented lamps preempted by federal patent law). 
2 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (holding state unfair competition law that prohibited the copying of 
unpatented light fixtures preempted by federal patent law). 
3 See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (dismissing 
diversity jurisdiction suit seeking common law protection against the copying of then-
uncopyrightable fabric designs because "the Constitution allows only Congress" to grant a 
creator the power to prevent any imitation of his work), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930). 
Writing in 1940, Zechariah Chafee suggested that the courts were engaged in cautious 
exploration but that a broad scope for unfair competition had been rejected. Zechariah 
Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1940). Howard Abrams suggests that 
the judicial pendulum has swung in both pro- and antiprotectionist directions over the 20th 
century. Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional 
and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 509, 518-32. A mid-century 
example of the willingness of courts to give rights in intangibles is Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. 
Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., IOI N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d. 
795 (1951) (enjoining commercial copying and selling of opera broadcasts). 
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effects of new intellectual property rights4 and of the deference owed 
to federal power in the area. 5 In addition, a tempered hostility to 
intellectual property that went beyond questions of federal preemp-
tion or of legislative versus judicial competence was discernible during 
these periods. 6 Courts often perceived copying and other forms of 
free riding as acceptable means of serving public demand, and they 
recognized the virtues that inhere in competition. 7 
Then, about twenty years ago, the judicial tide began to tum in a 
clearly propertarian direction. In the United States Supreme Court, 
several state law rights in intangibles were upheld against preemption 
challenges. 8 The Court also spoke approvingly of state restrictions on 
the copying of intangibles on grounds of preventing unjust enrichment 
and of providing economic incentive to creators. 9 The reversed tide 
quickly accelerated. In some quarters, the traditional suspicion 
toward intellectual property soon was replaced by its opposite: an 
eager acceptance of the voracious notion that beneficial products of 
human effort-works of visual art, information, computer programs, 
inventions, designs, ideas, or symbols of celebrity-should yield 
court-protected rewards for the persons who create them, discover 
4 See, e.g., Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d at 281 (Hand, J.) ("[W]e are not in any position to pass 
upon the questions involved .... We must judge upon records prepared by litigants ... [that] 
cannot disclose the conditions of this industry, or of the others which may be involved."); see 
also International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (advocating reasons for preferring legislative resolution of the issues presented). 
s Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 8, Congress has enacted copyright and 
patent statutes. 
6 See Chafee, supra note 3, at 1317-21 (discussing "four reasons of social policy which 
render judges cautious"); see also Richard H. Stern & Joel E. Hoffman, Public Injury and the 
Public Interest: Secondary Meaning in the Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 935, 
935 (1962) (describing the conflict between the "public injury" rule and the misappropriation 
doctrine). 
7 Thus, in Sears, the Court wrote: " 'Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by 
patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the free exercise of 
which the consuming public is deeply interested.'" Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 (quoting Kellogg 
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938)); see James A. Rahl, The Right to 
"Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 56 (1962). 
s See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding state trade seeret 
law not preempted by federal patent law); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) 
(holding state statute criminalizing the commercial copying of phonograph records and tapes 
not preempted by federal copyright law). 
9 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-77 (1977) 
(discussing both incentives and unjust enrichment in upholding against First Amendment 
challenge a state right of publicity in performances). 
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them, or give them popularity. Io Further, courts seemed to assume 
that ownership was the most appropriate form for this reward to 
take.II 
Although- federal preemption continues. to prevent states from 
imposing many kinds of restraints on the copying of products, I2 today 
states are creating new intellectual property rights in a host of areas. 
Under the rubric of "misappropriation,"I3 or under sister doctrines 
to See generally David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., 
Autumn 1981, at 147, 151-71 (describing the new developments). 
11 See, e.g., Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1987) (upholding a newspaper's property 
right in prepublication confidentiality and exclusive use of information compiled by its 
reporters); San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 
532-35 (1987) (upholding statutory limited property right in word that acquired value due to 
entity's efforts and expenditures); Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (terming human cannonball's 
interest in being paid for a broadcast of his act a property right); Factors Etc. v. Pro Arts, 579 
F.2d 215, 221-22 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that under New York law Elvis Presley's right of 
publicity was a transferable, survivable property right). But see Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 
F.2d 579, 586-87 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting the judicially created right in Factors is probably 
preempted by state statute), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). 
12 See, e.g., Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding a Florida 
statute that prohibited the "direet molding" of boat hulls preempted by federal patent law). 
The Court in Bonito Boats specifically noted that "all state regulation of potentially patentable 
but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto pre-empted by the federal patent laws." Id. at 
154. The proper scope of preemption is a much-debated issue. Sec Wendy J. Gordon, Toward 
a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 
57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1009, 1020-26 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Benefits]. 
13 In terms of precedent, the new developments find their roots in the 1918 Supreme Court 
case of International News Serv. v. Associated Press ("INS''), 248 U.S. 215 (1918), in which 
the Court enjoined the copying of uncopyrightable ''hot news" on the ground, inter alia, that 
the copyist was "reap[ing] where it ha[d] not sown." Id. at 239. This decision, announced as 
pre-Erie federal common law, gave birth to the tort of "misappropriation," an amorphous 
cause of action that had little effect in the initial decades after its emergence. See Edmund W. 
Kitch & Harvey S. Perlman, Legal Regulation of the Competitive Process 29-31 (4th ed. 1989) 
(discussing the early disinterest in the INS doctrine). INS also was thought largely interred by 
the Sears and Compco decisions. See, e.g., Jolm P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 
Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1415-16 (1974). In recent years, the misappropriation tort has reemerged 
with such vigor that in the 1980s the Supreme Court relied heavily on INS in its most recent 
ruling that information is property. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26-27 (1987) 
(construing federal statutes governing wire and mail fraud); see also San Francisco Arts & 
Athletics, 483 U.S. at 532 (relying in part on INS in finding a federal statutory property right in 
the word "Olympics" valid against First Amendment challenge). Today, the tort of 
misappropriation is asserted in a wide range of areas and also is used as a source of analogy, 
inspiration, and authority in sister doctrines such as the "right of publicity" and "dilution," in 
which its coneerns often are joined by other issues, such as privacy. On the general impact of 
INS, see Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intelleetual Property and the Legacy of 
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such as the "right of publicity"14 and "dilution,"15 state and federal 
judges (the latter applying an often-conjectural version of state law16), 
are expanding state law to give creators of intangibles both tort and 
property rights in the "fruits of their labors." In the process, tradi-
tional defenses to the creation of such rights based on notions of pub-
lic interest are sometimes improperly resisted17 and desirable 
prerequisites for suit ignored. 18 
At least until recently, decisions construing relevant federal statutes 
or constitutional clauses showed a similarly expansive willingness to 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411 (1983) (discussing INS's 
impact on the development of intellectual property rights). 
14 The right of publicity began as an outgrowth of the right of privacy, but many 
jurisdictions now treat it as property-fully assignable and descendible, as well as potentially 
perpetual. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Law of Defamation, Privacy, Publicity, and "Moral 
Rights" 537-85 (1988). As property, it owes much to misappropriation doctrine. See, e.g., 
Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging 
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 158, 173. 
is Dilution is a species of state trademark right that, in its purest form, frees the owner of a 
strongly distinctive trademark from any obligation to prove consumer confusion when a use of 
his mark would "dilute" its distinctiveness. See 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and 
Unfair Competition§ 24:13, at 212-15 (2d ed. 1984) (defining dilution). For an explication of 
the rationale behind dilution, see Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1927). 
16 See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (construing California 
law as granting singer a right against imitation of her voice in a commercial). 
11 For example, courts otherwise sensitive to First Amendment and other public policy 
considerations seem to lose that sensitivity when dilution is involved. One court went so far as 
to hold that a form of truthful comparative advertising could trigger liability under the 
dilution rationale. Sykes Lab. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 856-58 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding 
defendant's description of its product, which referred to plaintiff's trademark, capable of 
offending the dilution statute, impliedly without regard to whether the two products were 
indeed identical). Contrast this approach with the perspective of traditional trademark law, as 
in Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that a seller of inexpensive 
perfumes is entitled to use famous trademarks to describe accurately the fragrances the seller's 
products imitated, provided of course that the use did not create a reasonable likelihood of 
confusion as to the product's "source, identity, or sponsorship"). 
IS See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 90 (Ill. 1983) 
(holding that competition between the parties is not a prerequisite to a misappropriation suit). 
For a disagreement between federal courts on whether to simplify plaintiffs' tasks in 
intellectual property litigation, compare Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & 
Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (holding that defendant's sale of embroidered 
team emblems could constitute trademark infringement even without a showing that 
consumers were confused as to the source and origin of the physical goods sold), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 868 (1975) with International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 
912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (adhering to the traditional understanding that confusion about 
origin, sponsorship, or endorsement should be a prerequisite to a plaintiff's suit), cert. denied, 
452 U.S. 941 (1981). 
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grant rights against strangers who would use what others have 
made. 19 The Supreme Coures recent ruling that noncreative compila-
tions of facts should receive no copyright protection may check 
some of those developments. 20 The very decision that so restrained 
federal copyright protection for facts, however, unfortunately 
may have opened the door to state-granted private ownership 
rights in information.21 Litigants probably are gearing up already 
19 In copyright, for example, it long had been understood that the social costs of giving 
ownership in expression were tolerable because facts remained free for all to use. Then, many 
copyright courts began to grant relief that swept facts into the protectionist net. See National 
Business Lists v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 92 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding an 
infringement even though defendant's use of facts in plaintiff's compilation did not copy the 
expressive form of plaintiff's arrangement, in part because of the "injustice of permitting one 
to appropriate the fruit[s] of another's labor''); sec also Harper & Row, Publishers v. National 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (holding that the copying ofless than 400 words from presidential 
memoirs constitutes an infringement of federal copyright law); West Publishing Co. v. Mead 
Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding West entitled to a preliminary injunction 
to stop LEXIS from showing the internal page numbers of judicial opinions in West 
Publications), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). Justice William Brennan asserted in his 
Harper & Row dissent that "the Court's fair use analysis has fallen to the temptation to find 
copyright violation based on a minimal use of literary form in order to provide compensation 
for the appropriation of information from a work of history," something he attributed to a 
misplaced reliance on Locke and natural law. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
20 See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (holding that a 
telephone utility could not copyright the white pages of a telephone directory). 
The narrowing effect of this recent case-excluding information from legal protection-may 
be restricted to copyright law. In noncopyright settings, the Supreme Court twice has declared 
information to be property-once in the context of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), and once in the context of a federal statute 
whose scope was " 'limited ... to the protection of property rights.' " Carpenter v. United 
States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987)). 
Standing alone, neither case directly grants an information producer a common law right of 
action against strangers who use the information. Unfortunately, the cases may be used to 
buttress just such results. See Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus 
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intelleetual Property Law?, 38 Cath. U.L. Rev. 
365 (1989) (suggesting that Ruckelshaus and Carpenter may have an unfortunately expansive 
impact on intellectual property law). In addition, other recent expansions of copyright law 
remain unrebuked. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 
1970) (reversing judgment for defendant despite the fact that defendant's hnitative greeting 
card copied neither copyrighted text nor copyrighted artwork). 
21 The Supreme Court indicated in Feist that noncrcative compilations of fact lie outside the 
purview of Congress' copyright power. 111 S. Ct. at 1294. The opinion, therefore, can be read 
as hinting that state protection for facts !night not be preempted. 
The Court indicated that under the Constitution federal copyright can protect only original 
works of authorship and that "[f]acts are never original." Id. The Court suggested that facts 
by their nature have no human "origin.'' See id. at 1287-89 (discussing the originality 
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to pursue that avenue, although preemption remains a strong 
possibility. 22 
requirement); see also id. at 1288 ("Census-takers ..• do not 'create' the population figures 
that emerge from their efforts .... "). 
If one assumes arguendo that the Court will stand by its dictum that "facts" cannot 
"originate" with people, the Feist analysis might lead a proponent of state protection of facts to 
argue: (1) that the section of the Copyright Act dealing with preemption, 17 U.S.C. § 301 
(1988), is exhaustive on the preemption question; (2) that § 301 says that subject matters 
outside the scope of copyright are open to state protection; (3) that Feist declares that facts are 
outside the scope of copyright; and, therefore, (4) that states are free to give ownership rights 
or other rights in facts. 
The Supreme Court could have ruled the white pages unprotected by copyright law on 
nonconstitutional grounds. The traditional interpretation of the Copyright Act long has been 
that Congress made a policy decision not to give protection to facts themselves, and the statute 
seemed to say clearly that compilations of facts could be protected only insofar as their 
creative arrangement and selection were concerned. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (definition of 
"compilation"); id. § 102(b); Financial Information v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987). Such a statutory, nonconstitutional 
approach would have provided a seeure basis for preemption of state attempts to change the 
balance that Congress set between protection and nonprotection. Instead, the Court reached 
out to the Constitution, suggesting that perhaps Congress in its copyright law constitutionally 
cannot make choices about the protection of facts because facts are not "original." Its choice 
of reasoning, parroting Nimmer on Copyright that facts are not original, unnecessarily allows 
the opinion to be interpreted as giving implicit permission for state law activism. Feist, 111 S. 
Ct. at 1288-89 (citing 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 
§§ 2.03(e), 2.ll(A) (1990)). It seems to say that protecting facts is simply none of Congress' 
business under the Copyright Clause. 
The Court's observations about the inherent noncreativity of facts are unnecessary to the 
result. Even if the facts had been "created," the plaintiff telephone company had not created 
them. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97. Further, the majority's view of reality is flawed crucially: 
some facts are original even if some are not. After all, one's address does not cease to be a fact 
upon a showing that the name of one's street originated in the fancy of a housing developer. 
Facts are not "already there, suspended in the ether." Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 
Emory L.J. 965, 996-97 (1990) (asserting that facts "do not exist independently of the lenses 
through which they are viewed," but rather can be as original as conventional works of 
authorship); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment 
on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History After Roehling v. Universal City 
Studios, 29 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 647, 658 (1982) (arguing that the central fallacy of the 
"Platonic fact precept" is the belief that facts merely exist and thus may be uncovered, but not 
created). A false dichotomy between fact and expression has proved troublesome in other 
areas of copyright law as well. See Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul, 36 J. Copyright Soc'y 
U.S.A. 167 (1989); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 
(1990) (arguing that courts incorrectly reject defendants' arguments that they should be 
privileged to quote copyrighted expression when they use it as fact). 
22 Despite Feist, § 301 might be applied to preempt state protection. See Dennis S. Karjala, 
Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. (forthcoming 1992) (arguing that 
because some compilations still are protected by copyright, compilations that fail to attain 
copyright because of a lack of originality are to be governed solely by federal law). Further, 
even if§ 301 is read as not preempting state protection, see supra note 21, state attempts to 
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I suspect that this common law trend23 toward granting new intel-
lectual property rights has been fueled largely by two forces. On the 
one hand is an intuition of fairness-a norm often linked to natural 
rights-that one should not "reap where another has sown. "24 On the 
other hand is a set of empirical developments: the gradual decline in 
our nation's industrial/manufacturing sectors, the dramatic growth of 
high-tech information industries, and the perception that our nation's 
wealth is declining relative to that of other nations. As the economic 
hopes of a less confident, service-oriented economy have become 
give ownership in facts may be vulnerable on preemption grounds independent of§ 301. For 
example, the First Amendment exists as an independent constraint on state protection for 
facts, 2 Paul Goldstein, Copyright: Principles, Law, and Practice §§ 15.2.3, 15.3.3 (1989), 
though the Supreme Court so far has proved reluctant to apply the amendment to intellectual 
property rights. Id.§ 10.3, at 241-43, § 15.20.2.3. In addition, state protection for facts could 
raise the specter of inconsistent state rulings and interference with interstate commerce. See 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of 
Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, at 1901 n.141 (1990) (discussing what she terms 
"horizontal" preemption). Most importantly, general principles of "vertical" constitutional 
preemption-the inquiry into whether state law would interfere with congressional 
intentions-should remain available despite the existence of § 301. See, e.g., 2 Goldstein, 
supra, § 15.2.3, at 489 n.65, § 15.3.3, § 15.9.2; Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, 
supra note 12, at 1025. Under the latter standards of constitutional preemption, the Feist 
argument that "facts" are not "original" can be accepted without opening a door for state 
protection of facts. 
The Supreme Court, in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989), recently 
reaffirmed that when the existence of a particular balance between protected and public 
domains is an important presupposition of congressional action, the states are not free to upset 
that balance. Id. at 152. Bonito Boats struck down a state statute prohibiting the copying, via 
plug-molding, of boat hull designs. The Court noted: "implicit in the Patent [and Copyright] 
Clause" of the Constitution is the "understanding" "that free exploitation of ideas will be the 
rule"; the effectiveness of the patent regime "depend[s] almost entirely on a backdrop of free 
competition in the exploitation of unpatented designs and innovations." Id. at 151. 
Analogously, the unprotectability of facts is an essential assumption behind Congress' grant 
of a lengthy and easy-to-obtain tenn of copyright protection, see infra note 33 and 
accompanying text. Under such an analysis, state protection of facts that alters that 
background condition should be preempted pro tanto. Under Bonito Boats, then, facts should 
remain unprotected by state law regardless of whether they are "original" and in spite of state 
desires to implement reap/sow arguments. 
23 As courts have expanded intellectual property rights, legislatures also have granted 
broader rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (1988) (lengthening the duration of copyrights). 
This Article, however, concentrates on the distinct issues raised by the institutional capacities 
and self-conceptions of the judicial branch of government; legislative expansions of intellectual 
property rights are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
24 See infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan chastised his brethren for 
drawing on a natural rights tradition in a copyright case in which they indirectly prohibited 
the copying of information. Harper & Row, Publishers v. National Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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increasingly dependent on the nation's intangible assets, 25 legislatures 
and courts seem willing to extend intellectual property protections on 
the questionable, and surely often unconscious, assumption that pro-
tection means prosperity.26 
Although an initial jump toward creating private rights in 
intangibles therefore may be understandable, it is nevertheless impera-
tive that these case law developments be refined before the effect is 
quite the opposite of that intended. Our intangible assets are indeed 
valuable, but an overbroad grant of monopoly rights to prior creators 
may retard the development of new intellectual products27 and some-
times may interfere impermissibly with the autonomy of others and 
with efforts by individuals to achieve cultural self-determination. 
Indeed, some of the current developments threaten to chill more crea-
tivity than they induce, and they may impair our culture's ability to 
respond flexibly to future opportunities and dangers. 
After all, the potential free riders-the users, copyists, and adapt-
ers-are not mere parasites. Many are creators themselves. They 
may reach markets different than those reached by the original cre-
ators, or they may bring new perspective, reduced cost, special exper-
tise, deeper insights, or innovative technology to the exploitation and 
adaptation of established works. It is true that very often such puta-
tive defendants would be able to obtain licenses to utilize the valuable 
work and that, in those cases, giving the creator protection would not 
inhibit the flowering of derivative works and new uses. 28 But, at other 
2S "[T]he United States has been for some time the world's largest exporter of copyrighted 
works." Marshall A. Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law§ 12.5 (1989); see also id. at 351 
n.38 (stating that the value of exported movies exceeds that of the steel we import). 
26 Aside from making possible our adherence to international treaties-which is primarily a 
province of legislative rather than judicial action-increased proteetion for intellectual 
property plaintiffs here is not likely to contribute much to Ameriea's relative international 
position, because domestic and international protections largely are independent of each other. 
Copying by non-Americans is most prevalent on other nations' soil, and broadening domestic 
prohibitions on free riding likely will not persuade foreign governments to give American 
anthors more protection against copying in their countries. In general, when works created in 
the United States are copied in a foreign country, that country's copyright law, not the law of 
the United States, governs any legal action. See 2 Goldstein, supra note 22, §§ 16.2-16.3. 
21 Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 333-44 (1989) (arguing that an intellectual property right given to 
current creators will increase the future costs of creation); Rahl, supra note 7, at 72 (stating 
that "our economy would still be in the Dark Ages" if all imitation were forbidden). 
28 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1605-13 (1982) 
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times compllcations, such as transaction costs, strategic maneuvering, 
and income effects-or the perceived inappropriateness of using a 
market to mediate certain qualitative judgments-will leave us less 
than satisfied that the grant of a property right to an initial creator 
will lead to optimal economic development or to optimal opportuni-
ties for cultural and individual expression. 29 
Indeed, federal intellectual property statutes and the well-estab-
lished intellectual property precedents exhibit a recognition that the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights may "stifle the very crea-
tivity which that law is designed to foster"30 and that the law must 
grant something less than a right to all the benefits one's work gener-
ates. 31 Consequently, traditional intellectual property law has drawn 
dividing lines to resolve the tensions that inevitably arise between the 
desire to give creators incentives and the desire to encourage dissemi-
nation and use of creations. 32 Similarly, among the three major fed-
eral statutes in the area-copyright, patent, and trademark-the 
duration of rights is proportional to the social costs of the relevant 
package of entitlements: the greater the costs, the shorter the duration 
[hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use] (describing the mechanism in the copyright context whereby 
the value of resources (for our purposes, the resources that go into producing intangibles and 
the intangibles themselves) is maximized via consensual market transfers). 
29 Id. at 1613-46 (advocating employment of a fair use privilege to alleviate market 
failures); Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12, at 1042-43 (outlining the 
economics of suppression). In addition, of course, intellectual property rights sometimes 
afford their possessors a degree of monopoly power, which typically imposes deadweight losses 
in the form of reduced output. See William W. Fisher, m, Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1702 (1988) (defining "deadweight loss" as the sum of (1) 
"the consumer surplus that would have been reaped" by consumers who value the product at 
more than its marginal cost of production but not highly enough to be willing to pay the 
monopoly price and (2) "the producer surplus that would have been reaped by the copyright 
owner had he sold the work to them"). 
3D Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (dicta). 
31 Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir.) (granting fair use to a Mad 
Magazine parody of plaintiff's song despite defendant's free ride), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 
(1964). 
32 Thus, in copyright, ownership of a book's copyright gives the owner no exclusive rights in 
the ideas or facts the book might convey. The Supreme Court, having restated this principle in 
Harper & Row, Publishers v. National Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985), gave it bite in Feist 
Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) 
(copyright protection does not extend to ideas or concepts). Further, statutory exemptions 
and doctrines such as fair use that limit creators' rights and compulsory licenses force certain 
creators to let others use their works at a price set by a government entity. See 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 107-114 (1988). 
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of protection. 33 The new developments disregard many of the old les-
sons about the importance of drawing lines and setting limits. 
Instead, the recent tendencies seem based on the assumption that any 
use of an intangible is improper unless preceded by consent and com-
pensation to the intangible's creator. 
Admittedly, this new growth may not be all bad. Just as tort law 
can be termed a jurisprudence of harms, the misappropriation and 
related cases may constitute the first building blocks of an elaborate 
modem jurisprudence of benefits. 34 In many ways, these cases even 
33 Roughly speaking, one finds that the less important the subject matter and the less 
extensive the creator's rights of control, the lower the social cost of reduced access and the 
longer the protection tends to last. 
Traditional trademark law imposes little social cost. It gives mark-holders rights only 
against the use of arbitrary symbols, configurations, and brief combinations of words. Those 
rights are assertable only in limited product-identifying contexts. Even in such contexts, the 
"genericism" doctrine precludes protection by trademark of words used in their ordinary 
English-language meanings. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e)(l), 1064(3) (1988). Trademark law does 
not restrain use of configurations that enhance the functionality of an object. In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Further, an action in trademark 
infringement was traditionally available only where the defendant's use of the mark threatened 
to cause consumer confusion. International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 
F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981). Giving someone this limited 
control over this limited subject matter has little social cost. Not surprisingly, trademarks that 
retain their meaning for the public need never expire. 
At the other extreme, utility patents give inventors a highly valuable monopoly, good 
against independent replication as well as against copying, and the patentee's rights are 
particularly costly to society in the short term because they limit competition in the making of 
utilitarian objects. But, in the absence of special legislation, patents last at most for seventeen 
years. See 1 Peter D. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals § 1.06 (rev. 2d ed. 1991). 
At what one might term the mid-range, copyrights give creators rights only over expression, 
not over facts and ideas. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Courts even will deny authors proteetion 
for their expression when necessary to preserve free access to functional designs. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (1988) (definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" excludes mechanical or 
utilitarian aspects). Courts also will deny protection to expression with which an idea is 
intertwined inextricably. See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 
1967) (denying copyright for a series of short instructions, where "at best only a limited 
number" of possible forms exist, lest the use of the underlying idea be constrained). Further, 
copyrights give creators rights only against use of their own work, as opposed to rights over 
independent replication. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Thus, the subject matter of copyright is 
more limited than that of patent, and copyright law gives rights more limited than patent law 
does. As one might expect, therefore, a copyright's duration is much longer than a patent's. 
34 Thus, for example, Professor Raskind has suggested that the misappropriation doctrine 
provided the "conceptual basis" of the privilege for reverse engineering embodied in § 906 of 
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988). Leo J. 
Raskind, Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 385, 386-
87, 404-07 (1985). Note, however, that Raskind also argues that the misappropriation 
doctrine is too imprecise to provide much assistance in interpreting that section. Id. at 407-11. 
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follow the overall patterns of tort law.35 Just as tort law encourages 
reasonable care by placing some of the costs of carelessness on those 
who have the most control over the conduct of dangerous enterprises, 
the law of intellectual products encourages productivity by placing 
some of the rewards that productive activity generates into the pock-
ets of those who have control over its level and direction. This is, of 
course, the familiar notion of internalization. Persons who create val-
uable benefits by writing books, collecting information, composing 
music, or designing boat hulls may produce more of such valuable 
things if they expect to be paid for at least some of the benefits their 
efforts yield. 36 One way to ensure such payment is to give producers a 
right to sue37 when strangers indulge in specified modes of benefit-
35 By "tort law" here I mean to refer to the usual package taught in first-year torts 
courses-a set of problems focusing on harms done, usually physical in nature. As a matter of 
nomenclature, misappropriation itself can be defined as a tort, as ean copyright infringement, 
for a tort typically is defined as a cause of action for violation of any noncontractual right. 
(That this common definition ignores the existence of restitution-based causes of action I put 
aside as a matter of historical accident. Cf. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of 
Restitution, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 1277, 1277 (1989).) Misappropriation and copyright infringement 
should be distinguished from ordinary torts, however, because their essential ratiouales have 
more to do with internalizing the benefits the plaintiff has generated than with internalizing the 
harms the defendant has generated. See Gordon, Toward a Jurisprndence of Benefits, supra 
note 12, at 1048-49; Douald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 57 (1984). Putting the necessarily slippery distinction in corrective justice terms, 
ordinary torts primarily have to do with "unjust loss," whereas misappropriation and its 
cousins have more to do with "unjust gains." 
36 Obviously, desirable behavior also can occur without monetary internalization. Some 
potential tortfeasors will be careful out of beneficence or squeamishness; some potential 
authors will write out of a love of words or a desire for attention. 
37 Special legal protection is not always necessary to achieve monetary internalization. 
Some potential harm-causers refrain from eareless behavior for monetary reasons unrelated to 
a fear of tort liability, such as a desire to maintain a good reputation among potential 
customers. Similarly, some potential benefit-creators invest in productive behavior for 
monetary reasons unrelated to an ability to sue beneficiaries of their efforts. Loyalty to an 
author might prevent the making or purchasing of unauthorized copies. Technological fences, 
such as a computer program's copy-protect device, can be installed to ensure that persons who 
want to make use of a beneficial product will pay for that privilege, regardless of whether there 
is a credible threat of suit. 
Where intangioles are concerned, it often is argued that the cost of initial production can be 
so high relative to the low cost of copying that these devices yield insufficient internalization. 
In other words, the lure of producing and selling low-cost copies is so great that there is strong 
incentive, as it were, for disloyalty and the evasion of fences. Thus, the argument goes, legal 
rights over copying must be given to eusure adequate internalization of benefits. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, 
and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1343, 1344-54, 1435-46 (1989) [hereinafter 
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reaping-most notably, the mode known as copying-without 
permission. 
But the jurisprudence of benefits has not yet received the fine tun-
ing that courts and commentators have lavished on tort law.38 In 
torts, even strict liability is not absolute, and a restitution-for-benefits 
rule should not be either. Just as some harms should be allowed to lie 
where they fall without the courts' ordering recompense, 39 some bene-
fits should be allowed to flow without court-ordered recapture or pay-
ment. At least two parties participate in the creation of either harms 
or benefits,40 and a broad pro-plaintiff rule provides incentives ouly to 
one side. In conventional tort law, strict liability is thought inappro-
priate in areas where plaintiffs as well as defendants should be 
encouraged to take care.41 Conversely, in intellectual property law, 
broad prohibitions on copying may be inappropriate where the efforts 
of creative defendants in adapting others' work should be 
encouraged. 42 A broad pro-plaintiff rule also must be modified to take 
Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits] (analyzing the debate over whether copyright is necessary for 
internalization). 
38 Some excellent functional investigations of restitution already have been done. See, e.g., 
Dawson, supra note 13; Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985). 
These studies have not focused, however, on the misappropriation context. 
39 For example, in negligence law "reasonably'' caused harms are not compensable, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 (1965), the doctrine of proximate cause limits 
compensability even for negligently caused harms, id. §§ 430-31, and some types of damages 
(such as emotional harm) are often not compensable even when proximately caused by the 
defendant's negligent acts. Id. § 463A. 
40 I use the terms "harms" and "benefits" here to be consistent with the usages in tort and 
restitution cases, respectively. These terms are malleable, however, for both depend upon a 
prior choice of baseline, a level of welfare that either has been impaired (harmed) or improved 
(benefited). Cf., e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others 
31-36 (1984) (describing the harm principle as a "mere convenient abbreviation for a 
complicated statement that includes, among other things, moral judgments and value 
weightings of a variety of kinds"). See Wendy Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, 
Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming 1992). 
41 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496A cmt. d (1965); id. § 523 (1977) 
(discussing the availability of the assumption of risk defense in a strict liability action). Thus, 
negligence law leaves some costs "external" to potential defendants' decisionmaking, either by 
the requirement that plaintiffs bear the costs of nonnegligently caused aceidents, or by the 
appJication of a contributory or comparative negligence rule. One justification for the failure 
to force defendants to internalize these costs is the need to encourage plaintiffs to take care by 
leaving possible accident costs "internal" to their decisionmaking. See, e.g., A. Mitchell 
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 40-44 (1983) (discussing pedestrian's care). 
42 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. 
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account of the noneconomic, or "other justice,"43 effects that broad 
liability and property rules have on potential defendants and on soci-
ety at large. 
Indeed, conventional tort law privileges some valuable activities, 
such as self-defense44 and media discussion of public figures,45 which 
have "other justice" as well as allocative implications. In intellectual 
property, there must be similar privileges to provide relatively safe 
harbors for cultural activities such as criticism and satin~-to name 
only two among many valuable activities-and to shelter important 
commercial activities such as comparative advertising.46 Traditional 
intellectual property law recognizes this need by providing, for exam-
ple, privileges,47 compulsory licensing,48 and precise specification of 
boundaries.49 Yet, in many of the recent cases, the courts' myopic 
focus on the plaintiff's presumed rights has obscured the need to safe-
guard this dimension of social interest. 50 
43 By "other justice" I refer to all of the considerations not easily captured by monetary 
value. Cf. Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents 24-33 (1970) (discussing "justice" as a 
goal of accident law distinct from "reduction of accident costs," and essentially as a ''veto or 
constraint" on cost-reduction methods). 
44 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 63-68 (1965). 
45 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments protect false statements made about the official conduct of a 
public official, such that damages may be awarded only if "actual malice" is shown). 
46 In the copyright arena, at least one court has been willing to allow copying for purposes 
of comparative advertising, though the basis for the decision remains controversial. Triangle 
Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980). 
47 In copyright. the most notable example is the fair use doctrine, which provides some 
privilege of copying to critics and satirists. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). In federal trademark 
law, a kind of fair use privileges competitors to make truthful reference to each other's 
trademarks. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 567-69 (9th Cir. 1968), aff'd, 528 
F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976) (refusing to enjoin perfume manufacturer from truthful, 
nonmisleading use of competitor's trademark to identify the product it had copied). 
48 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ lll(c), 115 (1988)(mandating compulsory licensing for secondary 
transmissions by cable systems and for making and distributing phonorecords, respectively). 
49 One important boundary is duration. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
Another aspect of the lines and limits drawn by traditional intellectual property law is the 
law's precise fonnnlation of the plaintiff's initial case: the insistence upon an identifiable entity 
to be protected, see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) (requiring fixation in tangible form as a 
prerequisite to protection), and identifiable infringing acts, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) 
(enumerating those acts within the copyright owner's exclusive rights). See Gordon, Inquiry 
into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1378-84 (discussing both "thingness as specificity" and the 
importance of boundaries). 
so One example of the contrast between the traditional and modem approaches is the 
holding that a satire of the Pillsbury Dough Boy was fair use from a copyright perspective but 
an infringement of the plaintiff's rights under an antidilution statute. Pillsbury Co. v. Milky 
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Because no refined version of the appropriative claim's central 
assertion-no explication of the conditions under which beneficial 
effort should generate a noncontractual right to reward-has yet been 
set forth, many commentators are suspicious of the new intellectual 
property developments. 51 Some, like myself, fear that the recent 
developments evidence insufficient attention to the need for sharp 
lines and boundaries, given that the surface attractiveness of the reap/ 
sow claim, coupled with the vagueness of its perceived natural law 
roots, can lead to an expansiveness that will choke our cultural and 
scientific vitality in a morass of suits and fears of suits. 52 This Article 
attempts to determine whether the reap/sow claim has any internal 
boundaries that, if implemented, might help to alleviate such fears. 53 
Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981). Similarly, when an 
antidilution claim, see supra note 15, was brought by a fingernail-conditioner company that 
was angered by a competitor's comparative advertising, the court paid lip service to the fair use 
doctrine of traditional trademark law, which protects such activity so long as it is 
nondeceptive, but then stated that a cause of action against even truthful comparative 
advertising might be cognizable under the new antidilution approach. Sykes Lab. v. Kalvin, 
610 F. Supp. 849, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
Many new cases also ignore the need for boundaries. Thus, when Dow Jones objected to the 
Chicago Board of Trade's reference to the Dow Jones Industrial Average in a futures-trading 
contract, Dow Jones found that its copyright infringement suit gained it little. Dow Jones & 
Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). After finding that the 
list of stocks making up the average might sustain a copyright, the copyright court considered 
only those activities that constituted actionable copying in violation of the Copyright Act's 
enumeration of exclusive rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Dow Jones, 546 F. Supp. 113. 
Reasoning that the Board of Trade's copying had minimal economic importance and thus was 
most likely protected by a fair use defense, the court refused to grant an injunction. Id. In a 
parallel state suit, however, Dow Jones obtained an injunction against the Board of Trade's 
planned activity on the vague ground of misappropriation. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow 
Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). 
As for duration, the antidilution doctrine and modern trademark cases threaten to give 
perpetual protection for symbols even when their use causes no confusion as to source or 
origin. See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 
1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
s1 See, e.g., Lange, supra note 10; Samuelson, supra note 20. 
s2 See supra notes 27-50 and accompanying text. 
53 Clearly, external boundaries exist. Most notably, the First Amendment should trump 
any reap/sow claim that is inconsistent with free-speech principles, just as the First 
Amendment trumps any defamation claim that threatens such principles. This is, of course, 
the lesson of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its progeny. Also, 
where Congress has made a discrete policy choice that the enforcement of a reap/sow claim 
would frustrate, preemption requires that the courts' restitutionary impulses give way to 
Congress' more particular policies. See supra notes 12, 21 & 22. Similarly, adherence to 
judicially forged doctrines that focus on the particular facts of certain contexts may result in 
the defeat ofa claim based on more general reap/sow arguments. See, e.g., Sheets v. Yamaha 
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This Article begins by focusing on an important and accessible 
question: whether the sense of fairness that seems a primary norma-
tive motivator of these courts can, when taken seriously, justify the 
courts' apparent lack of concern with preserving what is good about 
reaping where one has not sown. 
In order to analyze a normative principle, it is first necessary to 
define it. Thus, Part I of the Article offers three possible understand-
ings of the reap/sow principle. The first two, which I call "status quo 
corrective justice" and "the property /value" notion, may arise from a 
judicial desire to protect status quo holdings. Although not fully 
without boundaries, these versions of reap/sow fail to provide enough 
sensitivity to the complexities underlying a determination of the 
appropriate circumstances in which a reap/sow claim might be 
asserted. 
The third interpretation, which I call the "restitutionary impulse," 
holds more hope for limitation. This interpretation views the reap/ 
sow claim through the lens of a modified vision of corrective justice. 
It draws on the judge-made area of law known as "unjust enrich-
ment" or "restitution," an area often seen as expressing or even 
embodying corrective justice. 54 Because that tradition, by and large, 
has been quite sparing in granting relief to plaintiffs who generate 
benefits and then seek payment from beneficiaries who did not agree 
in advance to pay, it offers the promise of suggesting-heuristically, if 
not doctrinally-helpful insights for parsing the internal structure of 
a legal claim based on reap/sow considerations. 
Pursuing this avenue, Part II draws on unjust enrichment law and 
other sources to identify considerations that should limit the reap/ 
Motors Corp., U.S.A., 849 F.2d 179, 184 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding an inventor who neglected 
to maintain the secrecy required to prevail on a claim based on state trade secret law not 
entitled to invoke unjust enrichment principles as an alternate ground for recovery because 
"[a]n action for unjust enrichment must not be allowed to defeat the purpose of a rule of law 
directed to the matter at issue"); see also Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable 
Injury Rule, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 687, 752 (1990) (noting it is appropriate to deny litigants use of 
courts' "general equity powers" where granting such relief would "evade more particular rules 
of law"). 
But this Article pays less attention to such external trumps and countervailing 
considerations and asks instead whether restitution case law provides any hints as to when it 
might be inappropriate to rely on a restitutionary claim as a basis, however inconclusive, for 
recovery. 
54 See Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part II, 1 J.L. & 
Phil. 5, 12-13 (1983). 
1992] Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 165 
sow impulse. Though the judicial decisions interpreting restitution 
have no necessary claim to perfection, ss past judicial experiments help 
to illuminate the difficulties inherent in applying this seemingly moral 
imperative in a real-world context of actual legal process. 
Part III, the crux of the Article, then draws on the unjust-enrich-
ment analysis to propose boundaries for the expansive reap/sow 
impulse. Part III proposes a set of minimum constraints that should 
condition any judge-made cause of action premised upon the sup-
posed unjust enrichment involved in "reaping" another's intangible. 
These constraints, which together constitute a slimmed-down misap-
propriation tort that I call "malcompetitive copying," apply both cor-
rective justice and economic insights drawn from the restitution 
pattern. 
Part IV applies these constraints to two cases involving rights in 
information, s6 an area newly vulnerable to state law activism. s7 
This analysis has several potential applications. First, one might 
view the set of minimum constraints as providing much-needed strnc-
ture for the reap/sow element of the ''hazily defined tort"ss of misap-
propriation. s9 Second, the analysis suggests that even when it is 
justifiable to grant information producers or other creators of 
intangibles a legal right of some kind as a reward for the benefits they 
generate, significant difficulties arise from using the "property" 
nomenclature to describe the resulting entitlements. I argue that the 
relevant criteria justify, at most, contingent and contextual rights and 
that far more demanding criteria must be satisfied before the act of 
creating a beneficial intangible should give rise to the strong prima 
ss See Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in The Politics of 
Law: A Progressive Critique 13, 15 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). 
S6 The cases to which I apply the constraints are International News Serv. v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), described briefly supra note 13, and West Publishing Co. v. Mead 
Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming issuance of preliminary injunction against 
LEXIS' use of page cites to West reporters), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). 
s1 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
ss Abrams, supra note 3, at 509, 543. 
S9 The Article assesses what must be shown before a particular kind of ground can be 
offered as justification for a right to sue for payment when others use information one has 
gathered. It does not purport to be exhanstive on all questions related to ownership of 
information. 
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facie rights typically associated with "property"60 in the common law 
system. 61 
The Article concludes by suggesting that the proposed constraints 
and the rejection of a "property" approach provide a potentially valu-
able first step toward articulation of the appropriation boundaries but 
do not provide fully specified limits. The Article thus submits that 
even when tied to its unjust enrichment roots, the reap/sow notion 
remains unduly expansive and, therefore, cannot stand alone as a 
basis for rights in intellectual products. 
I. MODELS OF REAP/Sow 
A. Demystifying the Natural Law Claim 
I begin my inquiry with the observation, shared by many commen-
tators, that at the center of the pro-property wave of cases lies the 
conviction that it is unjust "to appropriate the fruits of another's 
labor"62 and its corollary, that one should not reap where another has 
60 Note that although much of the theoretical literature employs the term "property right in 
information" to embrace any legal right to sue, I use the term "property" here to embrace the 
particular set of rights associated in the common law with ownership, particularly of real 
property. See, e.g., Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1354-77 (defining 
property in the tangible and intangible contexts); A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961), reprinted in Property: Cases, Concepts, Critiques 
78 (Lawrence C. Becker & Kenneth Kipnis eds., 1984). 
61 In our system, a full property right usually gives an owner the right to obtain monetary 
relief, as well as the right to obtain injunctions. Further, these rights are usually assertable 
against any intentional boundary crossing, regardless of whether the owner has suffered any 
loss from the unconsented intrusion or whether the intruder had every reasonable ground for 
believing his conduct was not wrongful. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 cmt. b (1965) 
(stating that it is "immaterial whether or not [the trespasser] honestly and reasonably believes" 
he is rightfully on the land); id. § 164 (stating that reasonable mistake is not a defense to 
trespass on land possessed by another unless the mistake was induced by the possessor). 
Perhaps most importantly, ouly very narrow privileges permit the intentional entry or use of 
others' property, thus typically cutting off inquiry into the beneficial effeets of such acts by 
defendants. See William C. Powers, Jr., A Methodological Perspective on the Duty to Act, 57 
Tex. L. Rev. 523, 526-28 (1979) (reviewing Marshall S. Shapo, The Duty to Act (1977)). 
62 National Business Lists v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 89, 92 (N.D. ill. 1982); 
see also Fisher, supra note 29, at 1688-89 ("authors and inventors deserve a reward for their 
labor and should be given it regardless of whether they would continue their work in the 
absence of such compensation"); cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-03 
(1984) (noting that the "perception of trade secrets as property" is consistent with labor 
theories of property). 
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sown. 63 One might call this either a "restitutionary" or an "appropri-
ative" notion. "Restitutionary" is the more general term: it reflects a 
belief that some unspecified rewards are due to those whose labor pro-
duces benefits and that when third parties intercept these rewards, the 
law should intervene to effect their restoration. To conceptualize the 
underlying impulse as "appropriative" is to reflect a belief that the 
reward due should take the specific form of a grant of property rights. 
Unlike most observers, I do not trace the restitutionary claim pri-
marily to natural law or Lockean labor theory.64 Instead, I seek to 
demystify the "natural rights" claim by tracing the restitutionary 
notion to two possibilities more rooted in observed practice: first, a 
particular conception of the judicial role and of the proper relation of 
common law to the community; and second, a particular conception 
of unjust enrichment. 
One might ask why there is a need to trace the restitutionary princi-
ple back to any other source, as there is an obvious moral attractive-
ness to the idea that it is unjust for an entity to reap where it has not 
sown.65 The simplest answer is that when taken literally, as a stand-
alone prohibition on free riding, the restitutionary claim is drastically 
overbroad. A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited 
within it. Every person's education involves a form of free riding on 
his predecessors' efforts, as does every form of scholarship and scien-
tific progress. Further, a bedrock proposition of the common law is 
that persons ordinarily should not be required to pay for the benefit of 
others' labor unless they have agreed in advance to do so, by con-
63 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918). A related 
notion-that the creation of value is a necessary and sufficient basis for granting a legal right 
against strangers who would seek to appropriate it-sometimes appears. See, e.g., Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990) (suggesting that the new growth in trademark law is not required by 
considerations of economic incentive and presenting a framework for protecting expressive 
interests against the protectionist tide); Samuelson, supra note 20; infra notes 106-14 and 
accompanying text. 
64 In my view, "Lockean theory" is largely the label courts use for their conviction that it is 
unfair for one person to take the fruits of another's labor. I suggest elsewhere that Locke's 
own approach, properly understood, leads to far fewer intellectual property rights than has 
been imagined. See Wendy J. Gordon, Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property (1990) (unpublished draft manuscript on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association) [hereinafter Gordon, Equality]. 
65 See INS, 248 U.S. at 239-40. 
168 Virginia Law Review [Vol 78:149 
tract. 66 Although exceptions to this proposition exist, it has yet to be 
repudiated in the wholesale way that the adoption of an unHmited 
reap/sow principle would require. 
An obligation to pay for benefits received does not apply to all uses 
of others' efforts or property. It could not. 67 If even intentional inter-
dependence were to trigger liability automatically, it is little exaggera-
tion to suggest that we would all spend our days in court. 68 The great 
fear of the common law judges-explosive liability-would be real-
ized, and with it could come societal paralysis. 
In addition, most notions of community would require drastic revi-
sion. Culture is interdependence, and requiring each act of deliberate 
dependency to render an accounting would destroy the synergy on 
which cultural life rests. Even if the accounting were done pain-
lessly-by a magic computer that somehow could costlessly deter-
mine who contributed what and could prepare a continuously up-to-
date, self-executing list of debits and credits-part of our self-concept 
as a people depends upon our having a common heritage. Parceling 
out that heritage to ouly those willing and able to pay destroys part of 
its value.69 
66 Note that this formulation implicitly refers to benefits not already eategorized as 
"property," for one result of categorizing some benefit (e.g., the wheat I grow) as "property" 
under common law is to impose on nonowners legal obligations independent of contract: for 
every "right to exclude" held by an owner, there are "duties to refrain from intruding" 
imposed on nonowners. See Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1354-65, 1414-
25. 
67 As John Dawson has said: 
Uncompensated gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being and survival depend 
on them .... For most of the elements that make life worth preserving no one is ever 
expected to pay, in part of course for the practical reason that it would be impossible to 
discover whom to pay or how much. 
Dawson, supra note 13, at 1412. 
68 Thus, Judge Walter Stapleton noted, "We live in an age of economic and social 
interdependence. . . . General Motors' cars, for example, enjoy significant popularity and seat 
cover manufacturers profit from that popularity by making covers to fit General Motors' seats. 
The same relationship exists between hot dog producers and the bakers of hot dog rolls." 
National Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) 
(holding, inter alia, that the National Football League had no legal right to prevent the 
Delaware state lottery from profiting from the popularity of NFL football by making reference 
to the teams' games). 
69 Cf. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 150 (1982) (arguing that 
community may constitute "a mode of self-understanding partly constitutive of the agent's 
identity"). 
1992] Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 169 
We do not earn most of what we have, either in terms of our quali-
ties, such as intelligence, or in terms of the physical world and social 
structure that allow those qualities to be used to advantage. Unless 
someone comes along who can demonstrate a better claim than our 
own to what we have but did not earn, we think it legitimate to keep 
what we have. Thus, our intuitions suggest that although earning 
may generate a special claim, not earning does not in itself require 
divestiture. Free riding, standing alone, assumedly is not wrongful. 
Finally, few would consider "just" a world in which people 
received only that for which they could pay.70 Earning is ouly one 
way of deserving; those who are unable to contribute-as may be, for 
example, persons who suffer from a severe mental handicap--never-
theless deserve both respect and some share of social resources. 71 
Thus, a blanket prohibition on free riding would contravene some of 
our most basic moral convictions. A clear need for limiting principles 
exists if the appropriative claim is to be recognized. The misappropri-
ation case law has yet to provide any. 
The appropriative principle is subject to a number of interpreta-
tions. One possibility might be that the principle expresses a duty to 
refrain from using what one has not earned. Under this interpreta-
tion, any unearned gain is suspect. 72 But such an interpretation surely 
goes too far. 
A second interpretation might suggest that one has ownership in 
anything to which one's labor attaches. 73 That, too, seems a remarka-
bly unattractive principle. People are born at different times, with 
different opportunities. For one person to be able to trump the inter-
ests of one who follows simply because she attached her labor first 
10 See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Justice as Reciprocity Versus Subject-Centered Justice, 19 
Phil. & Pub. Aff. 227, 228 (1990) (exploring the idea "that an individual has a right to a share 
of social resources (or moral rights of any kind) only if that individual contributes or at least 
can contribute to the cooperative surplus"). 
11 See id. at 244-45. 
72 See John P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment 25 (1951) (discussing "Mansfield's core idea 
that an unexplained gain received in the form of money must be restored if justice is to be 
served"). 
73 Lysander Spooner urged such a labor-based absolute property right in the area of 
intellectual property in 1855. Lysander Spooner, The Law of Intellectual Property, in 3 The 
Collected Works of Lysander Spooner (Charles Shively ed., 1971). 
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seems unfair. The morally arbitrary fact of temporal priority would 
gain too much power.74 
Moreover, labor in the abstract yields no necessary claim to 
reward. Labor can be destructive as well as constructive. One who 
works out of spite to deface an element of nature, for example, seems 
to have no legitimate ground for complaint when clean-up crews undo 
her work.75 Further, rewards take many forms, and labor's most 
proper reward may be payment or prizes rather than property. 76 
Although labor may be part of a legitimate principle upon which to 
base reward claims, it can stand neither alone nor unlimited.77 
The two interpretations of the appropriative principle that I have 
raised and rejected appear to rest on a principle of duty that forces us 
to disgorge anything we have not earned or on a principle of right that 
gives us an entitlement to those things that our labor touches first. 
Though each standing alone has obvious flaws, each captures an ele-
ment of what is needed to make the reap/sow principle attractive. 
First, as to plaintiff's interest: the intellectual property plaintiff's con-
nection to the matter at issue-be it through earning, labor, or causa-
tion-should be sufficiently strong as to make the plaintiff the 
appropriate person to whom reward is owed. Second, the connection 
of the defendant to the matter at issue should be less strong than the 
plaintiff's and of a kind that makes judges believe it appropriate to 
impose on the defendant a duty not to use, or a duty to pay for, a 
benefit traced to the plaintiff. A discussion of three potential 
responses to the reap/sow axiom follows. 
74 Locke's own theory accommodates this concern for those who come later; it contains a 
proviso that labor yields property only if "enough, and as good" is left for others. John Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government 134 (Thomas I. Cook ed., 1947) (6th ed. 1764). For a fuller 
development of this theme, see Gordon, Equality, supra note 64; Wendy Gordon, Reality as 
Artifact: Implications for the Right to Copy, 55 Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 1992) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Reality as Artifact]. 
1s See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 175 (1974). 
76 See generally Lawrence C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations 32-56 
(1977) (discussing a principle of moral desert that complements and supplements Locke's 
theory of labor). 
11 Even if one could develop a fully adequate notion of moral desert as it relates to labor-a 
notoriously difficult undertaking, see, e.g., id. at 32-56; see also Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory 
of Property 254-91 (1990) (arguing that a qualified partial justification for property rights can 
be found in a labor-desert principle)--such desert can provide only part of a satisfactory 
justification for property. Id. at 266-85. 
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B. The First Model: Status Quo Corrective Justice 
One paradigm that might explain the courts' actions when they 
implement a reap/sow claim begins with a notion sometimes associ-
ated with the phrase "corrective justice." As described by Aristotle,78 
"corrective" or "rectificatory" justice is a conceptual category, a way 
of describing the mode of justice appropriate to transactions between 
two persons.79 It is distinguished from "distributive justice," which 
governs the distribution of benefits and burdens among society as a 
whole. 80 Corrective justice disregards the parties' overall moral worth 
or social contribution-whatever the parties' potential claims to 
greater or lesser shares of the societal wealth might be is a matter for 
distributive justice. As between themselves, doer and sufferer are 
equals.81 When a wrong by one of them disturbs the balance of equal-
ity between them, the imbalance must be corrected. 82 Reetification of 
both gains and losses is dictated by justice when "necessary to protect 
a distribution of holdings or entitlements from distortions."83 
A critical problem with judicial application of the Aristotelian con-
ception is that it does not define wrongfulness explicitly but seems to 
78 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 84-86 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 1975). 
79 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Aristotle's Forms of Justice, 2 Ratio Juris 211 (1989). In my 
analysis of Aristotle in this context, I largely adopt Weinrib's formulation. 
80 Aristotle, supra note 78, at 82. 
81 See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 407 (1987) 
[hereinafter Weinrib, Causation]. Weinrib extends the relevance of "doer and sufferer" also to 
unjust enrichment. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of 
Law, 97 Yale L.J. 949, 979 (1988) [hereinafter Weinrib, Legal Formalism] ("the intelligibility 
of their relationship [between a plaintiff who has made a mistaken payment and a defendant 
asked to repay it] is conceptually dependent on the significance of doing and suffering"). 
82 Aristotle gives the example of a wrong in which one person has taken something from the 
other. Leaving the gain in the wrongdoer's hands causes an imbalance twice as large as the 
taking itself, whereas requiring its return restores both parties to the prior situation of balance. 
Aristotle, supra note 78, at 84-88. 
83 Coleman, supra note 54, at 6. Jules Coleman writes: 
[C]orrective or rectificatory justice is concerned with wrongful gains and losses. 
Rectification is, on this view, a matter of justice when it is necessary to protect a 
distribution of holdings (or entitlements) from distortions which arise from unjust 
enrichments or wrongful losses. The principle of corrective justice requires the 
annulment of both wrongful gains and losses. 
Id. (emphasis added). Note that Coleman talks of unjust and wrongful changes in holdings, 
which is not simply causation-based. 
Ernest Weinrib's position also can be understood as applying to both gains and losses. 
Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 81, at 979-80 (interpreting restitution as undoing a form 
of harm). 
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presume a prior specification of wrongfulness. 84 Clearly, "[n]ot every 
loss B suffers at A's hands is a wrongful one; not every gain A secures 
at B's expense is an unjust one."85 How can a court decide what gains 
are "wrongful" or "unjust" without the guidance of established 
rights? 
One interpretation of corrective justice attempts to solve this prob-
lem by assuming that any unjustified change in the status quo-any 
unmerited loss or unearned gain-constitutes a wrong that must be 
rectified. This interpretation could lead merely to an allocation of 
burden of proof such that the recipient must justify his gain, but often 
it is coupled with a substantively narrow view of justification-that a 
change is justified only if the person affected has, roughly speaking, 
agreed to it or caused it. 
This principle is associated with "causal maximalism"-the notion 
that causing an effect is a necessary and sufficient basis for the law to 
attach that effect to the generator.86 Under such a view, "causing 
benefits" would give one the right to capture and to keep those bene-
fits. 87 The law should, under this view, seek to join effects with their 
causers by granting rights and imposing correlative liability. 88 If this 
84 See Aristotle, supra note 78, at 90-94; Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective 
Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 187 (1981); Weinrib, supra note 79. 
Similarly, Jules Coleman seems to see corrective justice as dependent upon a prior specification 
of wrongfulness, or at least a prior specification of transactional norms. Sec Jules Coleman, 
Intellectnal Property and Corrective Justice, 78 Va. L. Rev. 283 (1992). Some commentators, 
however, suggest that substantive notions of wrongfulness can be gleaned from Aristotle's 
writings as a whole, and that these express themselves in Aristotle's discussion of corrective 
justice as well. See Richard W. Wright, Reclaiming Corrective Justice, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 1992). 
ss Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. Legal Stud. 421, 431 (1982). 
86 See H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honore, Causation in the Law, at lxxiv (2d ed. 1985) 
(discussing a more limited version of causal maximalism in the context of the tort law 
argument that causing harm is a "necessary and sufficient condition of tort liability"). 
s1 Hart and Honore apply "causal maximalism" only to harms, rather than to all effects, for 
their focus is on tort law. "That we are responsible for the harm we cause is a principle that 
makes an immediate appeal to common moral sensibility." Id. at xx.xv. 
Note that though Hart and Honore "think it is a moral and legal principle of central 
importance that people are responsible for the harm they cause, where 'cause' is understood 
not as sine qua non but in the sense in which ordinary people understand it," id. at lxxvii, they 
do not support the view that causing harm is always necessary and sufficient for imposing 
liability. Id. at lxxii-lxxvii. 
ss This approach to responsibility in tum may depend on a theory of atomistic 
individualism: the gains and losses each person causes should be assigned to him. Thus, all 
persons affect each other only as they mutually may consent to be affected. 
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is so, then people should receive payment for the benefits they cause 
and, conversely, they should not be entitled to keep the gains that 
someone else has caused. 
If one combines the notion that existing holdings should be pro-
tected with this broad version of causal maximalism, the following 
position emerges: Gains and losses should be incurred and transferred 
ouly by methods that conform with notions of individual responsibil-
ity. Established methods of consensual transfer such as contract and 
gift form an acceptable predicate for responsibility, as does causation. 
Outside of consensual dealings, 89 the law should assign to each party 
the gains and losses that it generates, consistent with causation. I call 
this position "status quo corrective justice," for it seeks to protect the 
status quo distribution of interests and advantages from disruption. 
Richard Epstein's initial articulation of his strict liability theory, in 
which he argued that various causes of harm-force or fright, for 
example-should generate liability regardless of fault, apparently 
relied on something akin to this model of status quo corrective jus-
tice. 90 Epstein has withdrawn from this view, conceding that harms 
should be actionable only if they violate previously specified rights.91 
Standing alone, causation is hardly compelling. 92 Part of the prob-
lem is definitional-what constitutes a "cause" is a much-debated 
issue.93 Causation is also problematic because it is not coterminous 
89 Cf. Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 81, at 979: 
[Flor benefits to have a legal standing, their conferral must conform to specific 
conditions concerning the transferor's intent and the mechanics of transfer ..• laid down 
in the law of gifts, trusts, and seals. Other unilateral transfers •.. are invalid .•.. [T]he 
form instantiated in contract and tort law allows us to think of the payee's retention of a 
mistaken payment [a form of unearned benefit] as a harm inflicted on the payor. 
90 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973). I do 
not mean to overstate the parallels between a full version of causal maximalism and Epstein's 
position. Epstein's position was limited to several specific ways of causing tangible harm. 
91 Epstein's current position is complex. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: 
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. Legal Stud. 49 (1979). 
92 Even Richard Epstein, who is most closely associated with causal maximalism in the tort 
arena, admits that "causing harm" should generate liability only if one holds a preexisting 
entitlement to be free of such harm. See id. at 59. 
93 Commentators generally agree that the "but-for'' or "sine qua non" approach to cause 
provides an insufficient basis for imposing responsibility; thus, it usually is combined with 
other approaches. Some commentators parse causal questions in terms of common-sense 
notions, see Hart & Honore, supra note 86, at 5; others use policy, see, Calabresi, supra note 
43, at 6 n.8, 131-97; Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for 
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1975). 
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with moral desert. If some wholly unforeseeable effect results from 
one's activity, no obvious moral basis for praise or blame, or for 
reward or punishment, arises. 
The more primitive view-that all status quo holdings prima facie 
are entitled to protection-in fact may animate the courts, however. 
At least one plausible explanation of tort law's patterns might rest on 
the view that all harms resulting from nonreciprocal risks (reciprocal 
risks being a mutual tradeoff and potentially equivalent to consent) 
constitute a sufficient basis for liability.94 The recent growth in intel-
lectual property similarly might be understood as an expression of the 
view that any benefit resulting from nonreciprocal effort must be paid 
for. 
Even as a description of actual case results, however, this form of 
corrective justice has the same defect as the appropriative principle 
itself: it is drastically overbroad. Even as a descriptive matter, all law-
yers know that there are interests, termed damnum absque injuria, 
that tort law does not protect. Classic examples of interests some-
times left unprotected, even when they result from nonreciprocal risk, 
have included emotional and economic harm. Similarly, in unjust 
enrichment law, although an unearned and nonreciprocally reaped 
benefit sometimes must be paid for or returned to the one who con-
ferred it, often the recipient will have no obligation to do so. 
But if one moves from the protection of specific holdings to the 
protection of the status quo as a whole, the status quo corrective jus-
tice model appears a more apt descriptor, for it is arguable that the 
interests left unprotected are simply those whose protection would 
disrupt larger existing patterns. f'.or example, a plaintiff's inability to 
recover for emotional or economic harm unaccompanied by physical 
damage often is explained by pointing to the disruptive effect that 
such liability would impose. 95 Similarly, a desire to preserve the pre-
94 See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 
(1972). Fletcher's theory of reciprocity draws on a Rawlsian principle of fairness, that "all 
individuals in society have the right to roughly the same degree of security from risk." Id. at 
550. To the extent such an approach took for granted that all current holdings were to be so 
protected, it would parallel "status quo corrective justice." 
9S It often is argued that intangible injuries might pose a danger of unlimited liability or 
chill otherwise-desirable activity, such as competition. See Peter W. Huber, Liability: The 
Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 115-32 (1988). But see Robert L. Rabin, Tort 
Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513, 
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vailing market system might explain a court's reluctance to compel 
restitution for all benefits conferred without request. 96 
One can imagine defenses of this drastically conservative notion of 
law.97 One also can imagine attacks upon it.98 But, as a descriptive 
matter it may well capture the assumptions that motivate legal protec-
tion of intangible values absent a strong showing that protection will 
advance some conception of social welfare. 
It often is suggested that one way in which courts perceive their 
role is as protectors of the status quo. For example, Jerry Mashaw 
suggests that this is part of a traditional paradigm of individualistic 
adjudication under which judges work to preserve a community's 
existing distribution of advantages by applying norms derived from 
that community.99 In this model of adjudication, the source of the 
1534-35 (1985) (arguing that the concept of avoiding disproportionate liability best explains 
case law patterns in the economic loss area). 
96 The origin of the desire to preserve the market system is more likely "economics" in the 
usual sense. See Levmore, supra note 38, at 79-82. Alternatively, however, its origins may lie 
in "status quo preservation." 
97 One argument in support of such a perspective might rest on the basic fact that persons 
work to achieve given ends. To the extent that happenstance or the uncontrollable actions of 
others can frustrate those ends, people will lose control over their own lives. If accidents 
frequently destroy their efforts, they may cease to work as productively. The law, therefore, 
arguably should honor any expectation or holding. 
Some observers link this protection-of-expectation function with the preservation of order. 
See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 772, 
789 (1985) (arguing that disorder would result if one had little incentive to "accept the 
imposed distributional system"). 
Judges practicing this model of private law might justify it this way: "Whatever our 
obligations might be when strong normative argument shows that status quo holdings are not 
justified, when such arguments are absent we do no harm-other than consuming some 
administrative costs-when we replieate and protect the status quo. Further, we even do some 
good in the process, for to be human is to wish to form plans and to carry them through. We 
are an organ of the community, and it is our rightful task to honor the claims of individuals 
based on community norms, at least so long as we do not in the process violate independent 
normative imperatives or disrupt the community itself. Thus, unless we have reason to suspect 
that some groups unjustifiably are imposing the costs of their plans on some other group, our 
mission is to make it possible for people to have plans and to carry them through in the only 
world that they know." 
98 Of the multitude of available arguments, one could argue that not all status quo holdings 
are justifiable or protected by Hohfeldian rights, see Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights 
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 975, or that 
a judge's proper task is to apply proper principles regardless of the impact on the status quo, or 
that there are so many interests within the sta<us quo that a mandate to "preserve" them 
would be indeterminate. 
99 Mashaw writes: 
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"operative notion of corrective justice[ ] is the specific culture within 
which the events giving rise to claims of right occur."100 One could 
imagine a court seeing in our culture an imperative to secure to per-
sons the benefits they create101 and perceiving in that security a pres-
ervation of existing balance. 
That the status quo corrective justice model anticipates that courts 
will protect the status quo ante by using community norms suggests 
that courts may be willing to protect expectations and interests simply 
because they exist. A reasoned or unreasoned respect for current 
holdings-which I speculated played a role in the status quo correc-
tive justice notion-actually may animate some court decisions. 
The plausibility of the status quo corrective justice model in turn 
suggests several useful avenues for critics of the new intellectual prop-
erty developments. Critics might suggest to the courts reasons not to 
grant automatic deference to existing holdings. 102 They might point 
The individualist model presumes a social order that is autonomous and relatively 
stable. The law derives its norms from the culture and applies authority (or vindicates 
rights) in order to reestablish the social equilibrium that has been disturbed. Moreover, 
this intervention to reconstruct the status quo ante exhausts the state's role in shaping 
the social world. 
Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 Yale L.J. 1129, 1157 
(1983). Mashaw goes on to discuss a competing model of adjudication. 
100 Id. at 1156. Whether and how to include community perception and values in law is 
very controversial. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 
75 Yale L.J. 986 (1966). The fact that community values and perception are included is less 
so. For example, Bruce Ackerman has shown that "ordinary" conceptions of property drawn 
from the lay community sometimes have proved quite influential in adjudication. See Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 97-110, 129-45 (1977); see also Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1161 
(1990) (approving copyright law's use of a fair use limitation that is responsive to ''the 
community's established practices and understandings"). 
101 See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 100, at 1145-46 (noting that the community perceives "a 
value that is tied to the creator's claim as creator," despite the existence of countervailing 
values, such as the dissemination of information). 
102 In formal terms, some holdings are proteeted not by "rights" against private 
interference, but by "privileges." Although the state will not impose duties that are 
inconsistent with privileges, private parties are free to interfere with privileged activities. See 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and 
Other Legal Essays 41-43 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923); Singer, supra note 98. 
An exponent of the status quo correetive justice position might try to explain away the 
existence of holdings unprotected by rights by arguing that all holdings would be proteeted by 
rights if there were no fear that disruption would result and that where fear of disruption is 
absent, the law should protect all holdings against private disruption. Even if one accepts the 
disruption thesis-and even if one concedes that the new intellectual property creates no new 
disruptions-such an argument remains problematic. Among other things, much of our law is 
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out the difficulties of using community norms in law. 103 They might 
show that the "responsibility follows causation" norm is not the only 
relevant norm and that many community moral beliefs run in the 
opposite direction, 104 as do many community practices. 105 They 
might demonstrate some of the conceptual difficnlties with causation 
by arguing that the image of atomistic individualism inherent in some 
of the causation literature is fundamentally misplaced or by sug-
gesting that necessarily complex notions such as "wrongfulness" and 
"merit" better measure responsibility than does causation. Some of 
these criticisms might persuade courts against use of the primitive 
corrective justice notion altogether. Other criticisms, such as pointing 
out inconsistent community norms or suggesting that the new intel-
lectual property protection is itself disruptive on some occasions, may 
help courts to limit it. 
At bottom, however, if this community-based impulse motivates 
the creation of new rights in intangibles, there may be little that 
observers can do to stem the tide except to wait for the community to 
become restive in the opposite direction. This unfortunately may be a 
long wait as the community may never recognize the loss of new 
works chilled by the misappropriation explosion. 
built on a deference to private choice, and many of the holdings that evolve from private 
arrangements merely are tolerated, rather than affirmatively justified on their own merits. To 
speak of protecting all holdings disregards this distinction. 
Thus, even if one accepts that the current distribution of holdings is nonwrongful-itself a 
controversial proposition-the nonwrongfulness may stem merely from the legal system's 
reluctance to intervene in individuals' consensual dealings. If the desirability of 
nonintervention by the legal system allows some holdings to exist, premising new forms of 
legal interventionism on the desirability of protecting them should be somewhat difficult. 
Patterns that result from more deliberate choices about the substantive justice of individual 
holdings might better deserve protection of the kind wc describe. Cf. Nozick, supra note 75, at 
155-60 (discussing "patterned" versus "nonpatterned" conceptions of distributive justice). 
103 See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 100. 
104 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 2 (1967). As Lloyd 
Weinreb recently has argued, that creators have a special claim to reward is part of our 
community attitudes, but so are many other values that, depending on context, may weigh 
against recognizing that claim. Weinreb, supra note 100. Thus, Weinreb suggests that 
although "[m]ost of us ... are likely to perceive ... a value that is tied to the creator's claim as 
creator," id. at 1145-46, this is only one of many community values that may prove relevant; 
see id. at 1140, 1152-53, 1158, 1160-61. 
10s Weinreb has examined certain community practices that would weigh against imposing 
a no-copy duty in several contexts. See Weinreb, supra note 100, at 1150-53. 
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C. A Second Model: Value Is Property 
A judicial self-conception that seeks to preserve the status quo does 
not necessarily evidence adoption of the causation model or use of 
community notions of responsibility. Something even less reasoned 
may be occurring. Several critics-the most famous of whom is Felix 
Cohen-have observed the following logic operating in many deci-
sions: X has "created a thing of value; a thing of value is property; X, 
the creator of property, is entitled to protection against third parties 
who seek to deprive him of his property."106 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes apparently thought this logic was 
animating his brethren in International News Service v. Associated 
Press 107 ("INS"), the most famous reap/sow case of our century. In 
INS, the defendant was a news service that had copied its competi-
tor's news from, inter alia, public sources. The majority viewed the 
copying as an actionable attempt to "reap where it had not sown ... 108 
Ruling that the news was "quasi-property" as between competing 
news services, the Court enjoined the defendant from copying its com-
petitor's news from public bulletin boards and early newspaper edi-
tions.109 Arguing that this aspect of the opinion went too far, Justice 
Holmes implied that his brethren were wrong in ignoring that 
"[p]roperty, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although 
exchangeable"-that the presence of exchangeable value is "a matter 
of fact"110 rather than law, a matter of "is" rather than "ought." 
If a notion that property automatically arises from value motivates 
the courts, there is so little reason in it that response is difficult. 111 
There is a fundamental mistake in moving automatically from "is"-
exchangeable value-to "ought"-legal protection-and if the courts 
have a reasoned basis for moving from "is" to "ought," they should 
specify that basis so it can be examined. For example, if the unspoken 
reason for protecting "value" as "property,, is that the courts see the 
106 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 809, 815 (1935). Rochelle Dreyfuss captures an analogous argument in what she 
identifies as the "if value, then right" notion. See Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 405. 
107 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
los Id. at 239. 
109 Id. at 236. 
110 Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
111 David Lange calls this property/value notion "nonsense" and finds its logic to be a 
massive exercise in question-begging. Lange, supra note 10, at 160. 
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two as the same, then this conceptual error can be clarified and recti-
fied. If the unspoken reason is to protect social cohesion by protect-
ing expectations, then one can point out the circularity of such 
reasoning, as courts often create expectations. If the courts believe 
they must protect all existing value in order to ensure productivity, 
one can point out that ouly sometimes will granting legal rights 
increase the amount of value in the world. Further, paralysis, rather 
than increase in social wealth, more likely will result from granting 
rights against any change that may cause harm to someone. Or if the 
leap from "value" to "property" rests on a conception of the judicial 
role such as the one Mashaw describes, 112 that conception can be criti-
cized, or dismantled on its own terms as not leading to these 
results. 113 
Further, one might argue that the distribution of value the courts 
seek to protect largely is created by the courts themselves; in the 
absence of legal protection, competition quickly would transfer that 
value to the public. 114 Or one might make the related point that even 
courts seeking to protect "value" must have some criterion by which 
to choose the point in a dynamic process at which the "value" that 
112 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
113 Among other things, giving property status to all value can lead to the ultimate 
disruption of a community-paralysis. 
114 One could argue that the value/property approach is circular because the monetary 
value of an intangible in a competitive situation depends upon legal protection. This argument 
might run as follows: placing a famous face or trademark on T-shirts makes them more 
desirable than T-shirts bearing less trendy designs. If everyone can copy the face or mark 
without paying license fees for doing so, the marginal cost of copying will consist solely of the 
cost of the physical paint or dye process needed to affix the image; no costs will be attributable 
to the image itself. Price in a perfectly competitive market will equal marginal cost and long-
run average cost. Because the copyist's average and marginal cost attributable to the famous 
face or mark is zero, none of the price will include payment for the face or mark. Its value to 
any given seller is then zero. 
Note, however, that this argument involves overstatement. In real-world markets the ability 
to be first with a new face or mark, or even to be second or third, usually will result in lead-
time advantages before others enter, and significant profits may be made before new entrants 
drive price down to the point where it equals marginal cost. 
Felix C-Ohen first noted the circularity of the value/property approach. He argued that the 
"property from value" reasoning "purports to base legal protection upon economic value, 
when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent 
to which it will be legally protected." C-Ohen, supra note 106, at 815. (By "economic value" 
C-Ohen presumably meant merely the monetary value of the sales device to a producer.) For 
suggestions similar to C-Ohen's, see Edward J. Blaustein, Privacy Is Dear at Any Price: A 
Response to Professor Posner's Economic Theory, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 429, 448 (1978) 
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then exists should be frozen and given property status. At bottom, 
however, the perception that "value is property" likely will not yield 
any usable limits. 
D. Toward a Third Approach: Modifying the Co"ective Justice 
Model 
The conception of the judicial role described in the prior models is, 
of course, no more than a partial account of what some judges may do 
sometimes. A third way to approach reap/sow draws on a broader 
conception: whatever the role played by community norms per se, 
judges also aim to achieve a result consistent both with their own 
sense of justice and with precedent, sources that inform-and are 
informed by-the community. Taking that approach, it is appropri-
ate to examine how the initial corrective justice model of causal max-
imalism might be modified by taking into account notions of justice 
drawn from both intuition and case law. In short, this section will 
investigate what happens when the primitive corrective justice model, 
which largely sought to use liability rules to link effects to their caus-
ers, 115 is modified by norms taken from these sources that are 
informed by, but not dictated by, the community. 
The primitive corrective justice model had several primary flaws: it 
lacked a plausible specification of wrongfulness; it posited a relation 
between causation and reward that did not comport with usual 
notions of desert; and it led to results inconsistent with most notions 
of social good. 116 A version of corrective justice more appealing to 
our intuitions can be developed by taking seriously the frequent refer-
ences to "unjust enrichment" in intellectual property case law. 117 
("advertising value" is based on "the law which artificially creates a scarcity by giving the 
individual a property right in its use"); Lange, supra note 10, at 160. 
Rochelle Dreyfuss makes a similar observation, bnt draws from it a somewhat different and 
interesting point: when the competition value of the intangible is competed away, the pnblic, 
rather than the competitor, benefits. Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 407. Dreyfuss' point is an apt 
supplement to Cohen's. One problem with the legal protection of "sales devices" is that sales 
protection seems unnecessary to preserve or promote value-celebrities will seek fame even if 
they are not able to sue those who put their faces on T-shirts. All that legal protection does is 
affect the distribution of that value, and that distribution is not a robust fact of economic life 
but rather is (as Cohen suggested) a product of deliberate legal action. 
115 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
116 See supra notes 26-43, 95-105 and accompanying text. 
117 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (dicta) 
(ratifying the use of supposed unjust enrichment principles in support of Ohio's grant to 
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Perhaps the courts are analogizing to that area of law most directly 
concerned with imposing liability on the basis of unjust enrichment-
the law of restitution. 
Restitution law may offer a cure for one defect in the status quo 
corrective justice model. Rather than relying on a controversial insis-
tence that all current holdings are prima facie justifiable and prima 
facie entitled to protection, advocates of that model instead might 
begin with a less controversial and more limited position-that an 
individual has some resources that she ordinarily is not compelled to 
make available to others, 118 and that the law ordinarily will protect 
from others' acts of compulsion. 119 They might then assert that both 
the legal system and independent normative judgments support a 
laborer's right and privilege to withhold aesthetic, intellectual, or 
physical labor-in ordinary circumstances-unless payment or other 
satisfactory inducement is forthcoming. This prima facie entitlement 
not to labor is to that extent a prima facie "justified holding," and it 
means that others have no legal right to compel others' labor. From 
this proposition it is a short jump-though a jump, nevertheless--to 
the argument that persons should have no affirmative right to keep 
the benefits of others' labor. From this it is another jump-albeit a bit 
longer this time-to the argument that persons who have labored are 
entitled to use the legal system to obtain payment from others for 
their use of the benefits the laborers have produced. 120 
What might justify these jumps from a right not to labor to a right 
to be paid? It is relatively uncontroversial that, barring circumstances 
giving rise to a special duty, a person ordinarily has and should have a 
plaintiff of a right to control the broadcast of his performances); Board of Trade of Chicago v. 
Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d E4 (Ill. 1983) (relying upon misappropriation doctrine in 
holding Dow Jones entitled to bar use of its average as basis for futures contract). The dissent 
in Dow Jones argued that "[t]he majority is swayed by what it sees as 'unjust' enrichment." Id. 
at 93 (Simon, J., dissenting). 
ns That is, a Hohfeldian "privilege" or "liberty" to refuse to make the resource available to 
others. See Hohfeld, supra note 102; Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1354-
61. 
119 That is, a Hohfeldian "right" to deny others access to the resource. See Hohfeld, supra 
note 102, at 96-97; Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1354-61. 
120 This conception might be bolstered further by notions of desert-that one who works to 
create something of benefit deserves some reward for it, at least where the benefit indeed is 
produced and where she has labored in the expectation of reward. But even principles of 
desert from labor cannot justify property; they offer perhaps only a qualified justification for 
property rights. See Munzer, supra note 77, at 254-91. 
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privilege and a right not to labor and that she can trade on this enti-
tlement package to obtain compensation via contract: "I won't work 
unless you pay me." More controversial is whether a person has or 
should have a right to control or to be paid for the results of labor 
without a contract. Can one reach such a right from a privilege not to 
put one's labor at others' behest? 
One possible bridge is restitution, a body of law that sometimes 
allows claims for payment where work is done and the worker no 
longer has leverage to obtain payment from the other party (leverage 
ordinarily provided by her freedom not to work). 121 Perhaps when 
courts grant rights to those whose investment of labor or of other 
resources122 has produced a performance, 123 a stock market index, 124 
a song style, 125 or a set of news items, 126 they implicitly draw on resti-
tution to move from a liberty not to work to a right to be paid for 
work done. 127 
121 Much of substantive restitution law can be seen through the lens of quasi-contract-in 
which a court asks whether, given the intei;-actions between the parties, it should treat them as 
if a contract existed. This viewpoint implies that the plaintiff once owned or otherwise 
controlled something conferred on the defendant that could have been consideration for an 
explicit contract. 
122 The analysis does not change if the resource invested is one other than labor. I use labor 
because it is one of the entitlements most easily defended. Thus, the analysis does not depend 
on any distinction among "labor," "creativity," "sweat of the brow," or other types of human 
effort, or between these and more tangible resources. 
123 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (Ohio law). 
124 Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983) (Illinois law). 
125 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (California law). 
126 INS, 248 U.S. 215 (pre-Erie federal common law). 
127 Note also that reference to nnjust enrichment law is historically appropriate, for its 
traditions played a strong role in the case most often cited by supporters of the reap/sow 
principle, INS, 248 U.S. 215. See infra notes 437-48 and accompanying text for a detailed 
description of INS. 
One need not stretch to interpret INS or the misappropriation cause of action it created as 
drawing on unjust enrichment-the reap/sow principle used there is inherently restitutionary, 
as commentators have noted. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 13, at 1415-16 (interpreting INS as 
a restitution case). The Court's language is itself indicative. The majority opinion found the 
news to be "quasi-property" between the parties despite the absence of anything that 
resembled actual property, INS, 248 U.S. at 242, much as restitution courts historically have 
found quasi-contracts to exist where they thought it appropriate to impose liability despite the 
absence of anything resembling an actual contract. See Restatement (Second) of Restitution 
§ 1 cmt. a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983) [hereinafter Restatement (Second) of Restitution]. 
Though other traditions played a role in the INS case as well, the decision often is seen as an 
application of pure corrective justice principles in which notions of unjust enrichment 
dominate. See Dawson, supra note 13, at 1415-16; Mashaw, supra note 99, at 1159-60 (noting 
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Useful models for addressing issues in the law of intellectual prod-
ucts might be sought, therefore, in the law of unjust enrichment. 
There, the courts have dealt with persons who have conferred on 
others labor, money, or other resources that they were not obliged to 
confer, somewhat as intellectual property producers choose to send 
their works into the world without promise of return. Identifying the 
norms that courts utilize to handle these claims provides some hints 
as to how to accommodate the claims of both users and producers of 
the intellectual product, as against each other and as they affect third 
parties. Moreover, reminding the courts of the ways that unjust 
enrichment law is constrained may help them find routes to appropri-
ate constraints for the reap/sow impulse. As it is now, the courts tend 
to use restitution too readily and inaccurately. 
For example, the Supreme Court in dicta has defended state intel-
lectual property law by pointing to an "unjust enrichment" rationale. 
The Court suggested that it can be a sufficient basis for requiring pay-
ment that the defendant had the use of "some aspect of the plaintiff" 
that had "market value" and for which the defendant normally would 
pay. 128 As will be explored below, however, that reflects only a tiny 
portion of the requirements imposed by restitution law. At a mini-
mum, the plaintiff suing for payment for benefits rendered without the 
defendant's request has to have a good reason for bypassing the mar-
ket, and the defendant's autonomy must be protected. 129 
that the case raised societal issues not adequately accommodated by the majority's corrective 
justice orientation). 
The link between intellectual property and restitution has been made in other contexts as 
well. See, e.g., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (dicta) (linking the right of publicity to an unjust 
enrichment rationale); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for 
the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 516, 519-20, 528, 530 (1981) 
(suggesting that the "act of aggregating isolated pieces of information" should be grounds for 
copyright protection, in part because of considerations of "natural right to the fruits of one's 
labor'' and unjust enrichment); see also Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 
1454-60 (comparing copyright and restitution principles). 
12s See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (dicta) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 331 (1966)) (ratifying 
the use of supposed unjust enrichment principles in support of Ohio's grant to plaintiff of a 
right to control the broadcast of his performances). 
129 The Article later returns to consider some of these rationales in depth. See infra text 
accompanying notes 198-245. Recent analysis of restitutionary arguments in the area of 
attorneys' fees similarly focuses on the many preconditions that attach to restitution. See 
Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76 Cornell L. 
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The use of restitution doctrine to provide limiting principles in the 
realm of intellectual property might be criticized, however, to the 
extent that the providers of unrequested services who prevail in resti-
tution suits and the creators of intellectual products are not situated 
similarly in the market. Some have argued that the availability of 
restitution for unrequested services should depend, at least in part, on 
whether the defendant would have agreed to pay for the services had 
the parties been able to bargain in advance, 130 and it is not clear that 
intellectual product producers often could make such a showing when 
they demand payment from persons who copy their databases, 
designs, or inventions. 
Some intellectual products would be produced even in the absence 
of intellectual property rights.131 For such products there can be no 
certainty that the defendant's copying of the product would have been 
the subject of a contractual restriction. Just as one can imagine the 
producer saying, "I will not make this product available to you unless 
you promise me that you will pay royalties for any copies you make," 
one also can imagine the user saying, "I will not buy this product 
unless you sell it without strings attached." Sometimes the producer 
would accept the latter condition. 132 In the real world, it may be 
impossible to know whether a given work or a given use would have 
been sold with a royalty promise attached. 
Rev. 656, 665 & n.47 (1991). The Silver article, brought to my attention too recently for full 
integration here, reinforces many of the points made in this Article. 
The vigor of the current philosophical debate over whether the receipt of governmental 
benefits can give rise to duties illustrates the general foolhardiness of imagining that the receipt 
of any benefit automatically gives rise to a legal or even moral duty. See, e.g., Richard J. 
Arneson, The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 Ethics 616 (1982); Nozick, 
supra note 75, at 90-95; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 111-12 (1971); A. John Simmons, 
Moral Principles and Political Obligations 101-42 (1979). Much of the debate, built around 
Rawls' fairness principle, centers on the role of the recipients-whether they are passive or 
active, whether they are engaged in a common enterprise, etc. These considerations arguably 
have equivalents in restitution law. See infra notes 198-284 and accompanying text. 
130 Robert A. Long, Jr., Note, A Theory of Hypothetical Contract, 94 Yale L.J. 415 (1984). 
131 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 282-83 (1970); Tom G. 
Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 Hamline 
L. Rev. 261, 287-300 (1989). 
132 If such imaginary bargaining sessions were possible, the no-strings condition might be 
accepted even if intellectual property rights existed; the same user who refused to promise 
royalties in a world without intelleetual property rights could, in a regime that granted such 
rights, refuse to purchase the tangible product unless the producer waived his entitlement to 
royalties. 
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But this indeterminacy should not be fatal. In fact, it is difficult to 
know why any emphasis should be placed on the question of whether, 
in a hypothetical world where only contract existed to restrain copy-
ing, a person would consent to pay royalties or to refrain from copy-
ing as part of the price of obtaining access to a given intangible. 133 
Whether a given creator can fence off her product to gain the leverage 
that will allow her to demand payment or promises usually depends 
on serendipitous circumstances-for example, whether her product 
and its mode of production can be easily concealed, or whether the 
product is otherwise difficult to duplicate. 134 Consent is meaningful 
as a normative category only when the background pattern of entitle-
ments-the pattern of available leverage-is normatively accepta-
ble. 135 Aside from transaction cost considerations, 136 ability to fence 
in a hypothetical world contains little of normative significance for 
the treatment of intellectual products. 137 
From a normative perspective, a more useful way to pose the issue 
is whether a potential defendant has any good reason to complain if 
required to pay for his use of the plaintiff's creation. In a world with-
out prohibitions on copying, the defendant might be lucky enough to 
obtain access to the good for free or upon payment of the modest 
price intended only for noncopyist end-users, but that is not a good 
133 Even a commentator who urges that restitution's treatment of unsolicited benefits should 
be seen through the lens of a hypothetical bargain admits that "courts frequently impose quasi-
contractual liability without considering the actual or hypothetical intentions of the parties." 
Long, supra note 130, at 415 n.3; see also 1 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts§ 19, at 48-
49 (1963) (citing public welfare as grounds for the existence of an enforceable duty ''without 
regard to assent or dissent"). 
134 Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1465-68. 
us In his COllllllent on my Article, Professor Kitch implicitly argues that all such 
entitlement issues can be sidestepped by utilizing the tort of "interference with contract," 
which would, he argues, render the question of actual physical leverage irrelevant. Edmund 
W. Kitch, Intellectual Property and the Common Law, 78 Va. L. Rev. 293 (1992). This 
contractarian analysis, however, merely shifts the entitlement question to another level. One 
still would need to ask which contracts between authors and publishers or between inventors 
and manufacturers are so normatively desirable that their preservation justifies interference 
with the h°berty of third parties. See Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1425-
35 (discussing consent as a criterion for moral adequacy). 
136 Costs of enforcement are only one component of the economic equation. Providing legal 
anticopying rules to supplement an incomplete set of physical fences may be expensive, but in 
the long run the rules may encourage more production than they cost. 
137 See Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1465-69. 
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reason for complaint unless one is willing-as I am not-to raise non-
moral luck to the level of a justifiable basis for entitlement. 
There is no reason to give users a baseline entitlement to whatever 
they could have obtained in a world without legal protection for intel-
lectual products. To the contrary: Consider person X, who intention-
ally has created something for which she wishes to be paid. Consider 
person Y, who deliberately uses the product, knowing the conditions 
under which it was made. In my view, as long as Y benefits from the 
investments of X in an amount greater than the amount X demands in 
return, 138 and as long as no issues are implicated except payment, Y 
has little ground for complaint if payment is extracted. 139 As earlier 
stipulated, 140 Y has no entitlement to X's labor resources, and as 
between X and Y, X's claim to the yield of those resources appears to 
be marginally stronger.141 This much, at least, I concede to the "cor-
rective justice" exponents. 142 Once that is conceded, one must reject 
the position that the public has a baseline entitlement to whatever 
goods and prices it could have obtained in a world lacking noncon-
tractual legal restraints on copying. 143 At most they have a baseline 
entitlement to be as well off as they would have been had the creators' 
efforts-and the creators' assertions of right-not existed. 
Yet, even if one treats as nonessential the inquiry into the defend-
ant's ex ante willingness to pay for the plaintiff's efforts, giving the 
creator a marginally stronger claim than the user may not avail the 
creator much. Payment, a mere shift in wealth, is not the only issue 
138 This condition assumes there is afungibility in what X gains (e.g., money) and what Y 
demands in exchange (e.g., money again). 
139 This is equivalent to my arguing that the entitlement pattern against which a legitimate 
pattern of contract can emerge is a pattern that (1) includes some baseline entitlement, 
however weak and conditional, to the yield of one's effort, and (2) does not grant an 
entitlement to products of others' efforts simply because they are accessible. See Gordon, 
Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1446-65 (discussing baselines and distributional 
principles). For an examination of Locke's treatment of this issue, see Gordon, Equality, supra 
note 64, at 114-23 (arguing that strangers have "no right" to "others' pains"). 
140 See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
141 Of course, when Y makes creative use of X's work, the yield is a joint product of the 
efforts of both X and Y. My argument in favor of Y's duty to pay applies most easily to cases 
of pure copying ("piracy," if you will) where a defendant adds nothing to X's work. 
142 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text. 
143 See Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1435-59 (discussing baseline 
entitlements). The result would be the same even if one shifted the burden of persuasion so 
that creative persons were asked if they had any good reason to complain if all weight were 
denied to their moral claims to payment. See id. at 1430-35, 1446-59. 
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implicated when the law imposes restraints on free riding. Almost 
invariably, free riding serves or disserves other important values, and 
these can outweigh the producer's weak claim to payment144 or give it 
strength. 145 Specifying and weighing these additional values, and 
identifying modes of implementing them, consistent where possible 
with the corrective justice impulse, become the more important 
questions. 
This brings us back to our starting point: we need to define the 
conditions under which a lack of payment for benefits gained should 
be deemed an "unjust" enrichment. 146 The restitution approach 
might be interpreted as asking whether the beneficiary has benefited 
from the use of something that the plaintiff could have used as consid-
eration-any liberty, any entitlement-and as defining circumstances 
in which imposing an obligation of payment is appropriate, 147 either 
because those factors that reinforce a reap/sow claim are present, or 
because those factors that contradict its force are absent. Thus, the 
concerns found in the restitution cases-such as a reluctance to 
undermine the market and a desire to protect the defendant's auton-
omy148-reenter as essential, for they may combine to yield useful 
information as to what limitations are needed to render a court-
imposed right to payment for benefits acceptable. 
Restitution doctrine also may help to refine our intuitions on other 
points. Earlier, I suggested that free riding is not itself wrongful, 149 
yet I have just suggested that some free riders should have an obliga-
tion of payment.150 Restitution doctrine offers a way out of this seem-
ing paradox, for it makes clear that an obligation of payment can be 
imposed fairly even when the defendant has done nothing wrong-
144 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the paralysis and injustice that 
would ensue if all free riding were forbidden in our society). 
145 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive purposes served 
by granting anticopying rights to creative persons). 
146 Thus, it has been suggested that the "three essential elements of quasi-contract" include 
"I. a benefit conferred; 2. appreciation by the recipient of such benefit; and 3. acceptance and 
retention of such benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable to allow 
retention of the benefit without requiring payment for it." 1 Corbin, supra note 133, § 19, at 
49 (Supp. 1991). 
147 I am indebted to Allan Axelrod for this formulation. 
148 See infra Part II. 
149 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
150 See supra text accompanying 138-42. 
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ful. 151 The formerly unconscious patient who was assisted in an emer-
gency acts wrongfully only when he later refuses to pay the doctor: 
allowing the ministrations while he was unconscious hardly conld be 
considered wrongful. Thus, the restitution approach does not pre-
sume that a copyist has behaved wrongfully in the usual sense. 
Rather, corrective justice is triggered by something similar to what 
Jules Coleman calls a "taking"-the copyist has the benefit of "what 
another has a legitimate right to" and has not yet "render[ed] ade-
quate compensation" for it. 152 The wrong, if any, lies in the lack of 
payment, not in the transferring or sharing of the resource. 
In the cases with which we will deal, the interaction between crea-
tor and creative copyist often will be a positive-sum game, yielding 
enough in the way of profit that the creator (plaintift) can be rewarded 
and the copyist (defendant) still can come out of the transaction with 
a net gain. This configuration yields a very different set of normative 
pressures than those presented by the typical tort cases involving acci-
dents and other negative interactions. In the latter types of cases, a 
court usually has only one unpleasant task: to decide on whom the 
harm should lie, plaintiff or defendant. Here no harm need be done, 
and there is correspondingly less need to find a culpable "wrong" to 
justify the court's intervention. 
Restitution also may aid us with finding a means to reduce the 
overbreadth of a pure causation test. It would be disproportionate to 
give a creative laborer payment for all valuable things, however bene-
ficial, that might make some use, however slight, of her contribution; 
for her to have a more plausible claim to deserve reward, ideally she 
should be able to show some kind of special connection, or nexus, 
between herself and the particular person to be charged. In tort law, 
the need for such a connection usually is addressed by asking whether 
1s1 See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text. 
1s2 Coleman, supra note 85, at 427 (arguing that even justified and nonwrongful "takings" 
are embraced by the corrective justice principle). Note that I have adapted Coleman's 
language to my purposes. He refers to one person's "taking" another's entitlement, whereas I 
refer to having "the benefit of" such an entitlement. 
Restitution embraces such nonwrong-based obligations of payment. See, e.g., Restatement 
of Restitution, Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts § 63 cmt. a (1937) [hereinafter 
Restatement of Restitution]; infra note 191 (discussing expense-to-plaintiff requirement); infra 
note 193 (suggesting restitution is due for entirely "innocent" behavior); infra note 222 
(contrasting unjust enrichment by subtraction from plaintiff and enrichment by wrong to 
plaintitl). 
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the defendant was "foreseeable"; in restitution, the need for such a 
connection usually is addressed by asking if the defendant's benefit 
crune "at the expense of" the plaintiff. 153 
In ordinary cases involving labor, the plaintiff often has rendered 
services for a particular defendant, and the expenditure of effort is an 
expense clearly attributable to a particular person's benefit. In the 
intellectual product context, by contrast, it is possible that the labor 
would have been invested and the work produced without expectation 
of payment from a particular defendant. If so, the plaintiff will find it 
hard to argue against any one defendant: "Your benefit is at my 
expense; I would not have labored but for the expectation of payment 
from you." 
Yet, once again, the difficulty of identifying the intended recipient 
of intellectual products need not undermine the applicability of resti-
tution theories to intellectual property. An alternative to identifying 
the recipient is identifying the likely range of uses. If the defendant's 
use is within the plausible range of uses for which the plaintiff could 
have contemplated receiving payment, then a plaintiff might be able 
to argue that it is at least possible that the expectation of that person's 
contribution induced her to labor, and thus that lack of payment from 
the defendant could leave her with something less than she would 
have had in the defendant's absence. Indeed, I later argue that an 
intellectual property defendant must be at least a person from whom 
the creator plausibly might have sought payment ab initio. 154 
153 Restitution is required only when the defendant "has been unjustly enriched at the 
expense of another." Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 1; see 1 Corbin, supra note 
133, § 19A, at 64 (Supp. 1991) ("detriment to plaintiff" said to be crucial to quasi-contract). 
The requirement may be satisfied, however, by showing a nonharmful violation of a "legally 
protected interest." 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 2.10, at 133 (1978). 
This Article later suggests two possible ways of satisfying the requirement of an "expense to 
plaintiff": (1) limiting the range of defendants to persons whose payment formed, at least 
arguably, part of the plaintiff's reason for laboring, or, more practicably, (2) limiting the right 
of reward to those occasions when a defendant uses the intangible created by the plaintiff's 
labor in a way that competes with the plaintiff and that thus may deprive the plaintiff of the 
rewards toward which she had labored. See infra notes 336-61 and accompanying text. 
IS4 See infra notes 336-61 and accompanying text. Thus, I argue that it is important that 
the plaintiff prove it is foreseeable that this defendant conld be within the range of the 
plaintiff's customers, or that this defendant intends to sell to such customers. I make this 
argument not because I agree that the copyist is entitled to whatever he could be lucky enough 
to get in a world without intellectual property law or restitutionary rights-that is a position I 
have rejected both here and elsewhere. See Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 
1446-65; supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text. Rather, I take this stance because a 
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This particular restriction on the range of defendants does not fol-
low mandatorily from the ambiguous expense-to-plaintiff requirement 
of restitution law. 155 That vague requirement can be interpreted as no 
more than a requirement of nexus-of connection between the plain-
tiff and the benefit reaped156-a requirement that is easily manipula-
ble. More fundamental than the ambiguities of the "expense" 
requirement are arguments of fairness. It does not seem fair to give a 
creator, whose claims of merit or reward are based on what she did, a 
reward based on something she could not have contemplated at the 
time of creation. Ordinary notions of desert and cause do not extend 
so far. 157 
Claims of deserving reward do not exist "in the air" any more than 
claims of wrongfulness do. The scope of merit or wrongfulness must 
be determined by referring back, inter alia, to the nature of the acts 
characterized as meritorious or wrongful. Plaintiff's entitlements 
should not extend to all remote benefits for whose existence her 
actions were a necessary condition-such an extensive reward hardly 
would be proportional to the reward deserved. 158 The strongest claim 
creator's desert claim is strongest when addressed to those benefits that she could foresee. In 
short, the limitation is plaintiff-based rather than defendant-based in its rationale. 
155 The expense-to-plaintiff requirement is discussed further infra notes 180-81, 191, 220-25 
and accompanying text, and is applied to intellectual product fact patterns infra text 
accompanying notes 336-79. 
156 See 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.10, at 134. 
157 But see Becker, supra note 76, at 48-56 (arguing hypothetically that some property 
rights may arise). Becker's analysis suggests that property can follow if, inter alia, it is a 
reward proportional to the value added by the laborer's efforts. Deciding how much ''value" 
to attribute to the initial creation, and how much to its later and potentially unexpected uses 
and adaptations, however, is a normative as well as an empirical question. In addition, the 
prospect of receiving unforeseeable rewards likely will not have much incentive effect. Id. at 
53-56. 
158 Thus, Robert Rabin suggests that "[t]he Anglo-American judicial tradition maintains a 
deep abhorrence to the notion of disproportionate penalties for wrongful behavior." Rabin, 
supra note 95, at 1534. I would suggest that the "notion of disproportionality evoked by an 
interpersonal corrective justice perspective," id. at 1538, also should limit the rewards one 
might claim for meritorious behavior. Cf. Becker, supra note 76, at 52-53 (proportionality 
linked to the value produced by the labor). 
One judge speculated that even a fraudulent user of another's property might receive the 
protection of some proportionality considerations. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st 
Cir.) (Aldrich, C.J.) (dicta) ("If an artist acquired paints by fraud and used them in producing 
a valuable portrait we would not suggest that the defrauded party would be entitled to the 
portrait, or to the proceeds of its sale."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). Following Judge 
Bailey Aldrich's example, Professor Dobbs has suggested that there may be occasions when 
"the defendant's own efforts or property played such an enormous part in the profits that it 
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of desert would seem to exist where intent conjoins with achievement. 
If a defendant's use is so creative as to be outside the range of uses 
contemplated by the creator, then the creator does not have even a 
marginally stronger claim to the yield than does the defendant. 159 
Several ways of addressing this concern, other than a mechanical 
repetition of the ambiguous expense-to-plaintiff formula, may exist. 
As Justice Benjamin Cardozo linked a negligence defendant's liability 
to the risks he foreseeably created, 160 perhaps a misappropriation 
plaintiff's range of claims for reward should be limited to the scope of 
the benefits she foreseeably created. Thus, one might ask whether a 
defendant copied a product for a purpose that was within the plain-
tiff's contemplation at the time of creation. 
In tort law, Ernest Weinrib suggests that the foreseeability require-
ment is independently required by the immanent rationality of tort 
law itself; for negligence law to be coherent, a plaintiff's claim must 
be based on carelessness foreseeably directed toward her. 161 An 
analogous argument can be made for limiting recovery for benefits 
generated: a defendant's liability for copying should be based on bene-
fits the plaintiff had foreseeably directed to the very audience that the 
allegedly infringing copies will serve. 162 
The reap/sow notion itself may be limited in this way. In the 
Supreme Court's articulation, one behaves wrongfully if one who has 
not sown reaps another's harvest. 163 The remote beneficiary who 
makes an unexpected and creative use of the work arguably does not 
becomes unfair to force disgorgement." Dan B. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies 
433 (1973). 
159 Cf. supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (creator's corrective justice claim 
dependent on a form of intentionality). 
160 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
161 See Weinrib, Causation, supra note 81, at 438-44 (defending Cardozo's approach in 
Palsgraf as essential to a proper understanding of tort liability). 
162 This includes cases where the copyist himself is a foreseeable beneficiary, for example, a 
company that makes many copies of a newsletter for which it purchases but a single 
subscription. 
163 INS, 248 U.S. at 237-40. Even Locke's labor theory might be read in a manner 
consistent with the view that the prohibition on "reaping without sowing" depends on the 
laborer's being deprived of something she would have possessed absent the defendant's 
intervention. See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text. 
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reap the plaintiff's harvest. At most, she gleans in a neglected comer 
of the field, and by gleaning Ruth met Boaz. 164 
Note that a recommendation to use foreseeability or similar con-
cepts to limit the range of potential defendants suggests that a right to 
reward cannot generate property rights. A right to exclude is at the 
center of any property right, 165 but to give the creator a prima facie 
right to exclude at whim would threaten to sever a defendant's liabil-
ity from considerations of whether the plaintiff deserves a cause of 
action. Foreseeability, proportionality, or merit could be irrelevant to 
determining the producer's claim of entitlement.166 These notions, 
combined with the expense-to-plaintiff requirement and other aspects 
of restitution law, work against granting "property'' and its right to 
exclude solely on the basis that one has expended labor that creates 
benefits for others. 167 
Thus, although the modified corrective justice approach may sup-
port giving a laborer a right to recover, it does not give "property." 
Natural law approaches to intellectual property, by contrast, tend to 
move quickly and controversially from "labor" to "reward" to "prop-
erty. "168 But property is not the only possible form of reward.169 The 
same reasons that persuade against a "property" treatment lead to a 
164 Gleaning not only was an accepted practice in the Biblical scheme, but it also provided 
the context in which two crucial ancestors of King David met. Ruth 2:2-23. 
165 See, e.g., Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 12 (1928). 
166 Note that I use considerations ordinarily applicable to limiting a defendant's 
responsibility in tort (e.g., causation, remoteness, lack of wrongfulness) to limit a plaintiff's 
claim. Although torts and restitution are different areas of law, each expresses corrective 
justice notions; thus, for these purposes it does not seem inappropriate to draw on the insights 
of both fields. 
167 I argue elsewhere that Locke's proviso causes his labor theory of property to yield a 
similarly limited result as applied to most of the new intellectual property developments. See 
Gordon, Equality, supra note 64, at 19-24. 
168 See Spooner, supra note 73, at 21-28. 
169 For example, restitution law may support some "reward." The form of reward it gives 
for labor is limited to monetary payment, but against a nonwrongful defendant the amount of 
that payment generally is "limited .. . to its value in advancing the purposes of the recipient." 
Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 155, at 611 (emphasis added); see also id. § 40 
cmt. a, at 155 (discussing limit on restitution for services rendered); Dobbs, supra note 158, at 
262 (applying subjective measure of value to nonwrongdoing defendant in the land context). 
Sometimes the market value of services is awarded. See Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164 
(Ark. 1907); Dobbs, supra note 158, at 264-65. Even where the purpose of a recovery "is to 
measure the benefit to the defendant ... any given benefit may be capable of being measured in 
d~erent ways." Id. at 260. 
1992] Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 193 
suggestion for mode of recovery: 170 injunctions should not be granted 
automatically to restrain persons' uses of the products of others' 
labor. 171 
Restitution also may help to address another possible flaw in the 
intellectual property producer's causally based claim to reward, 
namely, that it would lead to overbroad application and threatened 
social paralysis. Both restitution and a more sophisticated approach 
to corrective justice would suggest, by contrast, that the laborer's 
claim to reward is weak, being both conditional and fairly easily out-
weighed. The case law showing the many limitations on a volunteer's 
ability to prevail illustrates this weakness; the following may help to 
explain it. 
110 Restitution is capable of providing property-like remedies (e.g., constructive trusts, 
tracing, orders for the return of specific goods), but it does so only when the defendant has 
violated a preexisting property right or otherwise has behaved wrongfully. A classic example 
of such a "wrong" is when the beneficiary of a will murders the testator; he usually will find 
the inheritance stripped from him by a constructive trust. As for the existence of a preexisting 
entitlement, the schemes we are investigating assume that the laborer has as a preexisting 
entitlement only his entitlement not to labor. That entitlement falls far short of a full property 
right. For reasons why creating a property right in the benefits one's labor produces would be 
inappropriate, see infra notes 362-76 and accompanying text. As for other forms of"wrongful 
behavior," free riding is not per se wrongful; as Justice Benjamin Kaplan notes, "if man has 
any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his fellows .... '[P]rogress' ... 
depends on generous indulgence of copying." Kaplan, supra note 104, at 2; see supra text 
following note 65. 
171 Injunctive remedies pose dangers of harm to both the defendant and society at large that 
a right to payment does not pose to the same degree. See, e.g., 2 Goldstein, supra note 22, at 
277-80 (''The public policy problem raised by injunctions against works that only partially 
infringe a plaintiff's copyright is that injunctions in these cases can deprive the public of the 
original elements that the defendant added and that are unavailable from the plaintiff or from 
others"; also, "some part of the work's value that is attributable to the defendant's independent 
effort" may be captured by the plaintifi). 
More generally, any prohibition on communication may raise more serious issues than a 
requirement of payment. Thus, in rebuffing a First Amendment challenge to the right of 
publicity, the Supreme Court stressed that the performer sought only recognition of his 
"commercial stake," not to enjoin dissemination of his performance. Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-74 (I 977). Also note that though the absence of 
an injunctive right may minintize First Amendment problems, it does not eliminate them given 
that monetary restraints on the use of intellectual products such as news also can threaten 
First Amendment values. 
Similarly, Douglas Laycock suggests that the law now gives plaintiffs equitable remedies "if 
they want them and if there is no good reason to deny them." Laycock, supra note 53, at 689. 
One of the "good reasons" Laycock gives for denying injunctions is the presence of a 
"countervailing substantive policy, such as freedom of speech." Id. at 742-43. He lists other 
reasons relevant to intellectual property, such as avoiding hardship to the defendant or to 
innocent parties, id. at 749-50, and deference to more particular law, id. at 752-53. 
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Some intellectual property producers choose to send their works 
into the world without obtaining contracts from all who might wish 
to copy them; only later do they seek to restrain or to obtain payment 
for copies made. The corrective justice model suggests that one 
should take responsibility for one's own actions; if so, this choice 
arguably should constrain such producers' rights to sue. 172 
In corrective justice at least two variables exist: the change in posi-
tion effected (the gain or loss) and the nature of the acts that give rise 
to these changes (active or passive). Ernest Weinrib aptly terms the 
paradigmatic acts in corrective justice "doing" and "suffering."173 
Where the parties have this doer-sufferer relationship, the case for 
relief is strongest.174 
Deliberate copying of intangibles created and marketed by others 
stands on uneasy ground. The plaintiff is a "doer," a chooser, an 
active party. She has chosen to make the product-the boat, the 
book, the automobile, the stock market average-available to the pub-
lic, knowing that she does not have a contract with all the persons 
who might want to use the product in ways she does not like. One 
might say she already has chosen her "harvest": the profit from the 
sale or lease of these objects. 
But that does not lead immediately to denying the plaintiff's claim 
because, among other things, the defendant is also a "doer''-he has 
172 Cf. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 Tex. L. 
Rev. 35, 41-44 (1981) (arguing that enrichment at the expense of another is not necessarily 
unjust and therefore not subject to restitution, and noting that sometimes restitution is 
required when no real enrichment was received). 
173 See Weinrib, Legal Formalism, supra note 81, at 978. 
174 This point is evident when comparing tort and restitution. The relationship between 
"doer'' and "sufferer'' clearly is present in those tort cases where an active defendant harms a 
passive plaintiff. In those cases, relief is fairly easily granted. The relationship of "doer'' and 
"sufferer'' is virtually reversed, however, in the typical "volunteer'' and "intermeddler'' cases 
of restitution law where an active benefactor sues a passive beneficiary. But see Silver, supra 
note 129, at 664-65 (arguing for an extension of restitution theory to encompass "passive" 
absentee plaintiffs in class action attorney fee collection); Weinn"b, Legal Formalism, supra 
note 81, at 979 (extending the "doing/suffering" model to certain cases of unjust enrichment). 
When someone provides an unrequested service without a good excuse for failing to seek the 
recipient's advance consent, relief ordinarily will be denied. The restitution literature contains 
many references to the desirability of preserving the passive defendant's freedom to choose 
with whom he will deal; protecting his autonomy is a major reason for the general refusal to 
allow intermeddlers to recover. See, e.g., Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 2 cmt. 
a; Edward W. Hope, Officiousness, 15 Cornell L.Q. 25, 26 (1929-1930); John W. Wade, 
Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1183-84 (1966). 
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chosen to make a mold of the boat hull design, to copy the book for 
mass sale, to use the recent improvements in the automobile engine as 
a model for the car he is designing, or to market a stock market 
futures contract that makes reference to the famous average. Between 
two active knowledgeable parties-two "doers"-it is more difficult 
to say where entitlements should lie. The creator's efforts appear still 
to give her a marginally stronger claim than the user's, but the differ-
ence between them is not sharp. 
Note the number of issues even this qualified claim to a nonprop-
erty entitlement leaves unresolved.175 The status quo corrective jus-
tice model is concerned solely with two parties: X generates a benefit 
that Y uses so Y should pay. But requiring Y to pay may affect many 
persons· beyond X and Y. If a model focuses on "cause,'' it also 
should take into account systemic effects that are "caused" beyond 
the two parties. More broadly, transactional rights should be created 
.ouly if their effects on systemic and distributional considerations are 
acceptable.176 Courts resolving tort or restitution cases have dealt 
with such transactional claims in a societal context. Their decisions 
may provide some hints as to how to accommodate a two-party cor-
rective justice claim with the rights or interests of third parties. But 
such courts are not attuned to the particular difficulties of granting 
rights in intangibles. Rights over intangibles as diverse as informa-
tion, typography, or utilitarian designs implicate discrete issues as to 
different types and uses within each subject-matter class. Restitution 
law can provide useful suggestions for only a portion of the con-
straints that should be applied to the reap/sow notion. Nevertheless, 
the restitutionary analogy offers a plausible bridge that completes the 
corrective justice claim by providing entitlement baselines that make 
intelligible the concept of copying as a "taking." It also links correc-
11s For example, what should be the result when more than one party "produces" the 
benefits? Does someone who produces $5 of benefit "deserve" the legal system spending $20 to 
capture it? Should someone whose contributions are rendered valueless by a particular 
organization of society have no right to reward or compensation? That which is beneficial may 
itself depend on the social structure. See Buchanan, supra note 70, at 236-38 ("different 
cooperative arrangements may demand different skills"). 
176 See Calabresi, supra note 43, at 297-308; cf. Munzer, supra note 77 (arguing for a 
pluralist approach to property justification); James W. Nickel, Justice in Compensation, 18 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 379, 387-88 (1976) (arguing that distributive and compensatory justice 
"are not really separate categories" but conceding the difficulty that would be introduced by 
attempts to classify particular sets as "justified holdings"). 
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tive justice to other norms and does so in a way that cautions against 
a too-quick adoption of a "property" model. So let us turn to restitu-
tion for the general principles it yields, if any, that are relevant to our 
problem of an increased judicial willingness to grant intellectual prop-
erty rights. 
The doctrines are to serve not as sources for determinate answers, 
but heuristically, as sources for themes that may assist in demystify-
ing and limiting the appropriative claim. At a more fundamental 
level, the inquiry may show that some form of reward for creative 
effort is consistent with larger patterns in our law, thereby vindicating 
the core of statutory intellectual property that still is attacked some-
times as an illegitimate privilege.177 
The concerns of courts in the restitution cases are party-oriented 
and social-welfare-oriented, backward-looking in the manner of sub-
stantive corrective justice, 178 and forward-looking in the manner of 
economic and other social-welfare formulations. The party-oriented 
concerns are avoidance of harm and preservation of autonomy.179 
The socially oriented concerns involve minimizing administrative 
costs, preserving a market system, and creating allocative incentives. 
Taken together, these concerns suggest that there should be sharp 
limits on the extent to which this core restitutionary impulse should 
prevail. 
II. REsTITUTIONARY THEMES 
The central goal of restitution is to prevent "the unjust enrichment 
of one person at the expense of another."180 Thus restitution usually 
is available only where a defendant has been euriched unjustly and at 
the plaintiff's expense. To fulfill the latter requirement, a restitution 
177 See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 131, at 263 (criticizing intellectual property as a form of 
"illegitimate state-granted monopoly"). 
178 "Corrective justice" is a category that today is often associated with backward-looking, 
ex post decisionmaking. In his original formulation, however, Aristotle left open the definition 
of a "wrong." Conceivably the determination of "wrongfulness" could involve ab ante criteria. 
See Posner, supra note 84, at 190-91, 201. 
179 The strongest example of the autonomy concern is the courts' efforts to maintain 
purchasers' control over their own decisions by denying restitution to most "intermeddlers" 
who provide services without request. See infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text. 
180 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 1.1; 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 1.1, at 5. 
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plaintiff usually must show either some loss to herself or the violation 
of some "legally protected interest."181 
Restitution doctrines function not only as a remedy for other 
causes of action but also as an independent source of substantive 
rights. 182 Thus, when a landowner obtains an award based either on 
the profits a trespasser gained from the tort or on the amount of 
money the trespass enabled the defendant to save, 183 restitution essen-
tially serves as a remedy for the preexisting tort action. 184 By con-
trast, the cases of both the doctor who renders emergency medical 
care without a contract and is allowed to sue the patient for pay-
ment185 and the debtor who mistakenly overpays a bill and is able to 
sue for the overage186 are examples of restitution creating its own 
cause of action. Our focus will be on this latter class of cases, in 
which unjust enrichment provides the substantive basis for the relief 
granted. 
One obvious but key issue is the meaning of "unjust enrichment." 
As for "enrichment," in ordinary language whenever one is made bet-
ter off, one is enriched. 187 Though restitution doctrine occasionally 
departs from this simple formula, it is satisfactory for our purposes. 188 
181 See 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.10, at 133; see also Peter B.H. Birks, Restitution and 
Wrongs, 35 Current Legal Probs. 53, 61 (1982) (distinguishing the "subtraction" sense and the 
"wrong" sense of the phrase "at the expense of"); 1 Corbin, supra note 133, § 19A (Supp. 
1991) (arguing that "detriment to the plaintiff" is crucial to quasi-contract recovery). 
182 "In an outline of the sources of civil liability, the principal headings would be tort, 
contract, and restitution." Douglas Laycock, supra note 35, at 1277; see also 1 Palmer, supra 
note 153, § 1.1, at 2 (arguing that liability based on unjust enrichment constitutes a distinct 
category). 
183 See Edwards v. Lee's Adtn'r., 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936) (awarding a share of the 
trespasser's net profits proportional to the physical characteristics and size of the cave 
involved); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231, 239 (Va. 1946) (awarding the 
market value of the excess use of an existing right-of-way as an approximation of the money 
saved by a trespass). 
184 I adopt Palmer's view, disregarding the fact that on a formal level such actions may be 
termed "assumpsit" rather than "tort." I Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.1, at 51 (reasoning that 
"the plaintiff's action is based upon the tort whether he sues to recover damages or to obtain 
restitution ..• [therefore] [t]he expression 'waiver of tort' is inaccurate"). 
185 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 116 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
186 Id. § 20. 
187 "A person is enriched if he has received a benefit." Id. § 1 cmt. a. "The word 'benefit' 
••• denotes any form of advantage." Id. § 1 cmt. b. 
188 In restitution doctrine, the problem of defining "enrichment" or "benefit" can be 
complex, but these difficulties largely appear in contexts inapplicable to our discussion. See, 
e.g., 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 1.8 (discussing the meaning of ''benefit"); John P. Dawson, 
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"Better off" is, of course, a matter of comparison; thus, we will take 
as our baseline for comparison the level of welfare that the allegedly 
enriched party would have had in the absence of that interaction with 
the benefactor or with the things that provide the alleged basis for the 
duty owed. This is the counterfactual approach familiar from tort 
law: how the party would have fared but for that interaction with the 
other party is the basis for the dispute. 189 If the defendant is better off 
than he would have been in that baseline world, he has a "benefit" or 
an "enrichment."19° Conversely, if a plaintiff is worse off than she 
would have been in the absence of the contested interaction with the 
defendant, she has suffered a "loss" or a "harm"191 and the expense-
to-plaintiff requirement is satisfied. 
Restitution Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 563 (1981) (discussing erasable enrichment). 
For a simple example of a difficulty that "enrichment" can pose, consider the case of a 
doctor who renders emergency medical care without a contract. Can she collect a fee from the 
patient's estate if the care was unavailing? The patient was possibly "enriched" during the 
pendency of the care in that he was given a greater chance of survival, but at the end of the 
transaction the patient was no better off than if the doctor had not acted. Nevertheless, the 
doctor will be entitled to the fee. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164, 166 (Ark. 1907); 
Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 116 cmt. a, illus. 1. 
189 Cf. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement 204 (1986) ("rr]he base point for 
determining how I affect you ... is determined by the outcome that you would expect in my 
absence."). 
190 Note that the comparison is with a hypothetical world where the plaintiff's creative acts 
were absent, not with a hypothetical world where intellectual property rules were absent and 
the plaintiff might have created in any event. For my reasons for this choice of baseline, see 
supra notes 133-48 and accompanying text. 
191 Note that I follow what I perceive to be ordinary language patterns here; also, ''loss" 
and "gain" are defined by reference to empirical counterfactuals-how one would fare in the 
absence of the allegedly harmful or beneficial act. Also, "loss" and "harm" are used 
interchangeably. 
In my view, a violation of exclusivity (a trespasser crosses a border but injures nothing on 
the land) is different from a temporal loss (a trespasser destroys an outbuilding). To capture 
this distinction, I will label the former a harmless trespass. I will treat the violation of an 
exclusive right, therefore, as giving rise to a "wrong" but not as necessarily creating a "loss" or 
"harm." Good arguments can be made for the opposite position, however. See, e.g., Feinberg, 
supra note 40, at 106-07. 
In our particular context, for example, one might argue that any violation of right is a 
"harm,'' and that the restitution courts recoguize this by allowing proof of such a violation to 
substitute for proof that a plaintiff has suffered a loss when the expense-to-plaintiff requirement 
is at issue. See infra text accompanying 220-21. There is of course some truth in that 
perspective. If a plaintiff had a right to exclude, then violation of that exclusive right could be 
considered a harm. But because I argue that creators should have no such right-or rather, 
that a right to exclude is not valid solely on reap/sow grounds--it will be useful to have 
language capable of distinguishing the two different ways in which the expense-to-plaintiff 
requirement can be satisfied, namely "wrong" and "loss." 
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But defining "benefit" or "enrichment" helps us only to pose the 
problem. Our law clearly should not and does not allow all benefits to 
be appropriated by those who create them. In an interdependent 
world, we all reap without sowing. 192 The very language we speak is 
something of value for which we have not paid. If free riding is not in 
itself wrongful, we must define the dividing lines between those bene-
fits for which we should pay and those for which we should not. We 
must identify enrichment that is "unjust." 
A review of the Restatement of Restitution-and related materials 
and cases-reveals no particular kind of nastiness that must be proven 
to support a restitution recovery. Cases of fraud, violations of fiduci-
ary duties, and the like, give rise to restitution, but so do cases in 
which there is no wrong at all. 193 Yet the concept of unjust enrich-
ment is not empty. Speaking descriptively and very generally, inde-
pendently based unjust enrichment appears to include enrichments 
that are not wrongful so long as they: (1) are unearned and unrecom-
pensed;194 (2) result from the labor or other resources of plaintiff;195 
(3) are not transferred to the defendant to satisfy one's legal duty or 
with donative intent;196 and (4) occur in contexts where reasons to 
deny restitution are absent. 197 This may not suggest "injustice" in the 
popular sense, but it is what the restitution doctrines, taken together, 
seem to indicate is the operative principle: a weak presumption that 
reaping without sowing should trigger relief. 
192 See Dawson, supra note 13, at 1412; supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
193 See Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 127, introductory note, at 7; id. § 1 
cmt. b, at 10 ("Often a person owes restitution for a benefit he received through entirely 
innocent behavior ••.. "); Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, at 522 ("[r]estitution 
does not require a wrong by the person who has received the property"); id. § 63 cmt. a, at 245 
("a quasi-contractual right is not dependent upon the existence of knowingly wrongful or even 
tortious conduct by the transferee"); 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 1. 7, at 40-44 (discussing both 
restitution based on wrongs and restitution based on other considerations). In addition, 
sometimes the desire to provide incentives for the provision of valuable goods and services will 
favor the grant of restitution. 
194 See supra note 193. 
195 See infra notes 121, 146-47 and accompanying text. 
196 See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text. 
197 As will appear, reasons to deny restitution include both party-oriented concerns of 
preserving the defendant's autonomy and avoiding harm to him and societally oriented 
concerns of keeping administrative costs low and maintaining markets. See infra Parts II.A & 
Il.B. 
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The obviously interesting question is the nature of the reasons that 
will operate to defeat the presumption. We now turn to identifying 
those reasons. 
A. Restitution Materials 
1. Officiousness: The Need to Justify the Absence of a Contract 
Someone acts in a way that gives a benefit to another person. She 
improves another's land or chattel, pays another's debt, provides med-
ical services in an emergency, or supports another's dependent. In 
response to virtually all of these events, a court first will inquire into 
the actor's justification for interfering in another's affairs. Ordinarily, 
"[a] person who without mistake, coercion or request has uncondi-
tionally conferred a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitu-
tion. "198 Absent a request by the recipient, ''the claimant must be 
ready with an explanation why his conduct should not be regarded as 
officious."199 
The concern evident in this inquiry has several dimensions. First 
and foremost is the protection of autonomy: the desire to preserve 
people's control over their own lives.200 Persons should not be forced 
to become obligors, and they should be free to choose with whom they 
will deal.201 To have to pay for service not ordered, to find one's obli-
gations satisfied in ways one has not chosen, or to find a neighbor 
demanding payment because he has bought one's son dinner when a 
meal was waiting at home would play havoc with one's self-determi-
nation and one's pocketbook. 
The officiousness inquiry also is motivated by doubt as to whether 
unrequested goods and services are in fact beneficial to the recipient. 
Such goods and services may be useless or even harmful in them-
selves-the dinner that prevents the son from eating his scheduled 
diet-or they may be worth less to the recipient than the price 
198 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 112. 
199 Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 127, § 1 cmt. h. 
200 It has been argued, for example, that if courts allowed recovery for benefits conferred 
without request, "the only person reasonably seeure against demands he has never assented to 
create, will be the person who, possessing nothing, is thereby protected against anything being 
accidentally improved by another at his cost and to his ruin." Isle Royale Mining Co. v. 
Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 338 (1877). 
201 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 193, § 2 cmt. a; Dobbs, supra 
note 158, § 4.9, at 298-305; Hope, supra note 174, at 30-31; Wade, supra note 174, at 1183-84. 
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charged. Because no one can afford to buy all the things she wants 
and because not all the things one has received are easy to sell, even 
the presence of significant market value does not guarantee that the 
recipient has received a "benefit. "202 
A third concern that motivates courts to ask whether a benefactor 
seeking payment had a reason to proceed without the recipient's 
request is the suspicion of intermeddling. Courts fear that people who 
give benefits willy-nilly may be motivated by a desire to rearrange 
others' lives to suit their own sense of appropriateness. 203 
The court-accepted justifications for volunteering ideally should 
parallel inversely the concerns just discussed. First, the court should 
require the plaintiff to show that her actions were not disrespectful of 
the other party's autonomy and that a demand for payment would not 
interfere significantly with the other party. Second, the plaintiff 
should show that her actions conferred a real benefit on the other 
party. Third, the plaintiff should show she did not intend to inject 
herself into the other party's life. 
The judicially acceptable grounds for volunteering tend to fall into 
the categories of mistake, 204 coercion,205 request,206 and emergency or 
necessity.207 In part, these grounds meet the concerns just addressed. 
In an emergency, conferring a benefit shows neither disrespect for 
another's desire to control his own life nor a desire to obtain power 
for one's self at another's expense. These concerns similarly are 
202 See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 109-14 (1985); Levmore, 
supra note 38, at 74-78. 
203 Cf. Wallick v. First State Bank, 532 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (reasoning 
that it is not the bank's function to determine which of a depositor's alleged creditors should be 
paid); see also Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 43 cmt. a ("No protection is 
deserved by one who intermeddles by paying another's debt either without reason or to secure 
rights against the debtor without the consent of the creditor."); Hope, supra note 174, at 25-31 
(tracing the historical development of the concept of "officiousness" and noting its origin in a 
deeply rooted cultural dislike of voluntary intervention in the private affairs of others). 
204 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, §§ 6-69. 
20s Id. §§ 70-106. 
206 Id. §§ 107-11. 
201 Id. §§ 112-17. The cases closest to our fact patterns are those involving mistake and 
emergency. Much of restitution law concerns failed contracts, but intellectual property 
involves relations between strangers. Cases of "request" and "coercion" will be largely outside 
our purview. 
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addressed if the benefactor is operating under mistake or because of 
request or coercion. 208 
Concern for the defendant's well-being is not the only reason to 
demand that the plaintiff have a good reason for bypassing the mar-
ket. The courts also may be making the substantive, normative judg-
ment that benefactors bear the responsibility of making private 
arrangements for their own payment and that, in the absence of a 
special excuse, benefactors are "to blame" for the failure to engage in 
advance consensual dealing. 209 
Further, in most areas of law, the courts feel more comfortable 
imposing liability on active parties who have chosen to engage in 
behavior that imposes on a plaintiff's interest. Because restitution 
defendants are usually passive rather than active recipients of others' 
actions, courts are reluctant to impose liability upon them. As dis-
cussed earlier, the very paradigm of corrective justice is best described 
as a relationship between "doer" and "sufferer."210 Imposing liability 
on a nondoer requires special justification. 
Most fundamentally, allowing frequent restitution suits when con-
tracts could have been obtained would undermine the market sys-
tem211 and overload the judiciary212 for no good reason. Consensual 
transfers are preferable to judicially imposed transfers on virtually all 
grounds--efficiency, fairness, and autonomy. 
Several commentators see a pattern in the cases suggesting that 
concerns with officiousness largely can be satisfied if the defendant 
had some control over the benefits-that is, if the defendant actively 
sought them out or could have refused them. 213 Such a defendant has 
made a choice, so concerns about his harm and autonomy are less-
ened. Dean John Wade has gone so far as to suggest that virtually the 
ouly elements that a restitution plaintiff needs to establish are that the 
20s The presence of these grounds for intervening, however, does not guarantee that the 
recipients in fact will benefit or that no interference with their autonomy will occur. 
Therefore, additional requirements must further condition recovery. 
209 See Fried, supra note 172, at 45-46 (discussing notions of responsibility in the context of 
restitution law). 
210 See supra notes 173-74 and aceompanying text. 
211 This concern with the market system may not be articulated explicitly in the cases, but it 
appears to play a strong role. See Levmore, supra note 38, at 79-81. 
212 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 127, § 2 cmt. a; Dawson, 
supra note 13, at 1418. 
213 See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 158, § 4.9, at 303-04; Wade, supra note 174, at 1198-99. 
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defendant is an active party who deliberately used a measurable bene-
fit produced nongratuitously by another.214 But that would ignore 
market-preserving considerations and reopen the danger of paralysis 
from expansive claims-we all continually and intentionally use mea-
surable benefits produced nongratuitously by others. 
The Restatement of Restitution does not go so far. Nor does Pro-
fessor George Palmer: 
In some instances ... the defendant benefited through exercise of a 
free choice to accept or make use of a product of the plaintiff's efforts. 
It does not follow that there is a right to restitution, for the plaintiff 
may have no legitimate claim of exclusive right to the product. 215 
As I suggested earlier, a creator's corrective justice claim to recom-
pense for her efforts has some weight, but it is slight; other norms may 
outweigh it. Therefore, the active and intentional role of the defend-
ant is not a sufficient premise for liability. It merely eliminates some 
of the types of unfairness associated with compulsion of defendants; it 
does not eliminate all unfairness, for a defendant's failure to refuse a 
benefit is a less reliable indicator of his preferences than would be an 
explicit consent to pay. 
Finally, the emergency and necessity cases suggest that a need to 
provide positive incentives sometimes can excuse behavior that other-
wise might be deemed officious, 216 although officiousness still may 
survive as a criterion of relative fitness.217 The Restatement explicitly 
states that "under some conditions, it is desirable to encourage per-
214 Wade, supra note 174, at 1212; see also Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, 
at 1456-57 (applying Dean Wade's test to the typical copyright case). My earlier doubts about 
whether Dean Wade's principle provides adequate boundaries, see id. at 1457 n.498, have 
grown. 
21s 2 Palmer, supra note 153, § 10.10, at 462; see also id. at 420.21 (discussing a case 
denying restitution to a lawyer who successfully contested a will, benefiting third parties who 
had not contracted with him). Note, however, that Professor Palmer is more open to the 
notion that having a choice over benefits can be an acceptable premise for liability when the 
plaintiff has submitted a specific idea to a specific defendant. Id. § 10.11, at 463-65; see also 
Harold C. Havighurst, The Right to Compensation for an Idea, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 295, 300 
(1954) (arguing that the defendant often is held liable for restitution when he uses an idea 
submitted in the course of nagotiations with the plaintiff that are initiated by the defendant). 
216 See Hope, supra note 174, at 38-39. 
211 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 113; Restatement (Second) of 
Restitution, supra note 127, § 3 cmt. b (the volunteer's "claim may be rejected on the ground 
that he was not a person properly qualified to intervene in the affairs of the person benefitted"). 
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sons to interfere with the affairs of others."218 This does not mean, 
however, that people acting in a generally useful manner will obtain 
restitution whenever they can prove that transaction costs or other 
problems make contracting impracticable.219 Perhaps out of fear of 
massive liability, the possibilities of recovery generally are limited to 
situations of imminent threat to life or property. 
2. Enrichment at the Expense of Plaintiff 
When a defendant violates an established right of the plaintiff, resti-
tutionary remedies usually will apply regardless of whether the plain-
tiff was injured materially by the violation. 220 If a trespasser saves 
himself expense or earns a profit, that the trespasser trod so lightly on 
the grass that not even a blade was bent will not matter; the plaintiff 
likely will have some claim on the amount so gained.221 
Without such a violation of right or some other independently cog-
nizable wrong to her, however, a plaintiff usually must show some 
loss.222 The contours of this "expense" requirement are not sharply 
21s Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 112 cmt. b, § 116 cmt. a. 
219 See Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 127, § 3 cmt. b ("[T]he public 
interest in the conservation of resources in general falls short of the need on which a salvor 
may base a claim to restitution."); see also Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 112 
cmt. b & § 114 cmt. b (explaining that the emergency exception applies only in certain 
narrowly defined circumstances). For a proposal to alter this state of the law, see Long, supra 
note 130, at 415-16 (suggesting that remedies be given whenever transaction costs would block 
a transfer that would be in both parties' interests). 
220 In such cases, a plaintiff's recovery may make her better off as a result of the invasion 
than she would have been without it. 
221 See supra notes 61, 153; see also 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.5, at 74-75, 136 (noting 
that many decisions in recent times have granted recovery in quasi-contract where a trespasser 
benefits from using the land regardless of injury to the owner). Even now, not all violations of 
right lead to restitutionary recoveries. For an exploration of this issue, see Daniel Friedmann, 
Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of 
a Wrong, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 504 (1980). 
222 See 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.10, at 133; see also Restatement of Restitution, supra 
note 152, § 1 cmt. d (noting that the benefit to one party and the loss to the other ordinarily 
are coextensive); id. at 522 (reasoning that the definition of restitution implies a loss to the 
plaintiff). This is not to say that the plaintiff's recovery would be measured by his loss. See 
Dobbs, supra note 158, § 4.5, at 260-61. Peter Birks suggests that there are two forms of 
unjust enrichment recognized by the law: " 'unjust enrichment by subtraction from the 
plaintiff' and 'unjust enrichment by doing wrong to the plaintiff.' " Birks, supra note 202, at 
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defined.223 As suggested earlier, the requirement may be one of 
nexus: something about the transaction must make this plaintiff a 
proper person to bring suit224 and must make the plaintiff's claim to 
the benefit better than this defendant's. 
I see the question of "loss" also as an outgrowth of the inter-party 
balancing that sometimes occurs in the restitution area. For example, 
courts sometimes inquire whether it would be "more harsh" to deny 
relief to a plaintiff or to force a defendant to pay, and the answer 
apparently influences the outcome.225 Without a loss or a violation of 
an established right, the plaintiff has little to weigh against the defend-
ant's interest. 
3. Avoiding Hann to the Innocent Defendant 
In cases not involving violations of a legal right or other wrongful 
behavior, courts tend to deny restitution unless the defendant clearly 
received a measurable bene:fit226 and he will not be worse off after the 
suit than he would have been absent the interaction with the plain-
tiff.227 Thus, to the extent one can speak of general rules in restitu-
26; see also id. at 132-34 (explaining that the defendant must be enriched "at the plaintiff's 
expense" for the plaintiff to have a cause of action). 
Some commentators go so far as to place "detriment to plaintiff" at the center of the law of 
quasi-contract. 1 Corbin, supra note 133, § 19A, at 53 (Supp. 1991) ("[T]he basis of quasi-
contract liability is not unjust enrichment, but unjust detriment."). 
223 See 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.10, at 133-42 (discussing the concept of enrichment at 
the plaintiff's expense). The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Restitution translate the 
"expense" requirement as either "loss" to the plaintiff or "an infringement" of his "interest." 
Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 127, § 1. They do, however, note some 
uncertainty about their own formulation. Id. at xiii. 
224 See 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.10, at 134; cf. Weinno, Causation, supra note 81, at 
429-32 (arguing that the plaintiff is linked to the defendant by the symmetrical relationship 
between causation and wrongfulness). 
223 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 42 cmt. a; see also Dobbs, supra note 
158, § 4.9, at 306 (reasoning that the courts ''balance hardships of the parties and allow 
restitution where the hardships upon the recipient would not be great"); id. § 2.4, at 52-54 
(explaining that courts engage in a "balancing of equities and hardships"). 
226 See Levmore, supra note 38, at 70, 77-78; Wade, supra note 174, at 1186-87. 
221 An innocent defendant-we are assuming that a copier is not a wrongdoer merely by 
virtue of copying-who has received the benefit of a stranger's services without request 
generally will be liable for no more than "the amount by which the recipient or his property 
has benefited." Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 155 cmt. d. Persons who violate 
the rights of others, particularly if they do so knowingly, may be treated quite differently. See, 
e.g., id. § 129(3) cmt. d, illus. 5 (where a trespasser takes shrubs, knowing they are not his, and 
doubles their value through his gardening efforts, the plaintiff is entitled to their value as 
improved, thus granting plaintiff the advantage of defendant's efforts). Fiduciaries who violate 
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tion, the general rule is that one "has no duty to pay for that which 
has been received without his knowledge or desire and which he can-
not return."228 The ability to return the item speaks to whether the 
defendant will suffer a net harm if forced to respond in restitution; the 
defendant's knowledge or desire speaks to the autonomy issue. 
If one repairs a car, erroneously thinking that its owner requested 
the service-a case of "mistake" --one neither shows disrespect for 
the true owner nor seeks to meddle in another's business. Yet, the 
owner possibly will not want the repairs, and a judicial order requir-
ing payment may make him worse off than having an unrepaired car. 
The outcome, at least according to the Restatement, is a compromise. 
The mistaken improver of chattels cannot sue independently for pay-
ment; however, if the improved chattel owner brings an action for 
conversion, the value of the repairs are deducted from the damages.229 
In other cases of mistake, such as overpayment of debts or transfers 
of property that can be restored in specie, plaintiffs receive more 
favorable treatment. 230 Ordering a return of money or in specie dif-
fers from ordering payment for services that cannot be returned. The 
former merely returns the defendant to a status quo ante;231 the inter-
ference with the defendant is minimal and relief is more easily 
granted. 232 
In the absence of some wrongful action, knowledge, or misrepresen-
tation by the defendant, the courts usually show solicitude for the 
their trust, for example, may be required to disgorge all profits, including those that result not 
from the plaintiff's resources but from the fiduciary's own entrepreneurial ability. See 1 
Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.11. A trustee may be held "accountable for the profits made by his 
employees even though he received none of the profit." Id. § 2.11, at 142. 
There are exceptions even for innocent recipients. See, e.g., Restatement of Restitution, 
supra note 152, § 1 cmt. e (estate or family of an accident victim who is assisted skillfully, but 
fruitlessly, by a medical professional during an emergency must pay regardless of the fact that 
the defendant was not "enriched thereby"); id. § 155 cmt d. There is enough fiexibility in the 
term "benefit," however, that some such exceptions can be rationalized as not exceptions at all. 
For example, such a patient's "better chance of recovery" is said to constitute a benefit 
"although ... no recovery [of health] is effected." Id. It generally is asserted that "if the 
transferee was guilty of no fault, the amount of recovery is usually limited to the amount by 
which he has been benefited." Id. § 1 cmt. e. 
22s Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 40 cmt. b. 
229 Id. § 42(2). 
230 See id. § 40 cmt. a, § 56 (explaining that restitution is not granted as freely for benefits 
that cannot be restored in specie). 
231 See id. § 56. 
232 See Dobbs, supra note 158, § 4.9, at 302-03. 
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defendant.233 There are several possible explanations for the emphasis 
that some courts place on "avoiding harm" to the innocent benefici-
ary. The first may be a desire to maintain clean judicial hands. Given 
the special nature of state power, arguably it is worse for a judge to do 
harm-other things being equal-than for a private party to do harm 
or to reap an unearned gain. This is particularly true when the 
defendant is not a wrongdoer. 234 
A second explanation of judicial solicitude for the restitution 
defendant stems from the priority that avoiding harm arguably occu-
pies in our system of law. In our law, the imperative to avoid harm-
ing our neighbors is stronger and more deeply entrenched than the 
duty to reward those who have benefited us. If by nothing else, this 
observation is supported by comparing the historic importance of tort 
law with that of restitution law. Other societal values seem to express 
a similar preference. The Ten Commandments, for example, prohibit 
various harms but do not order payment for beneficial acts. 
A third possible explanation for the courts' efforts to avoid impos-
ing net harm on defendants is substantive. The courts may derive the 
appropriative principle, in part, from a "do no harm" principle. If so, 
the logical hierarchy would seem to dictate that when the two princi-
233 Other examples of this solicitude for defendants are found in the rules on changed 
position that by and large favor defendants, at least where the defendants themselves are not 
wrongdoers. See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, §§ 69, 142. Note, however, that 
Professor Dobbs believes that some of these differences partially reflect the differences in 
available alternative remedies. Dobbs, supra note 158, § 4.6, at 280-81; see also 3 Palmer, 
supra note 153, at 527-29 (discussing change of position in the mistake context). 
The defendant who receives property by mistake probably need not pay if the property is 
lost before the mistake is discovered. Dobbs, supra note 158, § 4.6, at 280-81. Similarly, the 
recipient of undesired and unrequested goods "is subject to no duty of restitution" if he has not 
accepted the offer that they represent and if "the things are destroyed or lost without his 
fault." Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 56 cmt. b; cf. 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1988) 
(eliminating the duty to return unordered merchandise sent by mail). Further, a person often 
is relieved of the obligation to make restitution when his position has changed as a result of his 
innocently receiving another's funds and making expenditures he otherwise would not have 
made. See 3 Palmer, supra note 153, § 16.8, at 523-27 (discussing mistake and change via 
expenditures by the defendant). But see Dobbs, supra note 158, § 11.9, at 769-71 (noting 
limitations on courts' recognition of expenditure as a change of position). 
234 This is one explanation for the famous case of Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 
494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), where the court felt required to declare a certain preexisting land 
use a nuisance but conditioned relief on the plaintiff's willingness to pay the reloeation costs of 
the nonwrongdoing defendant. 
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ples conflict, the courts should defer to the "do no harm" principle. 235 
John Locke's labor theory of property can illustrate how a right to 
payment for benefits might be derived from a right against harm. 
Locke's primary argument for property depends on three steps. 236 
First, he took from his religion the proposition that "no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions."237 Second, 
he argued that each person has a property in his body and in the labor 
of his body.238 Third, he posited that when one appropriates things 
from the common-picking apples or drawing water from the river-
one joins one's labor to the things so taken. 239 Thus-and this is 
implicit-to take the apples or water from the laborer would harm 
him because his labor was joined to these items of sustenance. 
Because persons are under an obligation not to harm others' property, 
and because labor is the laborer's property,240 Locke could conclude 
235 This third argument suggests that the two principles-"do no harm" and "do not reap 
without sowing''-may not be simply two independent principles of differing weight, but that 
the first may be the source of the second. 
236 I here interpret Locke's "labor-joining'' argument. See Locke, supra note 74, at 134. 
Other interpretations of the argument also exist. See, e.g., James Tully, A Discourse on 
Property: John Locke and His Adversaries 116-21 (1980) (offering a different interpretation of 
Locke's "labor-joining'' argument). Locke presents additional arguments for property of an 
entirely different sort-for example, those regarding the beneficial results of property 
ownership. Locke, supra note 74, at 139-40, 143-46. 
237 Locke, supra note 74, at 123-24. "[M]en being all the workmanship of Cine olllllipotent 
... Maker ... they are his property whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not 
one another's, pleasure." Id. 
238 Id. at 134. 
239 Id. at 134-35. 
240 It is essential to the Lockean schema that he make this assumption that the individual 
has ownership rights in her own labor. Without it, a right against harm yields ouly 
indeterminate results in all but the rarest of circumstances. 
Consider, for example, the effect of Locke's proviso suggesting that property ean result from 
appropriation only if "enough and as good" is left for others. Id. at 134. The proviso often is 
interpreted as giving persons other than the appropriator a right against being harmed by the 
appropriation. If the proviso is satisfied, strangers and neighbors have no right to complain of 
the appropriation. Defining "harm" is problematic, however, as "[t]he proviso itself cannot 
settle what is to count as the baseline of disadvantage and thus as the ground of complaint." 
Ernest J. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1283, 1295-96 
(1989) (criticizing all attempts to found rights on considerations of advantage or welfare). If, 
for example, the noulaboring stranger plausibly could claim an entitlement to both the 
common and the fruits of others' labors upon it, the stranger intelligibly could claim to be 
"harmed" whenever others appropriated the fruits of their own labors rather than giving them 
to the stranger. It is the right to one's own labor that limits the nonlaboring stranger's claim. 
Locke believed that the stranger has a right to complain about the loss of her equal 
opportunity to use and to appropriate the common. Locke, supra note 74, at 137. This belief 
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that others have no right to that to which someone else's labor is 
"joined."241 In short, one who labors to draw forth objects from the 
common plenitude "has a property" in the things so gathered, at least 
as long as there is "enough and as good" left for others, 242 perhaps 
because others are under an obligation not to harm the laborer by 
taking from him his labor and the things to which that labor is 
attached. 
I suspect that this sort of logic, which I attribute to Locke, may 
play a role in restitution cases. It helps to explain why some courts 
prefer to leave a benefactor without recompense rather than to risk 
making a nonwrongdoing beneficiary worse off after suit than he 
would have been had the putative benefit never been rendered. 243 If 
the restitutionary principle depends on a moral command to avoid 
places a limit on what the first laborer is entitled to claim. These are normative positions that 
Locke assumes rather than defends. When the stranger's claims to use and appropriate the 
common herself in the future can be satisfied simultaneously with satisfying the laborer's 
claims, no one has ground to complain and, Locke seems to assume, property then can result. 
Id. at 136-37. 
241 Here Locke arguably builds upon one of his earlier notions of"property": an entitlement 
not to have what one owns unjustifiably taken away or harmed. Id. at 123-24. Locke's views 
on the meaning of ''property" are complex. See, e.g., Tully, supra note 236, at 60-79 
(examining Locke's many views of property). 
242 Locke, supra note 74, at 134. The proviso that there is a clear case for property ouly if 
"enough, and as good" is left for others constitutes an additional "do no harm" principle. It 
assures that the laborer has no clear claim to property unless he gave no one else a ground for 
complaint when he joined his labor to some portion of the common resource and appropriated 
the result. But see Beeker, supra note 76, at 42-43 (criticizing the idea that property rights 
gained by virtue of labor do not constitute a loss to others). 
243 A harm-oriented logic also may help to explain other aspects of restitution law, such as 
the importance of the voluntariness of the defendant's receipt of benefits. Assume that a 
benefactor, plaintiff P, labors and that a free rider, defendant D, benefits by that labor. 
Depending on how unavoidably or deliberately D has utilized those benefits, we might say, 
respectively, that D has "received" Ps labor, or that he has "taken" Ps labor. In the latter 
case-arguably following Locke-we might feel comfortable saying that D has "harmed" P. 
To the extent that choosing to cause harm tends to trigger liability in our system, this might 
help to explain why active Ds are more likely candidates for suit than passive Ds. 
I do not mean to suggest that in our system voluntary action must be present before any of 
the legal results that usually follow "doing harm" can be imposed legitimately. Although 
acting to cause harm or to reap benefit is more likely to trigger an obligation of payment than 
is passivity, the latter is not ipso facto exempt. 
That the strongest tort and restitution suits involve relatively active defendants is, in my 
mind, attributable more to considerations of fairness than to Epsteinian notions of causation. 
In some situations, it would not be unfair to impose payment obligations on passive persons. 
Consider, for example, the obligation of an overpaid creditor to return the overage. See supra 
text accompanying notes 230-32. 
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harm, the principle rightfully could not be used in a way that imposes 
harm without raising additional problems of justification. 
Even in cases where defendant D "harms" plaintiff P by actively 
and intentionally taking her effort in a way that deprives P of some-
thing she otherwise would have had, an "avoid harm" principle 
standing alone does not justify a court's doing more than correcting 
the imbalance. Unless something about D's act is independently 
wrongful or other considerations are involved, the putative harmful-
ness of D's act does not justify a court in remedying P's loss by 
imposing a money judgment or other relief that makes D worse off 
than he would have been before the interaction with P began. If the 
court took that step, it would harm D more surely than D harmed P. 
If courts implicitly give a priority to avoiding harm, this might 
explain why plaintiffs in restitution actions find it difficult to succeed 
on a complaint of unjust enrichment uuless they can prove that some-
how the defendant gained at their expense. 244 This priority is also 
consistent with limiting the scope of the reap/sow principle to one's 
expected harvest. 245 
In sum, a plaintiff must do more than prove that she was not seek-
ing to control another's life if she is to obtain restitution. Inter alia, a 
plaintiff must show some "expense" to herself and that giving relief 
will not harm the defendant or significantly diminish his autonomy. 
244 Note, however, that the extent of the plaintiff's loss would not limit the measure of her 
recovery in restitution. Availability of restitution is a separate issue from the measure of relief. 
245 See supra notes 153·64 and accompanying text. When D does something creative with 
Ps work that P could not have anticipated and that costs P nothing, as compared with Ps 
status quo ante, the fairness argument is weak for P. In such cases, D enjoys the fruits of Ps 
labor in a way that does not interfere with P. Enforcing Ps claim would, on the contrary, 
greatly interfere with D's plans. 
Locke is of little help in such cases as he only discusses objects that the laborer will lose if 
the covetous stranger makes use of them; he does not discuss objects from which two parties 
simultaneously can draw benefits. Locke, supra note 74, at 137. In his discussion most 
analogous to the topic, Locke indicated that when the fruits the laborer has gathered are in 
danger of spoiling, the laborer loses.his title in them. Rather than have the harvest go to waste, 
Locke writes that others are free to take the benefit of the laborer's earlier efforts and 
appropriate the fruits from him. Id. at 136, 144. Although the import of Locke's ''waste" 
discussion is much debated, one possible meaning is that the laborer has no claim in what he 
himself would not use. If so, then the requirement that P show a loss as prerequisite to 
recovery is further consistent with the Lockean approach. 
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B. Autonomy and Efficiency as Possible Influences on the 
Restitutionary Claim 
The restitution courts' concern for the defendant's autonomy and 
well-being, and their concern with societal economic effects, may 
reveal something about the internal structure of the appropriative 
claim. I suggest that the restitutionary claim is most intelligible when 
seen as a relational matter between the parties. Thus, preservation of 
autonomy and avoidance of harm may play a crucial explanatory role 
on both sides-plaintiff's and defendant's-of the restitution 
equation. 
1. Voluntary Action and the Relational Nature of Restitution 
From the point of view of autonomy, the strongest claims for judi-
cial intervention occur when a defendant who knowingly risks affect-
ing another's interests is sued by a plaintiff who was helpless to avoid 
the effects of the defendant's acts. One can see the importance of this 
consideration by comparing typical tort causes of action with the 
"intermeddler" cases within restitution and then by comparing these 
with the cases in which a deliberate copyist is accused of 
misappropriation. 
There is an element of voluntariness in the actions of any benefit-
generator. If the benefit-generator works in a context where, despite 
her hopes of profit, she has no assurance that she will be paid for or 
will be able to keep the fruits of her labor, then to some extent she 
knowingly takes a risk. This may not by itself defeat a right to pay-
ment, but it does create a weakness in the creator's claim that is not 
present, for example, in the claim of the typical victim of a harm. 246 
Persons who have not contributed to their own woes, like the typical 
victims of harm, are more attractive candidates for relief than the typ-
ical restitution plaintiffs. 
Similarly, the person who has acted or who otherwise has "made a 
choice" is a more plausible defendant from the perspective of auton-
omy than one whose "wrong" was a passive one. 247 Thus, although 
246 Unless a victim has contributed meaningfully to his own situation-through carelessness 
or self-destructive behavior-the plaintiff in a tort context merely suffers the harm, typically 
with little voluntariness involved. 
247 See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 95 (1881) ("The requirement of an act is 
the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice .... [The defendant must have 
some] power of avoiding the evil complained of .... "). 
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autonomy has not been the only relevant consideration, tort causes of 
action historically have tended to be limited to active defendants sued 
by comparatively passive plaintiffs.248 Such pairs are strong candi-
dates for judicial intervention. 
In the restitution cases falling under the "volunteer" or "intermed-
dler'' doctrine, parties typically have the opposite alignment. In those 
cases, plaintiffs who voluntarily have chosen to provide goods or serv-
ices without a prior assurance of payment, and thus have weak claims 
to payment, typically are paired with recipients who did not request 
the things provided and who may be unable to divest themselves of 
them-and thus have strong claims to be free of liability. One might 
call these the "paradigmatic pairs" of the intermeddler cases: an 
active benefactor sues a passive recipient. 
Thus, consider the case of the vacationing homeowner D who 
returns home to find that an itinerant volunteer P has painted his 
roof. In these cases P renders a service to D and then sues D. D has 
done nothing. Not surprisingly, under the intermeddler doctrine, D 
would not be compelled to pay.249 Given the weakness of the active 
plaintiff's claim and the passivity of the defendant, this paradigmatic 
pair forms a strongly unattractive scenario for judicial intervention. 
In the misappropriation cases and the other forms of restitution 
sued upon in the context of intangibles, the result today may well be 
different. D often is forced to pay.250 The difference in result may rest 
in part on the fact that a creator of intellectual products has a greater 
248 Only with the fairly recent advent of comparative negligence have at-fault, active 
plaintiffs been able to recover in negligence law. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467, 
special note (1965). Similarly, in recent years passive defendants have been forced to pay 
increasingly often. Consider, in this context, the growth of exceptions to the rule that one has 
no duty to rescue. Setf, e.g., id. §§ 314-24. Yet even today, suits by passive plaintiffs against 
voluntary actor defendants face fewer barriers than do suits where either the plaintiff's 
passivity or the defendant's activity is missing. 
249 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 2, § 112 illus. 3; Hope, supra note 174, 
at 29-31; Wade, supra note 174, at 1198 ("A person is ordinarily not required to pay for 
benefits which were thrust upon him with no opportunity to refuse them."). In this example, I 
am assuming the volunteer painted the house in the hope of payment from D and without any 
request, mistake, or other special circumstance. 
2so See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). For 
historic examples, see International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918); 
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1950), aff'd, 107 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1951). 
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need for judicial intervention to provide incentives251 than does the 
typical volunteer or intermeddler.252 I suggest, however, that the 
more significant difference is party-oriented, focusing on the defend-
ant's active or passive role. In the typical dispute over intangibles in 
which recovery is granted, the defendant is an active party, a knowing 
and intentional copyist.253 Similarly, in the relatively rare volunteer/ 
intermeddler cases where a volunteer P is allowed to collect, the facts 
often show that the defendant willfully had chosen to avail himself of 
the benefits provided. 254 
From these observations emerge several important conclusions that 
underline the difference between restitution and property. First, the 
differing outcomes illustrate that restitution is a relational cause of 
action. When a voluntary actor's claim as plaintiff is addressed to a 
paradigmatically passive defendant, the actor is termed an intermed-
dler and her claim to restitution is denied. When that same actor's 
weak claim is addressed to a defendant who had some control over 
the receipt of benefits, however, the plaintiff often can recover. One 
might conclude that the plaintiff wins only when the defendant can 
offer no good reason not to pay. 
From the point of view of voluntary action, recovery in restitution 
seems to depend on the consolidation of a weak plaintiff's claim with 
an even weaker defendant's claim.255 The strength of one party's 
251 See Wendy J. Gordon, Prisoner's Dilemma and Asymmetric Market Failure in 
Intelleetual Property, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. (forthcoming 1992) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Prisoner's Dilemma] (briefly discussing ab ante incentives). 
252 For example, it might be argued that intermeddler services run the gamut of possibilities 
from negative value (painting someone else's roof chartreuse) to positive value, whereas 
intellectual products used by other persons tend to be more uniformly positive. Of course, this 
empirical estimate could be challenged (consider, for example, pornography). 
253 A person who writes and publishes a book certainly operates in furtherance of his or her 
own interests, as does the volunteer painter who hopes to be paid. Except as to someone who 
has bargained with the author for production of the work-such as a patron, granting agency, 
employer, or contract publisher-the author is a sort of volunteer. Someone who wishes to 
copy the author's book draws from it benefits in excess of those received by the usual reader-
benefits not reflected in the book's purchase price. Absent copyright law, the author might be 
left to sue on a restitutionary cause of action. Unless something distinguishes the author's 
relationship with a copyist from the painter's relationship with the homeowner, such a suit 
likely would fail. 
254 Sec Wade, supra note 174, at 1198-99. 
255 See Dawson, supra note 13, at 1417-18 (arguing that "the claim of the self-seeking 
producer of a stranger's gain is marginal at best" and that such plaintiffs tend to recover only if 
conjoined with defendants who "contributed nothing to their own enrichment and ... [whose 
gain] is the traceable product of the producers' loss"); see also id. at 1457-58 (concluding that 
214 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:149 
claim is weighed against the other's, both in terms of the impact on 
autonomy, and in terms of their respective utility calculi. In particu-
lar, much seems to turn on the defendant's ability to avoid receiving 
the benefit upon which the plaintiff is suing256 and on a weighing of 
the comparative "harshness" that the ruling would impose on the two 
parties. 257 
Property law, by contrast, is much less willing to weigh the inter-
ests of strangers against those of the property owner, particularly 
where intentional actions are concerned. 258 Property rights give own-
ers prima facie claims that are presumptively "good against the 
world" rather than against particular parties.259 An innocent tres-
passer is as liable as a knowing one.260 By contrast, the benefit-creat-
ing labor that suffices to justify a plaintiff's restitutionary award 
against a defendant who knowingly avails himself of the plaintiff's 
labor might not justify that same plaintiff's prevailing in a context 
where the defendant innocently receives the putative benefit.261 
Second, the above suggests that the driving force behind the new 
misappropriation cases may not be the strength of the plaintiff's 
claim, but rather the weakness of the defendant's.262 In property law, 
the opposite is tme; such great deference is given to the plaintiff's 
interest that it prevails even when the defendant has a strong argu-
self-serving intenneddlers recover restitution only in situations where those who have gained 
did so "without effort or contribution of their own"). 
256 See id. at 1417-18; Dobbs, supra note 158, at 301-05; Wade, supra note 174, at 1195-
1205. 
257 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 40 cmt. e, § 42 cmt. a. 
258 As defenses to trespass actions, the doctrines of private and public necessity are quite 
constrained. Nothing approaching an equal weighing of plaintiff's and defendant's interests is 
even attempted. 
259 For example, an intentional trespass claim is good against both knowing and innocently 
erring entrants to the owned realty. See Restatement (Second) of Torts,§§ 163-64 (1965). Of 
course, "good against the world" is an exaggeration. Some defenses are available even against 
a property-based claim like trespass, and an unintentional, nonnegligent act can damage 
property without the owner's being entitled to recover. 
260 Id. Copyright does not require proof that the defendant knew he was infringing; 
copyright tends to follow the property model rather than the restitutionary model. 
261 See infra note 278. 
262 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 171-72 (1978) (distinguishing right-based and 
duty-based theories). 
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ment on his own behalf.263 In restitution, the cases manifest lesser 
deference to the plaintiff's interest. 
Third and :finally, this discussion of inter-party weighing leaves 
unaddressed the role that factors other than the comparative volunta-
riness of a plaintiff and a defendant should play in the new jurispru-
dence of benefits. For example, in the realm of intellectual products, 
if a defendant is prevented from serving the public's interest in access 
to or interpretation of plaintiff's work, profound negative effects on 
public discourse may result. The pattern in restitution suggests that 
some kinds of public interest, including the preservation of markets, 
can and should be accommodated. 264 Restitution cases do not 
address the possible noneconomic "merit good" or First Amendment 
issues that affect intellectual property problems.265 Nor is restitution 
equipped to deal with the "deadweight loss" that granting rights in 
intellectual products may impose. 266 
2. Autonomy in the Broader Context of Community Notions of 
Fairness 
One might argue that the principle of autonomy gives no guidance 
because autonomy claims are always symmetrical. What one party 
wants, the other party does not want. In this vein, I have argued that 
"[a]n approach that says 'favor liberty and avoid compulsion' without 
specifying the kinds of liberty and compulsion is ... radically indeter-
minate. "267 Yet, in everyday parlance, freedom and autonomy con-
note more than the "yes or no" question of whether one's will is 
honored in a given case. One can be "more" or "less" free, depending 
on the strengths and advantages one has to implement one's 
263 For example, a defendant who believes he is not acting wrongfully when he unknowingly 
crosses a boundary line seems to have a fairly strong argument that he should be free of 
liability. Nevertheless, if sued in trespass he will be liable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 164 (1965). 
264 Sec, e.g., Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 62 (transferee protected by 
public policy). 
265 I address these noneconomic issues at more length in Gordon, Equality, supra note 64. 
266 See supra note 29 (defining "deadweight loss"). 
267 Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1430; see also id. at 1425-35 (arguing 
that consent should not be used as a criterion for moral adequacy independent of an inquiry 
into the moral justifiability of the pattern of entitlements against which the consent was 
extracted). 
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desires.268 This is of course a nonabstract notion of autonomy,269 a 
view of one's control over life--including benefits and burdens, gains 
and losses-in terms of the concrete contingencies of daily life. 270 
There may be degrees to which one's ability to pursue one's own ends 
may be interfered with, degrees of nonabstract autonomy.271 If so, 
then some of restitution law conceivably might be understood as 
resulting from a comparison of the parties' stakes in terms of this 
interest. 
When the Restatement's authors consider whether granting relief 
would be "more harsh" to the defendant than would be denying relief 
to the plaintiff, 272 they may be groping for some such comparison of 
the parties' autonomy stakes.273 At least one group of commentators 
268 See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118, 122-34 
(1969). 
269 Immanuel Kant's interest was in the abstract realm; mere real-world consequences 
would be irrelevant to his conception of the autonomous will. See Weinrib, Causation, supra 
note 81, at 449. 
210 A notion of autonomy as the ability to have one's desires or whims carried out is also 
non-Kantian. 
271 One easily might argue that I am posing a utility argument in autonomy clothing. I 
indeed do see the two interests as intimately connected. For example, being compelled to hand 
over a resource involves a disutility greater than the simple market value of the resource itself. 
In my view, most of the evils popularly connected with loss of autonomy, cf. Epstein, supra 
note 90, at 189-204 (discussing the problem of the good Samaritan), would be avoided under a 
utilitarian regime. Further, I do not concede that interpersonal comparisons of utility are 
inherently any more difficult to perform than are the estimates that judges, administrative 
agencies, or scholars routinely try to make of likely economic effects. See, e.g., Brian Barry, 
Political Argument 44-47 (1990) (defending interpersonal comparison of utility). 
212 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 40 cmt. a,§ 42 cmt. a; see also Dobbs, 
supra note 158, at 306-07 ("balancing of hardships" in each case). 
273 At least one commentator applying a Kantian notion of autonomy, although admittedly 
a quite different notion than the every day notion of "the ability to pursue one's own ends," 
has suggested that substantive rules of noninterference can be derived from the "formal and 
abstract" equality among property holders. Sec Weinrib, Causation, supra note 81, at 426-29. 
Weinrib suggests that applying the "objective" standard in negligence law, as embodied in 
Learned Hand's Ca"oll Towing test, involves a defendant's recognition that the "interests [of 
others] have the same claim to consideration as his own." Id. at 428. 
Weinrib argues that the negligence standard appropriately applies to accidentally caused 
harm. See id. at 427-28. By contrast, we have considered primarily intentional action. 
Perhaps in inquiring into ''harslmess," the authors of the Restatement of Restitution are 
treating the necessity of interaction in a community as a functional equivalent to inadvertence 
in the accident context. 
My use of the negligence analogy might be misunderstood as arguing that courts should 
permit free riding that generates more profit for the copyist than cost to the original creator. 
This is not my point. First, in cases of that kind the copyist will be able to pay for a license to 
make the desired use (so long as market failure is absent); if no legal privilege of copying must 
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has sought to resolve intellectual property questions in terms of this 
inquiry, asking what "the impact upon the value at stake, namely, 
freedom of action" is for each party.274 
If a balancing of such interests is the operative notion, that suggests 
one reason that a creator might have a stronger claim to what she has 
made than a copyist would. To the extent a creator labors toward a 
goal, she has forgone alternative investments of effort and reduced her 
available avenues of action. Thus, the particular avenue remaining 
has great importance for her, and interfering with it may render pur-
poseless many of the prior choices she has made. For the copyist, 
however, closing this particular avenue arguably will mean compara-
tively little, for he has little prior investment in its pursuit. Although 
both may value equally the profits at issue, only for the creator does 
the creation embody a host of prior sacrifices and the implementation 
of her distinct and general goals. 275 
The case may be harder when the copyist has his own more general 
goals for which copying is essential. For example, the copyist may 
want to paint landscapes of all public areas in his town in order to 
preserve a historical record, and it may happen that the statue in the 
central square was sculpted by a creator who disapproves.276 But at 
least where such complications are absent and one party has invested 
in the creation of something in which the other has not, then ceteris 
paribus, a respect for persons as equals might join with the prima facie 
entitlement over one's labor to suggest that the creator's claim against 
be given to ensure that an economically desirable use be made, then the economic desirability 
of that use provides no argument for free use. See Harper & Row Publishers v. National 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985). Second, the balancing envisioned here is not a narrow cost-
benefit calculus, in which the value of the contested resource is considered independent of the 
mode of transfer. The mode of transfer (compelled or consensual) can inflict disutility that 
needs to be assessed. 
274 S. Coval, J.C. Smith & Simon Coval, The Foundations of Property and Property Law, 
45 Cambridge L.J. 457, 467-72 (1986). Of course this kind of inquiry is unlikely to decide 
many particular cases. In evaluating Britain's equivalent of INS, Victoria Park Racing & 
Recreation Grounds Co. v. Taylor, 58 C.L.R. 479 (1937), even Coval, Smith, and Coval are 
forced to resolve at least one of their hypotheticals by positing that the defendant was utilizing 
a means "already owned by" the plaintiff-the very question to be decided. Id. at 471. 
21s Underlying this also may be a substantive notion of fairness or of what it means to live a 
good life. Taking advantage of "another's pains" may be seen either as unfair or as inhibiting 
the copyist's own development. 
276 This may be one reason why current copyright law is likely to give the painter a fair use 
privilege to include the statue in his painting. 
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the copyist should be honored. 277 Of course, cetera are never paria. 
When all other things are not equal, other norms must play a role. 
This logic suggests that the courts' concern for the defendant's 
autonomy may be matched by a concern for the plaintiff's autonomy 
and that the latter helps to generate the plaintiff's restitutionary claim 
whenever it is stronger than the autonomy interest on the other side. 
This logic arguably is at work in those cases in which restitution is 
granted because the beneficiary had special knowledge and power that 
undermined his autonomy claim and augmented the benefactor's.278 
211 Cf. Weinrib, Causation, supra note 81, at 428 (arguing that the negligence standard "is a 
reflection of the formal equality of the rights-holders, setting the terms on which they can 
interact as equals"). 
27s One example might be if the homeowner in our painting example knew that the painter 
had been responding to a neighbor's call and had misread the house numbers. Without that 
knowledge, the arguments against restitution are strong. See Levmore, supra note 38, at 74-79, 
84-87. If, however, the homeowner stood by silently, grinning to himself at the thought of 
having his roof painted for free, his disrespect for the painter's life plan, coupled with the fact 
that the erring painter had committed no equivalent act of disrespect, might explain the court's 
willingness, to impose an obligation of restitution. See Wade, supra note 174, at 1198-99 
(owner obliged to pay in such a case). 
The recipient's "conduct in permitting the continuance of the services subjects him to 
liability." Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 40 cmt. d (defendant's conduct may 
amount to an acceptance); see Birks, supra note 202, at 104 (discussing "free acceptance"). 
Whether the reason for such results is described technically as estoppel or as acceptance, it 
also can be described in terms of fairness. The defendant is ill-situated to complain that the 
plaintiff has imposed on his autonomy when he stood by as the other worked, hoping to benefit 
by the other's error. His action suggests not only that he desired to receive the result of the 
other's efforts, but also that he has no respect for the other's desires. 
The position of a defendant who knows that services are being rendered is "weak" even 
against a "risk-taking volunteer'' because "when [the defendant] begins to say that the plaintiff 
chose to run the risk of disappointment he is immediately trumped by the reply that if he had 
spoken out there would have been no risk to run." Id. at 104. Note that these are not cases 
that require significant effort by the defendant to keep the plaintiff from a fruitless investment 
of labor. Also note that the paint job is something for which a homeowner ordinarily would 
expect to pay. When considering a cause of action about intangibles that are not preexisting 
subjects of ownership for which payment ordinarily is made, the argument in favor of 
restitution might be harder to make even given an equally callous beneficiary. 
Notions of weighing the impact on both parties' life plans also may help to explain the 
"n¥staken overpayment" cases. If a debtor overpays a debt, she admittedly once had an 
entitlement to the money used. But now she has paid it to someone else. Why should she be 
favored over the recipient? One possible answer might be that it might be more harsh to leave 
the payor without recovery than to impose an obligation on the defendant. For the plaintiff, 
the amount of overpayment ordinarily will reflect money earned and thus sacrifices made; for 
the defendant, the overpayment is a windfall on which nothing usually rests. If a defendant 
who receives money by mistake does change position in reliance on the money received, the 
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The comparison of "hardships" or autonomy claims should not be 
required to bear much weight, however, for one's investments and 
expectations may depend upon the law. For illustration, return to the 
case of copying. If the law warns authors that they cannot expect 
recompense, then they likely will not invest much of themselves in life 
plans that depend on receiving compensation for creativity, and the 
investment-based "autonomy" argument in favor of payment would 
appear weaker as a result.279 More generally, just as the context, or 
the law, might warn a potential beneficiary that he is about to avail 
himself of a benefit in which another claims an interest, the context, 
or the law, might warn a potential benefactor that she proceeds at her 
own risk because the law gives no assurance of repayment.280 The 
autonomy argument should be available for unrecognized as well as 
recognized legal claims. 
3. Economics 
One final set of observations is in order. Restitution cases appar-
ently grant recompense where party-oriented fairness concerns con-
join with societal concerns, notably with economics. This sort of 
redundancy is common in the law but is particularly noteworthy here. 
Restitution seems to be denied where it would impose unfairness, 
either by threatening an innocent defendant's autonomy or by impos-
ing a net harm on him, or where a restitutionary right would impose 
high systemic costs by undermining the market and burdening the 
courts sometimes reduce his otherwise-applicable duty to repay. See 3 Palmer, supra note 153, 
§ 16.8, at 522-27. 
The courts do not, of course, condition restitutionary recoveries on the plaintiff's ability to 
prove she earned the money at issue. Other explanations for the mistaken overpayment cases 
exist. For example, allowing recovery of overpayments respects initial entitlements and may 
facilitate transactions by removing the risk that errors will be permanent. (I am indebted to 
William F. Young here.) 
Also, there is another economic reason to favor a plaintiff who has earned the money over a 
recipient who has not. The prospect of random gains and losses tends to discourage 
productive behavior by severing the apparent relation between effort and income. See infra 
text aecompanying note 284. 
279 Some conceptions of autonomy, however, might go well beyond a notion of 
investment-to embrace, for example, an author's interest in "living fully." Because there is 
little consensus on these broader conceptious of autonomy, I identify only one of autonomy's 
hard-to-dispute elements-the preservation of a life plan to which one is committed. 
280 Just as a potential beneficiary may have some choice about accepting benefits that bear a 
price tag, a potential benefactor may have some choice about generating benefits that will not 
be recompensed. 
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courts. But no precise dividing line can be drawn between economic 
issues and fairness issues because one of the key economic concerns-
preservation of markets-arguably is also an autonomy concern. 281 
Moreover, other key economic issues, such as the imposition of high 
systemic costs that will be borne by third parties, also can be viewed 
as a concern with minimizing harm. Further, awarding restitution 
not only gives a laborer her arguably "just reward"; the availability of 
restitution also may have an economic effect by giving similarly situ-
ated persons an incentive to in.vest time and money in.to new creative 
work by promising them a significant degree of internalization of ben-
efits produced. 
Nevertheless, economics can be disentangled from other concerns 
in some factual settings, and one tentative observation emerges that 
might be surprising from the perspective of aggregative economics. 282 
Courts apparently view a mere transfer payment-a distributional 
rather than an allocatively oriented change in resource holdings-as 
desirable. Other things being equal (e.g., autonomy and market-pres-
ervation concerns not being implicated in a given case), the courts 
seem to prefer that benefactors receive payment. 283 
Yet even this preference can be interpreted economically. Ordering 
restitution undoes random events, such as mistake and failed con-
tracts, that, if left unremedied, may erode a person's confidence that 
her efforts will bear reliable fruits. Providing incentives by preserving 
a perceived connection between effort and income is a long-recognized 
economic goal. 284 
The next section will demonstrate that the stand-alone principle--
the desirability of paying those whose labor yields benefits for 
281 Markets involve not only a much lower level of transaction costs than do court-
supervised transfers, but they also involve consensual dealings, albeit in a limited sense. On 
the nature of those limits, see Gordon, Inquiry Into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1425-35 
(examining the use of consent as a criterion for moral adequacy). 
282 Aggregative economics-usually associated in the legal world with Judge Richard 
Posner's "efficiency" criterion and in the economics world with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion-
places stress on allocative rather than distributional issues. See Jules Coleman, Efficiency, 
Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 Cal. L. 
Rev. 221 (1980). 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 194-97. In other words, there appears to be a weak 
presumption in favor of requiring the transfer payment. 
284 See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of"Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214-18 (1967) (discussing 
"demoralization costs" in a utility context). 
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others-integrated with competing principles and policies might yield 
recommendations for handling legal conflicts over intangible prod-
ucts. The unifying device for the demonstration will be a proposed set 
of minimum constraints, in which enforcement of the restitutionary 
principle is conditioned upon satisfaction of the various other consid-
erations that the preceding sections have brought to light. 
III. SET OF MINIMUM CoNSTRAINTS 
What factors are relevant to deciding that a plaintiff's claim of 
"unjust enrichment" entitles her to recoupment? Voluntary action by 
the defendant is obviously one factor. Whether the benefits are trace-
able to their origins might be another. A third might be whether the 
plaintiff obtained a nonreciprocal benefit. Regarding the third factor, 
if over time the benefactor likely will receive similar benefits from 
other people, fairness might be served even if she has no right to sue 
for recompense (and administrative costs thereby might be saved in 
the bargain). 285 
The Article here articulates a set of criteria that, when present 
together, ordinarily will satisfy both the party-oriented and market-
preservation concerns. I present them as if I were defining a set of 
necessary (but not sufficient) elements in a cause of action286 for mis-
appropriation based on unjust enrichment. Three qualifications 
should be noted. 
First, my project is to outline the several conditions that a plaintiff 
should be required to satisfy to have a valid reap/sow claim. Satisfy-
ing these conditions, however, does not ipso facto entitle a plaintiff to 
relief; rather, a plaintiff merely has demonstrated that one particular 
reason counts in her favor. Intellectual products often implicate 
important normative concerns not found in restitution case law, 
which may justify placing further limits on a producer's claim. The 
285 Id. at 1223. Of course, considerations other than fairness may mandate compensation 
even in the presence of reciprocity. See, e.g., id. at 1223-24 (arguing that utilitarian 
considerations sometimes weigh in favor of granting payments that a pure fairness approach 
might not require). 
Mere reciprocity does not guarantee productive behavior. Persons in the classic tragic 
common each may be in a position to harm the other; creating a regime of exclnsive legal 
rights may preserve their reciprocity but productively redirect their efforts. (I am indebted to 
David Friedman here.) 
286 Because restitution is governed primarily by state law, I use the term "cause of action" 
rather than the modern federal phraseology "claim to relief." 
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set of constraints refers to the existence of such other considerations 
but does not define them exhaustively. Because our jurisprudence has 
not yet evolved to the point where these other normative issues can be 
resolved satisfactorily, I am not supporting misappropriation even 
with the addition of the proposed set of constraints. 
Second, note that I rename the tort. The term "misappropriation" 
has an unfortunately propertarian ring. It would be truer to the tort's 
origins to give it a name more reflective of its relational nature. One 
might use the older term, "unfair competition," but as that is quite 
broad, I suggest the name "malcompetitive copying." 
Third, I present the minimum elements of a tort of malcompetitive 
copying as if the cause of action arose in a world without established 
intellectual property rights. In the real world, much that is covered 
by this cause of action would be protected or preempted by the copy-
right and patent statutes. Parallels between what the cause of action 
recommends and what existing intellectual property statutes actually 
provide wiij suggest the extent to which the statutes are consistent 
with the common law of restitution287 and the significance of the ties 
between the two areas. Space does not permit, however, a complete 
canvass of these linkages. 
A. The New and Slimmer Tort: Ma/competitive Copying 
In summary form, the set of minimum constraints that should limit 
any common law protection for intangibles premised upon a restitu-
tionary foundation follows: 
A defendant who has violated no independent right shall not be 
subject to suit based upon his or her use of an intellectual prod-
uct created by another unless: 
(a) he or she knowingly copies an eligible intangible; 
(b) in a context exhibiting asymmetrical market failure; 
287 A common criticism of intellectual property doctrines such as copyright and patent is 
that they are sports, "queer branches of our jurisprudence" that exist only by virtue of "an 
exception depending on statute." Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 932, 932 (1939). In another context I have taken issue with this position, 
demonstrating the consistency of copyright with common law patterns. See Gordon, Inquiry 
Into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1437-38, 1354-65. Part of my argument suggested that 
copyright's distributional baseline is consistent with that of restitution and that many other 
aspects of copyright are als~ consistent with the restitution case law. See id. at 1455-60. 
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(c) takes sales from plaintiff's actual or expected market; 
and 
( d) the use is of a type and amount not likely to be equiv-
alently valuable to the plaintiff over the long run. 
These might be considered requirements of (a) knowing use, (b) asym-
metrical market failure, ( c) competitive nexus, and ( d) nonreciprocity. 
In addition: 
An "eligible intangible" is a product that is: 
( e) deliberately created or produced by a person or other 
legal entity in excess of legal duty and with an expec-
tation of either reward or control; and 
(f) clearly bounded and marked as owned, or that is used 
in a context where the defendant has the knowledge 
that proper demarcation would have provided; and 
(g) otherwise suitable for trading in a market context 
where the seller's leverage is provided by a judicially 
imposed duty. 
The first two requirements for an eligible intangible-(e) deliberate 
production in excess of a legal duty and (f) demarcation-form part 
of the internal boundary marking the limits of an appropriate reap/ 
sow claim. Together with constraints (a) through (d), these condi-
tions, when satisfied, entitle a plaintiff to claim that the restitutionary 
impulse weighs in her favor. 
The third eligible intangible condition is (g), other suitability. This 
presently open-ended condition significantly differs in that it includes 
the many conceivable independent reasons capable of defeating the 
restitutionary claim. For example, a nonreciprocal and intentional 
use of another's eligible intangible should be privileged if the use 
would serve significant First Amendment goals, or perhaps if enforce-
ment costs would be prohibitively high. Constraints (a) through (f), 
by contrast, reflect solely the limits implicated by the law's treatment 
of benefits in general, and by the corrective justice model I developed 
earlier by reference in part to the ''benefits" case law.288 
That independent values may defeat a prima facie corrective justice 
claim should be no surprise. In torts, for example, innocent injured 
plaintiffs often are left remediless by immunities, privileges, and limi-
288 See supra Part I.D. 
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tations of causation and duty.289 Although condition (g) is a neces-
sary element, at present it is largely a black box, indicating the need 
for further articulation of policy and for attention to particular con-
texts. Until (g) is fleshed out-and our case law and commentators 
have begun this task-the tort of misappropriation or malcompetitive 
copying will remain a highly dangerous judicial tool. 290 
Taking the constraints one by one, the following section provides 
an overview of how such a cause of action might operate291 and the 
nature of its potential justifications. 
B. Substantive Provisions Examined 
1. Explanation of ~1'iolated No Independent Right'' 
This set of constraints does not apply to causes of action premised 
on rights other than a restitution-based right against copying simplic-
iter. Grievances growing out of breaches of fiduciary duty or breaches 
of contract would be free of these constraints, for example.292 More-
over, the constraints do not negate the possibility that rights in 
intangibles premised on grounds other than reap/sow arguments 
might exist. Such other rights would have their own rationale. 
2. Explanation of ~xnowing Use" 
The requirement of knowledge serves the two party-oriented con-
siderations of fairness: avoiding harm to the defendant and preserving 
his autonomy. One who knows he is about to use something that 
bears a price tag and nevertheless chooses to do so presumably values 
the use more than the money he will have to pay for it and exercises 
289 Recall that conditions (a}{f) merely state the grounds upon which it is appropriate to 
enlist a particular type of moral/legal reasoning in the plaintiff's favor. Thus, just as satisfying 
conditions (a}{f) may not avail a plaintiff who still fails to satisfy condition (g), it is possible 
that considerations other than reap/sow could give rise to a plaintiff's claim even where 
conditions (a)-(f) are not satisfied. 
290 At the close of this Article, two examples applying the set of constraints illustrate the 
importance of condition (g). See infra text accompanying notes 456-62, 475-85. 
291 The specification of the appropriate remedy for this eause of action will require 
additional investigation. I have suggested doubts about the desirability of injunctive relief, see 
supra note 171 and accompanying text, and offer some tentative suggestions about monetary 
measures, see, e.g., infra note 295, but full investigation of the remedial question is beyond the 
scope of this Article. A preliminary investigation is offered below. See infra text 
accompanying notes 412-36. 
292 I put aside here the difficulty of determining how to classify the borderline cases. 
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some choice and control over his life. By contrast, a beneficiary might 
suffer a net harm if he were required to pay for unwanted benefits 
thrust upon him. 293 One cannot afford to buy everything that has 
positive value in the market.294 Further, being required to pay for 
goods and services one has not ordered arguably infringes one's 
autonomy. Only if the defendant knows that he is about to use some-
thing owned by another for which the owner would request payment 
(and note that an "eligible intangible" must be demarked as owned 
under requirement (f)), will he be able to defend himself from 
unwanted incursions into his pocketbook. 295 The defendant's choice 
293 See Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 40 cmt. a (recipients of services may 
be free of obligation to pay because they lack "the opportunity of return" and they derive "no 
definite and certain pecuniary advantage" from the putative benefit); Levmore, supra note 38, 
at 75-76; Wade, supra note 174; supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text; see also Jessica 
Litman, supra note 21 (arguing that intellectual products that "seep into" one's consciousness 
should not be treated the same as those that are initially encountered with a knowledge of their 
ownership and a choice as to exposure). 
294 See Levmore, supra note 38, at 74-79. 
295 Arguably, the knowledge and demarcation requirements standing alone are insufficient 
to protect a defendant from unfair surprise because a potential user who sees a "do not copy'' 
warning may still be in doubt as to whether the law will enforce this prohibition. 
For example, the intangible's creator will not be able to sue a copyist successfully unless he 
can show, among other things, that he faced market failure (requirement (b)) and that the item 
is "suitable for trading in a market context" (requirement (g)). Yet, the potential user may not 
have the facts available from which to assess the market failure requirement and may not be 
able to forecast the court's decision on the normative issue of market suitability. The potential 
user thus remains uncertain as to whether he is copying an eligible intangible over which a 
creator may assert a right. 
If so, this may suggest that the first time a particular type of intangible is sued on, the court 
should be particularly careful to tailor its remedy in a way that avoids harming the defendant. 
So, for example, if the defendant already has begun an enterprise utilizing the plaintiff's 
product, the court should decline to give injunctive relief and should use as its measure of 
monetary relief a comparatively modest measure, such as the ex ante fair market value of a 
license. For later offenses, conceivably a more heavy measure should be used to preserve 
incentives to use the market. Sec Iowa State Univ. Res. Found. v. American Broadcasting Co., 
475 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). One example might be a proportional award of those 
defendants' profits attributable to use of the plaintiff's work. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Picture Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (ruling that despite the lack of mathematical 
certainty, a rule of apportioning profits may be applied). 
If for institutional reasons the court desires not to "make markets" via its own setting of 
priees, see Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1622-24, allowing the defendant free use might 
be an appropriate way to avoid inflicting chill on potential creators of derivative works. This is 
not terribly unusual; courts long have felt free to declare prospective rules, binding for the 
future but inapplicable to the parties before it. Admittedly, such a course has the danger of 
making plaintiffs less likely to sue on new variants of the cause of action because of a fear they 
might not collect. One solution to the dual need-to preserve plaintiff's incentives to sue, and 
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to use an owned product that is marked clearly with a tag indicating 
the likely price vitiates most arguments that he would be worse off 
after paying the plaintiff than he would have been had he not used the 
product at all. 296 
The requirement of knowledge also is tailored to the societal goal of 
preserving markets. Only a defendant who knows that he will be 
using an intangible in which another claims an interest will have the 
ability to seek the creator's consent before using it. 297 In other words, 
such a defendant can purchase an intentional use through the market. 
The set of minimum elements addresses persons who depart from the 
market without excuse298 and thus encourages the use of an institu-
tional structure (the market) that has distinct advantages over the 
courts as a forum for setting "prices and allocating resources.299 
to constrain the chill of new anticopying decisions-might be for the court to declare a new 
rule, to make it inapplicable to like behavior that already has occurred prior to the rule's 
announcement, but to make the rule applicable to the particular defendant before it so that the 
plaintiff can collect a significant sum. See Kelly v. Gwinnel, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984). This 
approach has its own difficulties, of course: its fairness can be questioned, as can its ability to 
constrain the chill on creative use of existing works. 
It also could be argued that the task of regulating intangi'bles should be left to legislative 
rather than judicial hands, for the legislature is much more able to provide advance 
specifications that will define classes of protected intangibles and categories of actionable 
copying. Such a suggestion would not be inconsistent with the current project and in fact is a 
position advanced in the conclusion of this Article. See infra Conclusion. In presenting the set 
of minimum constraints as desirable, I do not mean to suggest that the judiciary is the 
institution best suited to implement them. 
296 This would violate the Lockean pfQviso. See Gordon, Equality, supra note 64. Persons 
who have begun to rely on the use of certain resources may develop a property-like reliance 
interest in this continued availability. Cf. Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 
40 Stan. L. Rev. 611, 663-78 (1988) (arguing that the legal system often protects the more 
vulnerable party in an ongoing relationship from injury caused by a dissolution by the stronger 
party); see also Litman, supra note 21, at 1015 ("A rule requiring authors effectively to forget 
the facts learned from other authors would be destructive and impossible to enforce.''). 
297 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). If the defendant, 
despite his knowing use, does not have a realistic opportunity to bargain with the creator, he 
will be free of restitutionary claims because of the requirement of asymmetrical market failure, 
under which a market failure experienced by the defendant counts as a defense. See infra text 
accompanying notes 311-35. 
298 Iguorance is ouly one type of market failure. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 
1614-15, 1627-35 (discussing other types of market failures and their relevance). 
299 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297 (presenting a framework by which 
entitlements are protected by property, liability, or inalienability, rules). By contrast, a 
defendant who does not know he is using an owned product cannot seek to purchase it, and 
allowing the producer to sue him will not encourage markets to form. Admittedly, allowing 
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A troubling aspect of this element is that it prevents the courts 
from "making bargains" in some cases where such action might be 
economically desirable. If, for example, a producer's ability to stay in 
business depends on her being entitled to obtain recompense from 
innocent infringers, under my rule her business will fail even though it 
generates more overall benefits than costs. I nevertheless choose this 
route because suing innocents-particularly those who have inter-
mixed their own resources with plaintiffs' --can be unfair and can run 
afoul of the party-oriented fairness concerns of corrective justice and 
of the restitution cases. 
In any event, the element has an economic side effect that may out-
weigh the occasional loss of incentives to producers-preservation of 
an amount of freedom for creative persons who otherwise might be 
chilled through fear of lawsuits. 300 Limiting the remedies for 
unconscious copying, or requiring proof of a knowing use as a precon-
dition for recovery, would help to preserve a vigorous creative 
environment. 301 
The rule I propose does not follow the "property" pattern. In real 
property any volitional unconsented entry on land is actionable in 
trespass, even if the entrant reasonably believed he was on land upon 
which he had permission to stand.302 Similarly, in copyright an 
suit against innocent infringers might have indirect benefit in encouraging some innocents to 
become less so-it might spark them to research the question of what is owned and by whom. 
The rule could be tailored to treat differently persons who deliberately remain in ignorance and 
those who have no means of learning the needed facts. Nonetheless, making the right to sue 
valid against innocent infringers would be unfair and, I would guess, unlikely to encourage 
significant use of the market. 
300 Demarcation alone would not avoid the chill, for one unknowingly or unconsciously can 
copy a work that bears a proper notice on all its authorized copies. 
The argument might be made that any economically desirable "new use" will be able to pay 
its own way so that any one society would "want" to encourage will have nothing to fear from 
lawsuits. That is, it might be argued that no exemption for innocent infringers is needed. Such 
an argument would proceed by contending that anyone whose derivative work is economically 
efficient still will have net positive receipts even if he is required to pay a license fee, or even an 
allocable share of his profits, to the creators of works he innocently utilized; thus, fear of 
lawsuits would not deter efficient behavior. One must recognize, however, the many forms of 
market failure tllat may place less revenue in a user's hands than her actual service to the 
public might warrant. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1614-15, 1627-35; Gordon, 
Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12, at 1042-43. 
30I See Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12, at 1028-32 (evaluating 
tlle "subconscious copying rule" of copyright law). 
302 Restatement (Second) of Torts§§ 163-64 (1965). 
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awareness that one is infringing is not essential to liability. 303 My pri-
mary reason for departing from the property model is the dependence 
of the reap/sow notion on bounded notions of causation and desert, 
linked with the need to accommodate the legitimate interests of both 
the defendant and the plaintiff. Suits against innocents are hard to 
defend as fair when one of the bases for the cause of action should be 
the absence of any ground for objection on the defendant's part.304 
Thus, whatever the arguably desirable economic consequences of the 
way trespass and copyright law treat an innocent defendant's reason-
able mistake, those models are not followed here. 
Also note that the first element requires copying as well as knowl-
edge. The essence of that requirement is that the defendant must have 
borrowed something.from the plaintijf.305 One who sees an innovative 
dance troupe perform and memorizes the choreography copies when 
he recreates their steps on his stage; had he happened to create that 
same sequence independently, he would not be liable. In this, the set 
of elements follows copyright law (in which "independent creation" 
negatives any cause of action) rather than patent law (in which the 
patentee can sue even independent inventors of the patented product 
or process).306 A later but independent inventor should not be subject 
to restitution-based suit by the first inventor where he has not bene-
fited from her acts. 307 
Imposition of a knowledge requirement may seem superficially 
inconsistent with the unjust enrichment cases that do not require that 
the beneficiary knowingly have chosen to avail himself of the benefit. 
303 2 Goldstein, supra note 22, § 9.4. 
304 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
305 The cause of action does not yet specify what kinds of borrowing should be forbidden. 
The discussion proceeds as if at least the following are within the scope of the new cause of 
action: copying by reproduction, by the making of derivative works, by public performance, 
and by public display. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (listing copyright owner's exclusive rights in 
such activities). Thus, in addition to further specification of the content of element (g), 
adoption of any misappropriation or malcompetitive copying tort requires a better definition of 
copying than now provided either by the cases or by this first try at a sophisticated definition of 
the tort. For example, should mere reference to the plaintiff's work, without reproduction of 
the work, count as actionable if the reference allows the defendant to free ride on the 
reputation of the plaintiff's work? My instinct is that it should not count as actionable, but 
full investigation of that issue has to be put aside for another time. 
306 I am indebted here to Marian Coase. 
307 The Article does not intimate a view on whether suits based on other considerations 
(e.g., pure economic incentive arguments) would be appropriate. 
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These are often cases, however, where other means are present to safe-
guard the beneficiary's interests. For example, in the case of the 
unconscious accident victim given aid by a medical professional, there 
can be little doubt that the patient would have wanted the assist-
ance. 308 For another example, consider the debtor who mistakenly 
overpays his debt. When restitution law is used to make the creditor 
disgorge the benefit, the lack of valuation problems (a dollar is a dol-
lar) gives assurance that the creditor will not be made worse off than 
he was in the status quo ante by being required to repay the over-
age. 309 It is hard to see how preventing the creditor from keeping an 
amount of money that is more than he expected to receive would 
interfere with his life plan in any significant way.310 
In the area of intellectual products, however, unlike these unjust 
enrichment cases, the relevant factual context provides no such con-
venient substitutes. We all use ideas, symbols, and processes that we 
did not invent ourselves, and being sued after innocently basing whole 
projects on these inevitably borrowed elements would be likely to 
interfere significantly with our life plans. Also, valuation here is a 
difficult issue. Requiring as a precondition for suit that a defendant 
knowingly have chosen to copy something that he knows bears a price 
tag seems to be a minimal requirement to assure some respect for the 
defendant's autonomy and to protect him from being made worse off 
by plaintiff's suit than he would have been had the "benefit" never 
been utilized. 
Even the knowing use requirement may not provide sufficient pro-
tection for defendants. One willingly may purchase and read a book 
labeled "Do not copy without payment," learn what that book has to 
teach, and only afterward realize that the book has changed his way 
of thinking-he cannot help but copy its images to utilize what it 
taught him-but he cannot afford the price tag for this additional use. 
An additional privilege of use might be required to accommodate 
such cases. 
308 See supra text following note 151 & notes 216-19 and accompanying text. 
309 See Birks, supra note 202, at 109-12; cf. Levmore, supra note 38, at 77 ("a recipient may 
genuinely not want a benefit that is forced upon him"). 
310 When an obligation to return a mistaken payment does threaten to cause such 
interference because the recipient has changed his position in reliance on the income, 
restitution law often will relieve him of the obligation to repay. See 3 Palmer, supra note 153, 
§ 16.8, at 523-27. 
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3. Explanation of &~symmetrical Market Failure,, 
"Asymmetrical market failure" refers to those cases in which the 
plaintiff, but not the defendant, faced barriers precluding use of the 
market. Both components of this requirement might be satisfied, for 
example, if the creator has no practicable means of identifying who is 
using her work but the persons using it know the creator's identity 
and address. 
The requirement will not be satisfied if the plaintiff could have 
located the defendant, had some practical means of denying him 
access to the work until payment was forthcoming, or otherwise could 
have consummated a contract with him if use of the intangible were 
worth more to the defendant than the plaintiff's reservation price. 
The requirement also will be unsatisfied if the defendant practicably 
could not have sought out a contract with plaintiff. 311 Failure of 
either component would bar the plaintiff's suit. 
Arguably, both components are extensions of established restitu-
tion doctrine. Commentators, particularly in the literature on inter-
meddlers and volunteers, stress that benefactors who could have 
bargained in advance, but did not, will be considered officious and will 
not be permitted to use the courts to extract payment after the fact.312 
This view can be justified on both fairness and economic grounds.313 
The requirement that the plaintiff face a market failure responds to 
the economic concern about eroding markets.314 It seeks to assure 
that the plaintiff will have a restitutionary cause of action only where 
she had a good reason not to seek consent and where granting a right 
of action will not undermine the existence of markets that otherwise 
would evolve. 315 As for fairness, using a court is a mode of compul-
sion, and if a plaintiff conld have contracted in advance but failed to 
do so, she arguably has infused more compulsion into the situation 
than necessary. 
311 See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1614-15, 1627-35 (discussing market failure as a 
defense to copyright infringement). 
312 See, e.g., Hope, supra note 174, at 25-29, 205, 242; Wade, supra note 174, at 1183-84. 
313 See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text. 
314 See Levmore, supra note 38, at 79-82 (denying restitution to volunteers encourages a 
"complex, thick market" "of many active buyers and sellers"). 
315 Of course, there may be proof problems here. Tom Palmer suggests with some force 
that lawyers show less imagination than do market participants about ways to overcome 
market barriers. See Palmer, supra note 131, at 287-302. 
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The second component of the test-that the defendant could bar-
gain with the creator of the intangible-responds to an economic con-
cern with saving judicial resources.316 In some instances a right of 
action, addressing its monitory force as it does to defendants, can 
encourage them to seek market bargains.317 In others, defendants 
have no realistic prospect of purchasing what they need in the market. 
The requirement that the defendant not have faced market failure 
avoids placing the entire matter of payment for intangibles in the judi-
cial lap.318 This accords with fairness considerations. Although 
316 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Restitution, supra note 127, § 2 cmt. a; Dawson, 
supra note 13, at 1418 ("Absent some special reason for intervening, abstention by courts 
seems wise, especially if the activity is so common .•. that the scale of the intervention would 
probably have to be vast."). 
The restitution courts do not go so far as to allow any form of market failure to negate 
"officiousness." To the contrary, in the absence of elements such as mistake or request, very 
particular circumstances, such as a dire emergency, must be present before a volunteer is 
permitted to collect. Here I allow the active role of the defendant to compensate for the 
strictuess of the volunteer cases. 
317 This has implications for the question of remedy. What kind of monetary or coercive 
remedy will encourage a largely self-perpetuating market to evolve? Monetary remedies in an 
amount equivalent to the product's "value in advancing the purposes of the recipient," 
Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 155, may be sufficient to induce defendants to 
make contractual arrangements for licenses if licenses will cost them less than a litigated 
judgment. An injunctive remedy might be necessary, however, to foster a self-regulating 
market, which could create tensions with the desire to protect defendants from harm. 
318 This element of defendant's market access also has allocative effects. Some of these are 
positive. It could be costly for the tort to impose a payment requirement in instances where 
market failure disabled defendants from purchasing licenses. Depending on how the monetary 
remedy was structured, in such instances the tort might discourage some important and 
economically valuable uses from going forward. Inclusion of the market access element 
prevents the malcompetitive copying tort from blocking such desirable uses. 
Yet the element has two negative effects on resource allocation as well. First, 
inlplementation of a market failure defense may result in some plaintiff-creators having fewer 
incentives than they would have obtained had a market been operating. Even desirable 
commercial users should pay something for what they borrow; when a creator's product 
produces foreseeable monetizable benefits in another's hands, the creator should be able to 
internalize some of that income stream. Second, the failure of the market to give accurate 
information about value conceals not only uses that produce a positive net social product, but 
also those uses that impose a net societal loss. The element makes it possible for defendants 
whose uses should be discouraged to be immune from liability if they face market failure. 
At some point it may appear that the allocative costs attributable to the absence of 
incentives are greater than the transaction costs of having the judicial system inlpose liability. 
Assuming fairness considerations are not traversed, it may then be appropriate to modify the 
element relating to defendant market access. At such a point, proof of a commercial 
defendant's market failure should work not to defeat liability, but rather to affect the measure 
of recovery. Because such a defendant is able to pay, but could not have proceeded through 
the market, the court should require him to pay no more than a "reasonable royalty," an 
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requiring the defendant to pay may be unfair if he could not have 
proceeded through the market, it may be both fair and economically 
wise to encourage him to proceed through the market where feasible. 
Thus, the two components that together constitute the requirement of 
asymmetrical market failure not only preserve existing markets, but 
also encourage new markets to form. In sum, although restitutionary 
rights deter market formation in the typical volunteer setting, 319 they 
encourage markets in the typical intellectual product setting. This 
difference explains the preference of a no-liability-for-labor rule in the 
volunteer context, and the preference for a liability-for-labor rule in 
the intellectual product context. 
These differing preferences can be traced in turn to superior access 
to information. In each case, the party with the information is given 
the incentive to use it. In the volunteer context, that party is the ben-
efactor, at least where mistake and other exceptional situations are 
absent. The rule of no liability encourages the volunteering house 
amount equivalent to what he would have paid had he been able to go through the market. 
This is in contrast to the measure of monetary remedy I suggest for the tort generally, which 
would impose a significantly higher amount in order to discourage market bypass. See infra 
Part III.C. 
An alternative method of avoiding allocative losses is to retain defendant market failure as a 
ground for defeating liability, but to make that ground operative only in eases where the 
defendant's use constitutes a desirable project (e.g., it generates more benefits than costs) and 
free use would not substantially undermine incentives. This is the route I have proposed in the 
copyright context. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1615-22. 
319 In the typical volunteer case, the volunteer (the future plaintift) knows what she is about 
to do and is in the best position to make a bargain about it. A volunteer who knows a right of 
action is available may not seek out the beneficiary's advance consent. Even within the 
volunteer area, however, there can be occasions when granting restitutionary rights will not 
inhibit markets. On those occasions, the law is more likely to give restitution. See Levmore, 
supra note 38, at 79-82 (discussing "market encouragement" as one of the rationales 
influencing the court in the restitution area). 
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painter and other such benefactors to seek out contacts with potential 
recipients.320 Any other rule actively discourages market bargains.321 
In the intellectual property situation, the opposite pattern prevails. 
There, because of strategic behavior and the distribution of informa-
tion, a rule of no liability would be the one that would impede the 
formation of markets. The creator may not be able to identify the 
audience prior to publication. As a result, a creator who wanted to 
respond to a rule of no liability by making bargains with potential 
recipients might be ~nable to do so. Even after the work is in circula-
tion, the difficulties persist. It is the copyist (the future defendant) 
who knows what he is about to do and who is in the best position to 
make a bargain about it. For example, only the copyist knows how 
many copies he intends to make of what work; the creator may not 
even know the copyist exists. 
The law should influence the copyist rather than the creator at this 
stage. Because a copyist likely will attempt to bargain only if he 
thinks that unconsented use will result in liability, and because only 
the copyist can initiate bargaining in response to a legal rule, ouly a 
rule that imposes liability upon the copyist will encourage bargains 
and allow creators to internalize some of the benefits they generate. 322 
320 If information is distributed in such a way that only a potential plaintiff can react to a 
rule of law by contracting around it, then, other things being equal, a no-liability rule is 
preferable. Without a legal right to obtain payment via the courts, a potential plaintiff instead 
will bargain in advance with the recipient. This is the volunteer case. See Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 297, at 1106-10. 
If information is distributed in such a way that only a potential defendant can bargain 
around the applicable legal rule, then, other things being equal, a rule imposing liability is 
preferable. Such a rule will better motivate a defendant to seek out consensual bargains than 
will a no-liability rule. Id. This is the intellectual product case. 
321 If restitution suits were available to volunteers, they could choose between suit and 
consensual bargain. Volunteers who fear recipients will refuse what the volunteers have to 
offer might prefer the lawsuit route, because with judicial compulsion the volunteer need not 
worry about the recipient refusing to pay. Volunteers who expect recipients to be willing to 
pay likely will prefer face-to-face negotiations because that is less expensive than litigation. 
Conceivably, the law could respond to this not by a blanket refusal to give restitution, but 
instead by conditioning a volunteer's recovery on her good-faith effort to proceed via the 
market. Cf. Long, supra note 130, at 415, 420-22, 427-28 (arguing that a hypothetical contract 
should be imposed only where high transaction costs "preclude negotiation of an express 
contract"). 
322 In addition, exchange is more feasible when an entitlement is held by a closed class of 
individuals-for example, an author holds a right over copying-than by an open class-for 
example, all potential users are entitled to copy. See Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal 
Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. Legal Stud. 321, 324-25 (1985). 
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A potential copyist who knows that he risks hefty liability for copy-
ing without permission may be willing to disclose his identity and seek 
a license. 323 This possibility helps to justify a rule imposing liability in 
intellectual property cases, so long as the copyist himself does not face 
market failure. Thus, restitutionary rights for intellectual products 
cure a market failure caused by information asymmetries and the pos-
sibility of strategic behavior. 324 
Courts may appropriately refuse to investigate whether market 
arrangements are impracticable in the ordinary volunteer cases, in 
which a closed-door policy may encourage internalization by contract 
in those instances where it is feasible. Where consensual bargains 
cannot be reached in a definable class of cases-as, arguably, such 
bargains cannot be achieved in most intellectual property contexts-
then the law's refusal to intervene is less justified. 
Differential access to information is not the only systematic differ-
ence between the paradigm volunteer cases and the typical intellectual 
property cases. Consideration of other sorts of transaction costs, and 
of strategic behavior, shows that the analysis reaches the same result 
even where the intellectual property producer possesses adequate 
information. 
In the paradigmatic volunteer cases where restitution is denied, the 
recipients are identifiable in advance and usually are limited in 
number. Bargaining is likely to be fairly easy in such contexts. If 
locating a hotel nearby will benefit a landowner, for example, then an 
accomocation should be reached without undue difficulty in which the 
landowner pays the hotelier to encourage her to build the develop-
ment in his area. 325 Similar accommodations often occur in regard to 
drilling for oil, where neighboring lessees stand to benefit from each 
other's exploratory efforts. Such entities often sign "dry hole agree-
ments": if one drills and the hole comes up empty, the next-door 
323 Of course, there is the possibility that even with liability, a copyist will copy without 
permission in the hope that he will not be apprehended. This introduces familiar questions 
about the advisability of including deterrence considerations when determining compensation 
and penalties. But a copyist who reaps significant market success is likely to be spotted and 
apprehended eventually. For a discussion of remedy, see infra Part 111.C. 
324 For a fuller discussion of the ways that intellectual property rights encourage markets, 
see Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1610-14. Note that although rules forbidding copying 
cure these types of market failure, they can create a new set of market barriers. See id. at 1613, 
1614, 1627-35. 
32s See Fried, supra note 172, at 46. 
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neighbor will have obtained valuable information that may save him 
the fruitless expense of drilling his own hole. Knowing this, he agrees 
in advance to pay a share of the costs of drilling the hole should it 
prove dry. 326 
Thus, one might guess (as one suspects the courts have) that in 
most of the volunteer cases a recipient contacted in advance would 
have been willing to pay if he truly would have benefited from the 
plaintiff's offer. The volunteer's choice of litigation over advance bar-
gaining is suspicious: it suggests that the volunteer feared the recipient 
would not have paid the plaintiff's price for the benefit. 
Potentially, however, a recipient will refuse to pay even if he values 
the benefit at more than the price demanded. For example, a land-
owner in an area of potential development may want a hotel to locate 
near him but may suspect that the hotel will do so even if he pays 
nothing. In this game of "chicken," the landowner may gamble on 
the hotelier's continuing without his contribution. If he wins his bet, 
then he gets something for nothing. If he loses and the hotel devel-
oper cannot or will not build without the neighboring landowner's 
contribution, then both lose out on a development that may have been 
to their mutual advantage. Alternatively, the developer might try to 
effect internalization by purchasing the nearby land on which benefi-
cial spillovers might fall. But the neighbors might refuse to sell. 
Therefore, even in the realm of tangible property, a benefit-genera-
tor (the "benefactor" or "creator") sometimes cannot recapture the 
benefits through voluntary interaction. If strategic behavior lies at the 
core of the benefactor's problem, and if the behavior precludes value-
maximizing resource uses, then perhaps a court should order payment 
via restitution. 327 Benefactors may be less diligent in recouping bene-
fits, however, if they think a court will do it for them. A court may 
have difficulty policing whether a benefit-generator has made a good 
faith effort to proceed through the market. Keeping this judicial door 
open may erode the much-preferred voluntary system. 
326 E.g., 7 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas§ 140.1, at 207 (1979). The 
agreements typically provide that if the well strikes oil, a lesser payment or no payment is 
required. Despite an equally beneficial spillover of information in the seeond situation, the 
parties appear to treat the oil as sufficient harvest for the first driller. See id. § 140.1, at 121 
(Supp. 1990) (by implication). (I am indebted to Allen Axelrod here.) 
327 See Long, supra note 130, at 428. 
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The desirability of keeping the door open to the possibility of resti-
tution may depend on whether the creation of incentives for a feasibly 
defined class of cases requires it. From the incentive perspective, a 
benefactor need not receive payment so long as she, and persons like 
her, would generate the benefits regardless of the availability of resti-
tution from beneficiaries. In many restitution cases where relief is 
denied, the plaintiffs have sufficient motives of their own for engaging 
in the activities. 328 The court may presume that because the person 
seeking payment already has engaged in the valuable activity, incen-
tives are irrelevant. 329 But a substantial class of persons may exist 
who are like the plaintiff but have not yet engaged in the valuable 
activity and would do so if restitution were assured. The court may 
not know of their existence. The varying fact patterns of different 
volunteer cases may complicate generalizations across classes of activ-
ities or predictions about categories of behavior. 
But what should a court do when, as a recurrent pattern, a class of 
otherwise desirable activities clearly will not be undertaken uuless res-
titution is available? If such classes of activity can be identified, then 
perhaps some preference for restitution is in order,330 justifying an 
open door to the inquiry into whether a market failure makes the ben-
efactor's failure to obtain advance consent not officious. 
Intellectual products provide an area where such an open door may 
prove worth its expense. Most such products share common charac-
teristics. For example, the recipients typically are many and the bene-
fits neither tangible nor certain, unlike the usual one-on-one situation 
in the volunteer context, so that transaction-cost and strategic-behav-
ior problems (like the "chicken" problem) grow in significance. For 
intellectual products, the potential recipients are a far-flung audience, 
and the benefits are those that will flow from an as-yet-undisclosed 
328 See Dawson, supra note 13, at 1410. 
329 Thus, in the restitution area, courts may be tempted to take an ex post rather than ex 
ante approach. On the difference between these approaches, see Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 5-14 (1984). 
330 In those cases where a pattern is discernible-as there arguably is in cases involving 
emergencies-the restitution courts do seem to respond. See Restatement of Restitution, supra 
note 152, § 116. The need for positive incentives and the desire to minimize transaction costs 
by preserving markets are equally important as an economic matter. Where markets can be 
preserved and incentives simultaneously served by judicial intervention (as in emergency need 
for medical care, or arguably, intellectual product creation), the case for judicially imposed 
duties is strong. 
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intellectual product. As a result, bargaining may founder, even 
among rational actors.331 
In a world without intellectual property rights, an author may want 
to bargain with her audience for payment, but the audience is likely to 
be a wide and uncertain one. Even if the author somehow could iden-
tify all the potential recipients, it would be expensive and awkward to 
reach simultaneously332 all of the persons who eventually would want 
access to the work. Even if this were possible, what will happen when 
the creator tries to negotiate for a payment from the whole class of 
users in exchange for disclosing the work? Many of those audience 
members might be tempted to hold out in the hope that others' mon-
ies would draw the work into the marketplace. 333 The larger the 
group of potential purchasers, the better the gamble may seem. Also, 
the work's contents are largely unknown at this stage; the less certain 
the benefits, the less seems to be risked if the gamble does not pay off. 
With good odds in favor of winning and a perceived low cost in the 
event of a loss, the gamble becomes very tempting. If enough people 
take this gamble in the hope of getting a free ride, the requisite funds 
may not be forthcoming. 334 This result may disserve the interests of 
331 See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1610-14. 
332 The process must be close to simultaneous because, if it were not, the first customer 
could sell to the rest. 
333 This is part of the "public goods" problem. When it is difficult to exclude nonpurchasers 
from using a good, it is likely to be "under-produced if left to the private market." Gordon, 
Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1610-11. 
334 Arguably, a large group will be unable to coordinate itself to overcome this problem 
unless it can impose duties of contn"bution on its members, leading the group to impose such a 
duty on itself. Indeed, if audience members reliably could impose such rules upon themselves, 
court-imposed rules would be unnecessary. The same gaps in information, transaction costs, 
and free rider problems that would aftlict the author or the publisher would plague a group of 
audience members in their efforts to solve the problem, however. See Morton D. Davis, Game 
Theory 95-103, 128-31 (1970) (illustrating the low likelihood of cooperation in the presence of 
a particular pattern of payoffs from free riding). In fact, one can view the legal regime as rules 
imposed by the audience on itself by the only practicable means. 
The same temptation to hold out also plagues land development efforts and is one reason 
why governments have the power of eminent domain-limited, however, to cases where there 
is a public purpose. Intervention is even more necessary in the area of intellectual property 
where the hold-out problem is endemic. Just as eminent domain can solve the strategic 
behavior problems in land development, a system like copyright can solve these strategic 
behavior problems among authors and users. 
The desirability of a restitutionary right to resolve potential bargaining stalemates does not 
change much with the introduction of a commercial publisher into the picture. Admittedly, 
the author may find it easier to deal with a publisher than with an undifferentiated audience 
(only one party, low transaction costs), but then the publisher must deal with the audience and 
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the consuming class; they might be better off constraining their oppor-
tunity to engage in strategic bargaining if a lack of constraint leads to 
a lower level of production than they would prefer. 
In sum, because of the structure of the volunteer/recipient relation, 
a no-liability rule speaks best to the volunteer. 335 Because of the 
structure of the creator/copyist relation, a liability rule speaks best to 
the copyist. Thus, the same market-encouraging considerations that 
suggest there should be no liability in the volunteer context suggest 
there should be liability in the intellectual products context, so long as 
the facts encountered there fit the usual pattern of a plaintiff who 
faces market failure and a defendant who does not. Further, a liabil-
ity system is more necessary for intellectual products than it is for 
other kinds of resources precisely because creators are likely to face 
market failure unless they have the leverage of a right of action. 
4. Explanation of the "Competitive Nexus" Requirement 
Examination of whether the defendant's use was among those fore-
seeable to the intangible's producer when her labor initially was 
expended might establish the requisite nexus between the plaintiff and 
the contested use by the defendant. 336 Though perhaps desirable in 
the abstract, the foreseeability approach might encounter intractable 
proof problems. 337 In addition, a creator's expectations in part may 
the potential copyists in its midst. The author's problems with information, transaction costs, 
and free riders simply would be passed on one step further down the line. How much will a 
publisher pay for a book that can be copied lawfully by anyone once it appears on the market? 
This question is empirical rather than rhetorical. Unless the publisher has real-world clout 
that can discourage copying, the rate he will offer the author in such a world may be too low. 
Such leverage can be obtained through physical control or lead-time advantage, retributive or 
strike editions, gentlemen's agreements, book clubs, and other forms of patron relationships. 
See Breyer, supra note 131, at 294-306; see also Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 
37, at 1400-05, 1413-22 (examining such devices); Palmer, supra note 131, at 295-300 
(envisioning various voluntary market mechanisms that would increase the original 
disseminator's control over an intellectual product). If such leverage is unavailable and the 
anticipated rate of payment is low (to return again to the question of incentives), otherwise-
desirable works may not be created. 
335 See Levmore, supra note 38, at 73. 
336 See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text. 
337 The uncertainty introduced by limiting a creator's recovery to provably foreseeable uses 
also might work to dilute economic incentives. On both the proof and economic issues, see 
Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1384-85 & nn.192-93. In addition, 
questions of horizontal fairness may arise if two equally productive laborers are treated 
differently. 
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be a function of the law itself. As a proxy for this inquiry, the 
approach suggested here asks whether the plaintiff now stands ready 
and willing to supply the market served by the defendant's use. If the 
plaintiff can show she is serving, or shortly will be serving, the defend-
ant's customers, she will have presented an acceptable proof of con-
nection between the plaintiff and the contested use. 
This requirement in turn satisfies the restitutionary doctrines indi-
cating that relief should be given only where the defendant's gain is at 
plaintiff's "expense."338 Of the cases involving no violation of an 
established right, judges seem to have the least problem with restitu-
tion claims containing both a plaintiff's loss and a defendant's benefit. 
Consider our prior examples. The doctor who renders aid has "lost" 
an amount of time and effort expended specifically on the patient's 
behalf, and the patient has "gained" valuable services.339 The debtor 
who overpaid his debt has "lost" an amount of money that is now a 
"gain" for the creditor. Restitution restores an equality in both situa-
tions: the harmed party is made whole by payment from the party 
with the unearned gain. This is also the paradigm situation offered by 
Aristotle to illustrate corrective justice. 340 
The competition requirement works to assure that defend-
ant's gain is at plaintiff's expense341 because if the plaintiff is serving, 
or is about to enter, the market where the free rider is selling 
elements of the plaintiff's work, then allowing the free rider 
to continue likely will hurt the plaintiff.342 by taking her custo-
338 See infra notes 362-79 and accompanying text (discussing why copying another's 
intangible should not be considered a violation of exclusive right absent some specification 
from a source beyond the entitlement not to labor). 
339 A producer of intellectual products also may expend money or effort, but given the 
inexhaustibility of most intellectual products (they can be used by a potentially infinite group 
of persons without being consumed) it is less clear than in the doctor/patient case that the 
investment was expended on the beneficiary's behalf. If the presence of the beneficiary/ 
defendant did not "cause" the investment, it cannot be said to have "caused" a loss. See supra 
notes 133-58 and accompanying text. 
340 See Aristotle, supra note 78, at 84-85. 
341 For further discussion of the applicability of the expense-to-plaintiff requirement in this 
context, see infra at notes 342-79 and accompanying text. 
342 If the initial creator has no practicable means of selling to those persons served by the 
copying (because of transaction cost barriers or the like), then it is implausible to say that the 
copying has harmed the creator in this way. 
Because of the reap/sow focus of this Article, my discussion here does not address fully the 
questions raised by the case of a creator who could license (no transaction cost or externality 
barriers stand in her way) but chooses not to do so. Sometimes a putative user could not meet 
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mers. 343 This harm to the plaintiff may be severe: because the free 
the creator's reservation price because the desired use would impose costs on the plaintiff that 
the receipts generated by the use could not compensate. If the plaintiff refused to license or to 
serve the market herself, element (c) of the malcompetitive copying tort would render such a 
plaintiff unable to sue. 
Depending on context, good arguments indeed may exist for not honoring a creator's refusal 
to exploit a given work. See Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, snpra note 12, at 
1042-49. If, for example, the plaintiff wants to restrain a parodic use of her work-she is 
neither willing to serve the parody market herself nor willing to license others to make versions 
of her work for this purpose-it often is argued that her refusal should not be honored. 
Though there may be real economic costs imposed on her if the parody induces a potential 
audience to cease taking her work seriously, those changes in taste are not costs that the law 
should encourage the initial creator to take into aecount. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, 
at 1632-35. A certain scope of free use for parodies in fact is seen in copyright law, a statutory 
analogue to the instant tort. Id. 
This tort's element (c) is not the ouly way of dealing with the problem of uses that an initial 
creator desires neither to exploit herself nor to liceuse. For example, the court might be asked 
to determine if the fee demanded by a plaintiff as her minimum price for a copy or a license is 
"reasonable"; ifit is deemed reasonable, the court would allow the plaintiff to sue despite her 
unwillingness to serve, or to license another to serve, the market at a lower price. Or the court 
could be asked to define considerations that a malcompetitive-copying plaintiff may or may not 
take into aecount in setting her reservation price and to allow her to sue, despite a refusal to 
license, if legally relevant considerations motivated the refusal. For example, a court might 
deeide that the plaintiff could take into account costs from substitution (so the plaintiff could 
justify her refusal or her high minimum fee by reference to the likelihood that customers would 
buy the new version of her work instead of the plaintiff's initial version), and that same court 
might deem legally irrelevant those costs to the plaintiff arising from more personal 
considerations (so the plaintiff could not count as a good reason for refusal that the licensed 
use would invade her sense of privacy or that the use would serve an ideologieal purpose of 
which she does not approve). Obvious problems with these various solutions exist in terms of 
practicability and normative acceptability. 
This Article suggests that notions of reap/sow themselves do not justify restraints beyond 
the area of the plaintiff's own harvest. My provisional judgment is that, even from a utilitarian 
or economic perspective, it is best to use malcompetitive copying, misappropriation, copyright, 
and other copying-based causes of action only to proteet the plaintiff's interests as they relate 
to substitution effeet, and that when other interests are concerned (e.g., privacy) only those 
laws and doctrines fine tuned to the particular interest implicated by the plaintiff's refusal 
should apply. Because substitution effects likely will be zero or minimal when the defendant's 
use addresses markets wholly separate from those served by the plaintiff, I see element (c) as 
encouraging new uses and users without imposing economically inefficient substitution effects 
on initial creators. See Wendy J. Gordon, The Right Not to Use (unpublished manuscript on 
file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
343 Peter Birks suggests that in the absence of a wrong, a defendant who has received wealth 
from a third party need not respond in restitution unless the plaintiff can show that ''the 
wealth in question would certainly have arrived in the plaintiff if it had not been intercepted by 
the defendant en route from [a] third party." Birks, supra note 202, at 132-34; see also id. at 
138 (providing an example of the theory). 
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rider does not have to bear the full cost of production, he can under-
sell the originator. 
Arguments regarding fair reward underlie this interpretation of a 
foreseeability or expense requirement. 344 Also, I have suggested that 
the restitutionary impulse may be essentially comparative, resting not 
only on a perception that beneficiaries are less entitled to keep the 
benefit at issue than are benefactors (ceteris paribus), but depending 
also on an assessment of the comparative impact that a recovery (or 
the absence of a recovery) would have on the parties' ability to formu-
late and implement plans for their lives. 345 When the plaintiff is sell-
ing without interference in all the markets she intends to reach, she 
has less to weigh against the interests served by the defendant than 
she otherwise would. 346 
This requirement that actual or imminent competition be shown 
also can be defended by reference to the restitutionary principle. 
Without the competition requirement, the plaintiff would be allowed 
to use a lawsuit to capture a benefit resulting from something she 
never would have done herself.-she would get a "windfall," a net 
gain from the defendant's creative or productive activities in excess of 
what she would have had in the defendant's absence. 347 The restitu-
tionary principle condemns reaping without sowing; therefore, 
allowing the plaintiff to collect such windfalls may be inconsistent 
with that principle. 348 By contrast, the requirement of actual or 
344 See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text. 
345 See supra notes 267-79 and accompanying text. 
346 This consideration would suggest that a plaintiff should be required to show that the 
defendant's copies fulfill a need foreseen by the plaintiff when she initially created the work. 
Element (c) is less demanding than that, and admittedly this consideration in its own terms 
may not justify the element (c) approach of allowing a plaintiff to satisfy the competition 
requirement by a mere showing that near the time of the suit she was willing to serve the 
market in question, particularly if the new user's efforts brought the new market to her 
attention. I allow a showing of present or imminent competition to satisfy the competition 
element largely because making the plaintiff prove her expectations would introduce too many 
litigation costs and uncertainties-and consequent erosion of incentives. See supra note 337 
and accompanying text. This easing of the plaintiff's burden also may be defended on the 
ground of some lingering plausibility in the correetive justice causation argument: as between 
two parties equally able and willing to serve a need through selling a particular work, the 
person whose efforts caused the work to exist should be preferred. 
347 Windfalls may be appropriate in some restitution contexts, however, as where a 
defendant has violated a plaintiff's preexisting rights. See Dobbs, supra note 158, at 224. 
348 Arguably, my hypothetical cause of action should apply here as well; perhaps a creator 
should be able to reap without sowing where a user cannot meet the hypothesized minimal 
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imminent competition assures that the plaintiff will benefit only from 
her actions or from actions she was about to take before another 
usurped her place. 349 In these cases, an allocable share of the defend-
ant's profit or a payment otherwise keyed to the value350 of what was 
copied may be an adequate measure of what the plaintiff would have 
earned had the plaintiff engaged in, or licensed another to engage in, 
the activity that made the defendant liable. This may be a result more 
consistent with the notion of reaping what you sow.351 
Admittedly, this rule requiring loss of potential sales may leave 
some defendants with a gain based in part on the plaintiff's effort. 
But even if that gain were wrongful, the plaintiff may not have any 
particular standing to complain,352 at least according to Jnles Cole-
man's interpretation of corrective justice. In his view, nothing in a 
wrongful gain per se requires the money be paid to a particnlar 
person.353 
criteria for a cause of action. (Arguably, the user should have no legal ground for complaint if 
he were forced to hand over profits in excess of what the plaintiff could have earned on her 
own, except if he met the proposed tests that I posit as a prerequisite for a court to order a 
recipient to disgorge.) The tort was crafted, however, to respond to free riding by private 
actors in the marketplace. The plaintiff who has no intention of selling in the defendant's 
market can only free ride on the defendant's effort if the state acts. The requisite analysis 
therefore will differ in several respects. 
349 Compare Aristotle's references to each party having "his own." See Wright, supra note 
84. 
3SO On the issue of how monetary recovery should be computed, see infra Part m.c. 
351 This interpretation is not without difficulty. It might be argued, for example, that the 
plaintiff's efforts causally contributed to the defendant's profits (in a ''but-for" sense of cause), 
so that giving the plaintiff a right of payment would not be allowing her to reap without 
sowing. Nevertheless, allowing her to sue would make her better off than she would have been 
absent any interaction with the defendant. In that sense, she might be said to be reaping more 
than she sowed. Those profits also may exceed most common-sense notions of "cause" and 
may be outside the range of that for which she may claim "responsibility." 
352 A plaintiff unwilling to tend a field where some of her seeds have fallen should not be 
entitled to complain when another raises the plants to maturity. 
3S3 Jules Coleman has suggested that though corrective justice dictates that a plaintiff's 
"wrongful loss" should be remedied and a defendant's "wrongful gains" should be disgorged, 
it says nothing about how to effect these results. See Coleman, supra note 54, at 12-14. 
Corrective justice dictates that a defendant should disgorge a wrongful gain, but Coleman 
contends that there may be many fair ways of effecting that disgorgement. For example, the 
defendant might be required to pay the gain into a central treasury. Similarly, there may be 
many appropriate sources of compensation other than the person who caused a plaintiff's 
wrongful loss. Perhaps no-fault insurance can satisfy a plaintiff's corrective justice claim in 
the tort area. In the intellectual property area, governmental subsidies and grants, and 
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I need not take that approach here, for I suggest that unearned 
gains simply do not violate the reap/sow principle unless they some-
how interfere with the plaintiff's own plans to utilize the intangible. 
It long has been argued that a transitive cause of action-where a 
particular person Y owes a duty to another particular person X, and X 
has a corresponding right against Y-is fairest when both a loss (on 
the plaintiff's part) as well as a gain (on the defendant's part) are 
present. 3s4 In such a case any imbalance caused by the wrongful act is 
twice as great as the amount of the harm, or the gain, standing 
alone.3ss Further, granting a cause of action here erases that imbal-
ance and creates no new imbalance. Such cases seem to "present the 
strongest case for relief."3s6 If so, it is fairest to make a defendant pay 
a plaintiff when the plaintiff somehow is made worse off by the 
defendant. 3s7 In the realm of intangibles, the competition require-
ment serves this fairness function. By taking the creator's potential 
customers, a copier likely will make the creator worse off than she 
would have been in the copier's absence. Thus, the proposed set of 
constraints accords with fairness in requiring that a defendant's 
actions threaten the plaintiff with a particular kind of harm before the 
plaintiff may sue. 
Justification for the competition requirement also has an important 
societal component. If the two parties are positioned to serve the 
academic salaries and prizes, perhaps may be appropriate responses if no suitable defendant is 
available. 
Under such an analysis, a plaintiff who has suffered no loss may have no entitlement based 
solely on another's gain. Even where the plaintiff has suffered a loss, Coleman does not 
concede that corrective justice dictates a transitive cause of action. He argues that "even when 
an injurer gains through his fault in causing another harm, there is no argument from 
corrective justice which requires that we impose his victim's loss upon him." Id. at 14. In 
Coleman's view, providing a transitive cause of action in that context merely has the 
"fortuitous effect" of "cancelling both" the wrongful loss and the wrongful gain. Id. 
354 See L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 
46 Yale L.J. 52, 56 (1936); see also Aristotle, supra note 78, at 84-85 (in the paradigmatic case 
of corrective justice, injurer gains what the sufferer loses); John P. Dawson, supra note 72, at 5-
6 (''The translation of loss by one individual into gain for another is felt as an aggravation, 
multiplying both factors in the equation."). 
3SS See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 354, at 56 ("If A not ouly causes B to lose one unit but 
appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit 
but two."). 
356 Id. 
357 This usage of ''worse off" refers to the same baseline utilized to identify "harm" 
elsewhere in this Article-how the party would have fared in the absence of the contested 
interaction. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text. 
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same market, then the cause of action is most likely to create desirable 
incentives. Allowing free riding between competitors to continue 
unchecked and uncompensated first may destroy the initial producer 
(the initial "creator" who has paid to produce the intangible) and 
then destroy the second provider (who as a free rider may lack the 
know-how or other tools necessary to provide the intangible on his 
own). Uncompensated free riding eventually may result in unmet 
consumer needs. 358 
By contrast, if the two parties serve different markets, free riding is 
less likely to prove destructive. The first producer's plans-and thus 
her incentives-remain unaffected by the second producer's actions. 
Also, because the second producer will be serving a market that the 
first producer did not expect to serve, the potential defendant may 
exercise his expertise or creativity to benefit society in a way that the 
plaintiff would not. Thus, the requirement of actual or expected com-
petition likely will funnel the courts' energies into situations where 
incentives would be threatened most. 
The competition requirement might seem to make the restitution-
ary right equivalent to a right against harm. That is not so: A right 
against harm would penalize any competitive act that took customers 
away from a preexisting producer; the restitutionary cause of action 
gives a producer rights only when she has produced a beneficial intan-
gible and the other party competes with her by selling her intangible. 
Ordinarily, competitive harm is privileged; here, the restitutionary 
principle makes the difference. Y's use of a beneficial intangible pro-
duced by X's labor against X gives X the conditional right against Y. 
There the restitutionary cause of action is a species of unfair com-
petition; this competition is deemed unfair because the law recognizes 
the restitutionary principle. This relationship between the two doctri-
nal categories should not be surprising. After all, the case with which 
we began, International News Service v. Associated Press, 359 is a case of 
both unfair competition360 and unjust enrichment. 361 
358 Also, the prospect of such parasitism may discourage creativity ab ante. See Gordon, 
Prisoner's Dilemma, supra note 251 (discussing competition in the context of the prisoner's 
dilemma model). 
359 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
360 Samuelson, supra note 20, at 367-68. 
361 Dawson, supra note 13, at 1415-17. 
1992] Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 245 
Before leaving the topic of competition, the requirement in restitu-
tion doctrine that relief be granted only when an unjust gain is at the 
expense of the plaintiff has some relevant ambiguities that should be 
addressed. Courts sometimes will dispense with this expense require-
ment when an established right has been violated362 or when the 
defendant's action is sufficiently egregious. 363 Why then does the set 
of constraints insist on competition as a prerequisite for suit? 
In those cases in which expense is premised on violation of an 
established right, restitution functions as a remedy, not as the sub-
stantive basis of the relief granted. Such cases often rest on analytic 
foundations different than those on which the cases based solely on 
restitution rest. For example, cases of trespass364 and trustee misuse 
of funds365 involve established rights, and such preexisting rights have 
their own internal logic. When a :fiduciary betrays his trust, disgorge-
ment punishes and deters acts the legal system has already deter-
mined are wrongful. 366 There, the restitutionary award focuses on the 
defendant and on future persons who similarly might be tempted to 
betray their :fiduciary obligations, not on remedying harm to the plain-
tiff. Proof of harm is therefore dispensable in such cases. The pay-
ment to the unharmed trust beneficiary may be largely a matter of 
convenience. 367 
A similar logic applies in the trespass case. In classifying land as 
"property" and giving the owner a right to exclude even harmless 
trespassers, the legal system has made certain decisions, such as that 
the owner can best make efficient choices about use of the resource. It 
commouly is argued that the owner can do this wisely only with inter-
362 See supra notes 181 & 200-21 and accompanying text. 
363 Thus, in Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136 (Conn. 1955), a purchaser was awarded a 
constructive trust against a broker who managed to take a secret profit in the form of land, 
even though nnder established law the defendant apparently owed a legal duty only to the 
seller, not to the plaintiff. See Dobbs, supra note 158, 686-87, 688 n.13; see also id. at 466 
(viewing Harper through the lens of "almost fiduciary standards"). 
364 See 1 Palmer, supra note 153, § 2.5. 
36s Id. § 12.11. 
366 See id. § 2.11. ''The duties of a fiduciary are among the most important known to the 
law, [therefore,] it is indispensable that there be some sanction for their breach, and often the 
only effective sanction is restitution in favor of the principal of gains realized by the fiduciary." 
Id. at 141. 
367 Compare Coleman's position on corrective justice for comparison. See Coleman, supra 
note 54, at 12-14. 
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nalization of both costs and benefits. 368 This economic view of prop-
erty's functions would explain the landowner's ability to collect a 
significant monetary judgment when a defendant makes or saves 
money from a nonharmful trespass, for if the owner has such a right 
she will be better able to fulfill her function as a Smithian steward 
serving society's economic interests. 369 
An alternative explanation of the trespass rule views the owner as a 
"sovereign" with a personal interest in maintaining uninterrupted 
dominion. From this perspective, because even a nonharmful intru-
sion constitutes an interference with the owner's dominion, 
nonharmful intrusions must be punished or deterred. On either view 
of property, it is the applicable property model, rather than the resti-
tutionary claim, that explains the landowner's ability to collect from a 
defendant the profits made from a harmless intrusion. 
Where the legal system has not made such prior decisions about 
applicable duties and rights, the appropriative principle does not jus-
tify restitution where the defendant's act, however profitable to him, 
has caused the plaintiff no relevant loss. There is no established and 
preexisting exclusive right in the benefits that flow from labor. There 
is only a liberty to withhold one's labor, supplemented by rights 
against forms of coercion not implicated here. 
Still, one could ask whether such an exclusive right should be cre-
ated. If one granted the creator an entitlement to exclusive control 
over all the benefits her labor generates, then as a definitional matter 
the defendant's failure to pay could constitute an expense to her 
regardless of competition between the parties. If nothing else, the vio-
lation of such exclusivity could impair something the plaintiff values 
and could qualify as a wrong that should be deterred or punished. 370 
368 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 347, 349-56 (1967). 
369 Adam Smith's "invisible hand" operates accurately only in an absence of externalities. 
See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 368, at 347-49. 
370 Cf. Strand Elee. & Engr. Co. v. Brisford Entertainments, Ltd., 2 Q.B. 246, 254 (1952) 
(opinion of Denning, L.J.) (defendants liable for full market fee for equipment not returned 
because "[i]f a wrongdoer has made use of [another's] goods for his own purposes, then he 
must pay a reasonable hire for them, even though their owner has suffered no loss .... The 
wrongdoer ••. cannot be better off by doing wrong than he would be by doing right"). Note 
that the other judges treated the claim as one in detinue whereas Judge Denning viewed it as 
resembling "an action for restitution rather than an action of tort." Id. at 255. See generally 
Lord Goff of Chieveley & Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution 609-13 (3d ed. 1986) 
(surveying English and American law). 
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These results-that any free riding on labor would be wrongful-
demonstrate why exclusivity would be inappropriate for the benefits 
labor generates. The very interdependence of our society, with which 
this Article began, 371 should serve as a reminder of that. 
One can see why bodies should have rights to exclude; the 
intangibles those bodies produce are a different matter. Labor's prod-
ucts come in too many forms to apply any such general rule. Even if 
there were consensus on the applicable norms, this variation in fact 
pattern would render a grant of exclusivity impossible to justify for 
benefits as such. Even if one limited one's inquiry to economics as the 
relevant criterion, the value of some intangibles might be maximized 
by a legally imposed centralization of management, 372 whereas for 
others such legal exclusivity may be unnecessary,373 and for still 
others central control would unduly inhibit creative adaptations. 
Similarly, if personality protection were adopted as the relevant crite-
rion for granting property status, some intellectual products might be 
so connected to the author as to require her exclusive use,374 whereas 
for others the author's ties to the work might require only that copiers 
cite their sources accurately, 375 and for yet other products, there 
might be virtually no "personality" component worth protecting at 
all.376 
For some works, it is conceivable that these and other policies 
beyond reap/sow may require giving a creator exclusivity and a prima 
facie right over all derivative works, regardless of competition. The 
371 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
372 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265 
(1977). A similar set of variations would obtain if one looked at economics as providing 
incentives toward initial creation of an intangible. Different intangibles in different contexts 
require different incentives. See Breyer, supra note 131, at 344-45. (drawing a distinction 
between books, for which some types of copyright may be appropriate in his view, and 
computer programs, for which he thinks copyright more suspect). 
373 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. 
Legal Stud. 683, 711-15 (1980) (suggesting that information is difficult to appropriate even 
independent of legal controls). 
374 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287, 330-50 
(1988). 
37S Cf. Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 Duke L.J. 1532, 1581 
(suggesting that academic authors have other motives, such as the desire to augment their own 
prestige, that might lead them to desire maximum circulation). 
376 See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957 (1982) (arguing 
that some kinds of property are more "personal" than others and, therefore, should receive 
different types of legal protection). 
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legislature indeed has created such exclusive rights in particular 
areas, 377 but nothing justifies courts' creating such exclusivity simply 
because a benefit has been created by someone's labor. Thus, the 
expense requirement should not be obviated by granting the plaintiff 
an exclusive right. 
Similarly, the requirement should not be satisfied by considering 
copying per se some kind of moral wrong. Copying is essential to life, 
and the privilege of reaping without sowing in some contexts must be 
incorporated into any legal system if it is to be just. 378 Therefore, the 
requirement that an actionable enrichment must be at plaintiff's 
expense has no easy substitutes, and it supports the cause of action's 
loss requirement, here interpreted as competition. 379 
377 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (providing exclusive rights in copyright); see also 
Gordon, Inquiry Into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1384-86 (explaining why a copyright owner 
might be entitled to revenues from markets it could not serve, at least so long as mechanisms 
exist for collecting the revenue and licensing the work). 
378 See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. 
379 Two sets of hypotheticals should be noted before leaving the competition requirement. 
First, consider cases where one might be sympathetic to a creator's desire to control a 
noncompeting use. Assume a poet loves ouly classical music or an engineer opposes hunting; 
each objeets to a noncompetitive use of her work, for example, a rap group whose musical style 
offends the poet wants to use her poetry, or a weapons producer wants to use the engineer's 
invention. Second, consider less attractive claims: assume a public figure wishes to censor a 
hostile (noncompeting) biography by forbidding the author to quote her, or a misanthropic 
seientist has discovered a cure for AIDS that she prefers not to disseminate. The competition 
requirement would deny relief in both types of situations. 
Some of these results may appear counterintuitive. But the realm of intellectual products 
embraces information and words and cultural symbols. It is highly important not to chill the 
use of such "products." See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
When balancing this need against the weak nature of a claim to reward for labor invested, it is 
best to begin with denying relief in situations where the plaintiff will not serve the needs of the 
audience that the defendant is prepared to serve. 
Should particular interests demand more control, they should be aecommodated, but in 
narrowly drawn ways. Personality-based theories, for example, might give the poet or the 
engineer some control over how her work is used, or an inquiry into economics more refined 
than a court usually can undertake might justify such control. But torts based on reap/sow 
are weak and subordinate to other considerations of the public interest. See, e.g., Restatement 
of Restitution, supra note 152, § 62 (transferee protected by public policy). 
As Harvey Perlman observed in a related context, "the establishment of some limits is 
imperative." Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic 
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 74 (1982). To 
begin with a presumption that the producers of intangibles should control the intangibles' uses 
beyond their own range of uses (rather than demanding from them specific and additional 
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5. Explanation of the ''Nonreciprocity,, Requirement 
Many recent theories of property and tort rights have made varying 
uses of the basic insight that it may be fair to adopt a legal rule that 
disadvantages an individual at a particular moment if the rule, when 
generally applied over time, will work to the individual's advan-
tage. 380 This principle applies to insubstantial uses. Because a plain-
tiff loses little from a small use by a defendant (e.g., the copying of a 
few words) and probably will find it useful to be able to quote short 
segments from others' works, her own long-term self-interest suggests 
that the law should not restrict such uses. Thus, copying of a few 
words probably would be "reciprocal" and thus would not generate a 
right of action. 
This fairness rationale also might excuse even some quantitatively 
significant uses. For example, one might argue that a cause of action 
should be enforceable for only a limited number of years after the 
initial distribution of the intangible. Because all intangible producers 
must copy from predecessors, they likely will find that a limited dura-
tion serves their self-interest.381 
From an economic perspective, the argument for requiring proof of 
nonreciprocity depends primarily on the fact that giving a cause of 
action usually involves greater transaction and enforcement costs 
than does denying a right of action. If granting a right of action 
accomplishes nothing but a short-term (and in the long run, revers-
ible) wealth tran8fer, transaction costs often will weigh against giving 
the right. 
justifications for control beyond their own range of uses) would be to start at the wrong end, at 
least where the producer's claim is based solely on labor. 
One must admit that current copyright and patent may begin with the opposite 
presumption. In one of its most recent copyright cases, for example, the Supreme Court said 
in dicta that an author could ''hoard[] all of his works." Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 
1764 (1990). In patent, nonuse of one's patent usually is permitted. See Gordon, Inquiry into 
the Merits, supra note 37, at 1376. But see Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag 
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-30 (1908) (holding patentee entitled to injunction despite its nonuse of 
the invention, but keeping open the possibility of exceptions based on the public interest). 
380 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 284, at 1218-26; cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 
333 & n.13 (urging ex ante assessment of copyright holders' interests). 
381 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 361-63 (analyzing duration with a primary focus 
on tracing costs). Of course, once taken outside the statutory context, the problem of courts 
drawing arbitrary lines, such as "X number of years," arises. 
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But, as an empirical matter, the transaction-cost question can go 
either way.382 In addition, awarding a right of action may have eco-
nomically desirable allocative effects, even in situations of reciprocity. 
Though a tit-for-tat version of fairness may not require payment for 
reciprocal harms and benefits, a right of action sometimes will be nec-
essary even in reciprocal situations to encourage productive behavior 
or to discourage destructive behavior.383 For example, in a tragic 
common or in a reiterated prisoner's dilemma setting, the parties left 
to their own devices may well impose equal harms on each other over 
time; an appropriately tailored legal rule, however, can encourage 
mutually beneficial cooperation. 384 Hence, reciprocity alone does not 
guarantee desirable results. 
My intuition is that denying a cause of action to persons who gener-
ate intangibles would not result in a lower level of value-creation in 
most reciprocal situations. To the contrary, freeing creators of the 
obligation to trace and to contract for the elements they want to use 
would encourage creative spontaneity.385 The transaction costs of 
paying for reciprocal benefits could slow or swamp even pedestrian, 
relatively noncreative investigations. Nevertheless, in contexts where 
the law's allowing unrestrained reciprocity would result in private 
parties' wasting significant resources in efforts to achieve a short-run 
benefit, or where it would yield undesirable allocative incentives, the 
nonreciprocity component of the hypothesized set of constraints 
could be abandoned. In addition, given the difficulty of gathering the 
data needed to resolve the reciprocity issue in many instances, argua-
382 Litigation is usually more transactionally expensive than entering into a contract. But 
sometimes the availability of a right of action makes contracts possible and minimizes 
transaction costs. See e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-91 (1974) 
(indicating that wasteful monitoring and secrecy-enforcing costs would be involved if trade 
secret law were abolished). Transaction costs will vary according to context. 
383 I am indebted to Richard Epstein and David Friedman here. 
384 See Davis, supra note 334, at 95-103, 128-31; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, in Economic Foundations of Property Law 2 (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975). 
Thomas Schelling gives this example: all hockey players may want to wear hockey hehnets, but 
without a rule requiring helmets to be worn, each may refuse the protective headgear lest he 
appear to the fans less courageous than the other players. The players may prefer a regime 
where all (equally) wear helmets to a regime where all (equally) go bareheaded. Thomas C. 
Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 213 (1978); see Gordon, Prisoner's Dilemma, 
supra note 251. 
385 See Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12 (arguing that most art 
requires conscious and unconscious use of predecessors' work). 
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bly constraint ( d) should be reformulated as an affirmative defense, so 
that it would bar suit only upon a defendant's showing that reciproc-
ity exists. 
6. Explanation of the Requirement of Deliberate Production "in 
Excess of Legal Duty" 
Restitution is not available for one whose benefits fulfill a preexist-
ing duty owed to the recipient. 386 Many philosophers have argued 
more broadly that fulfi11ing one's moral duty deserves no special 
reward. 387 A defendant might argue that it would be unfair to require 
him to pay the plaintiff for a byproduct of plaintiff's performance of a 
duty owed to anyone. 
Whatever its roots in moral theory, an excess-of-legal-duty require-
ment also has an economic explanation. A producer who is under a 
legal duty to produce something, as a telephone company may have a 
statutory obligation to produce a phone book, already has incentives 
to produce. Giving such producers a right of action will yield no 
additional output but simply will impose deadweight losses and 
potentially inhibit valuable second uses. Thus, the excess-of-legal-
duty requirement makes economic sense. 
The legal duty element of the hypothesized tort refers to duties 
imposed by the law without regard to the parties' consent; it does not 
refer to duties owed to third parties by contract. 388 The presence of a 
contract price should not be treated as the equivalent of a finding that 
the plaintiff had all the incentive she needed. For example, a think 
tank may produce a particular report because it has contracted with 
the federal government to do so, 389 and a publisher of case reports 
may produce a compilation of opinions because it has contracted with 
a state government to do so, but the terms of these contracts may vary 
386 Restatement of Restitution, supra note 152, § 60; see also id. at § 61 (moral duty). 
387 See, e.g., Becker, supra note 76, at 41-42, 53-54 (1977). 
388 I do not address here the borderline cases between tort and contract. 
389 Though works prepared by government officers and employees are placed in the public 
domain, 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988), Congress declined to "mak[e] any sort of outright, unqualified 
prohibition against copyright in works prepared under Government contract or grant." H.R. 
Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58-60 (1976). 
Works by governmental employees indeed should be in the public domain, but, in my view, 
for reasons of democracy that are more important than incentive concerns. Under the 
malcompetitive-copying tort, this issue should be treated by element (g), general suitability for 
property treatment. See infra notes 405-11 and accompanying text. 
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depending on whether legal protection vis-a-vis third-party copying is 
available to the contractors: If the think tank and the publisher have 
rights against third parties, they may have an additional potential 
source of compensation that might make them willing to produce the 
desired item at a lower cost to the immediate customer. The prospect 
of obtaining no protection might merely increase the contract price 
or, more seriously, might create so much externalization of benefit 
that an otherwise desirable contract might not be entered. 39° For 
these reasons, judicial protection should not be denied simply because 
the plaintiff has a contractual obligation to produce.391 
In addition to excess of legal duty, the plaintiff must show an 
expectation of sale or control. This part of element (e) reflects the 
idea that there should be a nexus between that which the plaintiff 
sought to create and the benefits over which she now seeks a right of 
action. 392 This requirement ensures that the plaintiff will have some-
thing at stake that will be affected if the defendant is allowed the free 
use of the plaintiff's production. The requirement also helps to direct 
enforcement toward cases in which it will aid incentives. 393 
390 Also note another difficulty: An author or inventor under contract to an employer 
admittedly has an incentive to produce the product for which she is being paid, and that 
incentive may not depend on the number of copies sold or on a legal right to be paid for copies 
made. The employer's willingness, however, to hire the author or inventor may depend on the 
availability of legal relief against third parties who copy. To allow the existence of a 
contractual incentive to act as a bar would cause problems in those cases where the plaintiff 
was such an author. (Admittedly, such cases would be rare. The right to control probably 
would be held by the employer because, though the malcompetitive-copying tort has no rules 
on "work made for hire," such control likely would be assigned by contract to the employer. 
The employer himself is under no duty, contractual or otherwise, to produce the work.) 
391 I am indebted to Adam Pritchard here. 
392 This also is true of the requirement that the plaintiff intend to sell or to distribute the 
product in the market at issue (recall requirement (c), competition between the parties). I 
include the overlap in the set of constraints because I think the competition requirement likely 
to prove controversial, and the element of plaintiff's "stake" is too important to risk losing it in 
a debate over the competition requirement. 
393 The economic argunient is straightforward. Some expectation of reward or control 
likely gives the plaintiff an economic as well as a psychic stake in what happens to the work. 
The presence of such an expectation suggests that the plaintiff might respond to positive 
incentives such as the availability of the proposed right of action against free riders. Note that 
the requirement that plaintiff show some expectation of sale or control is much easier to meet 
than would be a requirement that the plaintiff show an expectation of sale or control of a 
particular market. Cf. supra note 346 (discussing the requirements of element (c)). Thus, the 
requirement is less likely to introduce a stutter into the incentive message. 
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Absent some intent to control or to sell the work, a plaintiff would 
be largely indifferent to the incentives provided by a right to sue. Fur-
ther, in such cases a plaintiff has little ground to complain on the basis 
of autonomy if denied a right of action. For example, if the creator 
made the item with the intention of giving it away, she arguably 
would have a relatively weak autonomy claim if she later tried to 
restrain the recipients' use or to force them to pay.394 Without a stake 
of some kind, some kind of a vested interest on the plaintiff's part-
and I am flexible on how this might be defined-the plaintiff's claim 
would seem flimsy and would be outweighed easily by the typical 
defendant's interests. 
An additional factor included in requirement (e) is deliberateness. 
Anthony Kronman has suggested that the law tends to treat deliber-
ately acquired information differently than that which is acquired cas-
ually. 395 Greater legal protection for the former makes economic 
sense. 396 For instance, although random creativity exists, it is 
394 In this vein, see Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 
320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. ill. 1970). On a technical level, this case addresses the law of 
copyright notice back in the days when lack of a notice on a "published" copy invalidated the 
copyright and put the work in the public domain. But the case also is about the effect of 
donative intent on the definition of property rights. 
Picasso had given a maquette and the right to reproduce it to the Art Institute of Chicago 
and to the Public Building Commission of Chicago, respectively, "desiring that these gifts 
shall, through them, belong to the people of Chicago." Id. at 1306. Without a copyright 
notice, the city displayed the maquette and encouraged photographs of it. The city later tried 
to defend its copyright. Id. at 1307. Although precedent suggested that the court might have 
ruled that there was only a "limited publication" for which no notice would have been 
required, see, e.g., King v. Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. 101, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), the court 
instead ruled that a divestitive publication without notice had occurred. Letter Edged in Black 
Press, 320 F. Supp. at 1313. 
In my view, the absence of copyright notice here accurately reflected the city's attitude. At 
least at first, the city had no intent to restrict replication. In addition, as the court noted, 
Picasso's ambiguous deed of gift had "dedicated [the sculpture] to the public," possibly 
making it "thus incapable of being copyrighted." Id. at 1309 n. *. Given this lack of stake in 
the copyright, it is not surprising that the court held the maquette and the scnlpture to be in 
the public domain. 
395 See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 
7 J. Legal Stud. 1, 13-18 (1978) (arguing that forced disclosure of deh1>erately acquired 
information may destroy incentives to produce socially valuable information but that casually 
aequired information need not be protected from foreed disclosure because its production 
needs no special incentives). But see Kim L. Scheppele, Legal Seerets: Equality and Efficiency 
in the Common Law 124-26, 162-78 (1988) (criticizing Kronman). 
396 Kronman, supra note 395, at 13-18. Note, however, that centralization of the 
management of particular intangible resources in one "owner" can be economically desirable. 
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unlikely to be induced by legal incentives. As for fairness, deliberate-
ness increases the nature of the plaintiff's stake, which is relevant to 
the autonomy concern. 
Roughly speaking, deliberateness includes even accidental byprod-
ucts if they issue from a project that is undertaken with something 
close to such products in mind. A serendipitous element would not 
disqualify an otherwise eligible intangible. Inventing a telegraph 
when one was trying to invent a telephone would yield an intangible 
that could be protected. By contrast, if one happened to overhear 
valuable information, that would not be deliberate acquisition. For 
much creative activity, virtually any production will be deliberate.397 
For other activities, the distinction between deliberate and casual pro-
duction may make a difference. 398 
Including the deliberateness requirement gives the courts a supple-
mentary tool with which to assess that part of the autonomy issue that 
I have called the magnitude of the plaintiff's stake and the economic 
issue of how far it is desirable to maximize a plaintiff's ability to con-
trol the rewards generated by the intangible in question. 399 The delib-
erateness requirement also might assist a court in assessing the 
prospect that a potential user would be surprised by the plaintiff's 
claim of exclusivity, which relates to the issue of the defendant's 
autonomy.400 The rationale for the requirement therefore can be 
See Kitch, supra note 372, at 285-86 (discussing patents). This rationale for property rights 
can exist regardless of whether the intangible was acquired deliberately or casually. 
397 For example, it is hard to imagine how one could nondeliberately paint in oils. I am 
indebted to Gary Francione here. 
398 See Kronman, supra note 395, at 13-18. The fact that there can be a skill in identifying 
the value even in serendipitously encountered information, just as there is a skill in identifying 
which of several drafts or even slips of the hand are worth adopting and presenting to the 
public, raises a lingering doubt. Also, scholars have questioned Kronman's thesis that 
deliberateness is a prerequisite to legal protection. See, e.g, Scheppele, supra note 395, at 124-
26, 162-74. 
399 This is not a matter only of providing incentives for initial production. The work of Ed 
Kitch and Mark Grady suggests that an additional and important economic criterion for 
protection might be the extent to which the plaintiff is the person best situated to organize the 
exploitation of the work or to investigate new applications of it. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. 
Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305 (1992); Kitch, supra note 
372. Deliberateness may provide an avenue into, or a not-inadequate proxy for, this functional 
inquiry. Only persons with knowledge of a field are likely to be in good positions to exploit a 
discovery in it, and such persons likely will meet the deliberateness test. 
400 A plaintiff's conduct of its business may indicate the area it means to control, and 
demand for payment that seems outside that range may be unexpected. 
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stated as follows: the more deliberately produced is the particular 
aspect of plaintiff's production, the greater is likely to be the plain-
tiff's autonomy stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, the plaintiff's 
responsiveness to incentives, and the plaintiff's expertise regarding 
the contested use of the intangible. Further, depending on context, 
the greater the plaintiff's deliberateness, the greater will be the likeli-
hood that a potential user will realize he probably will be working 
another's staked-out field.401 
Because the deliberateness requirement does not rule out judicial 
protection for those accidental byproducts that fall close to the plain-
tiff's initial goal, it does not work as an absolute bar to protection of 
serendipitous discoveries. Rather, it hopefully will prompt the courts 
to determine, case by case, the proper level of generality at which to 
401 Current statutory law requires that patentees publicly record that which they are 
claiming; this not only makes clear the plaintiff's stake but also warns potential defendants. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) ("The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention."). Once the claim is on record, however, even independent inventors 
who have no actual notice of it can be liable for infringement. Nevertheless, in the ordinary 
case, the scope of the patent claim will work both to make clear the plaintiff's stake and to 
limit the likelihood of defendants' being taken unawares. See, e.g., Pennutit Co. v. Graver 
Corp., 284 U.S. 52, 60 (1931) (statute "requires the patentee .•. to infonn the public during 
the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which 
features may be safely used or mannfactured without a license and which not"); Evans v. 
Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 434 (1822) (one object of claimant's specification is to "guard against 
prejudice or injury from the use of an invention which the party may otherwise innocently 
suppose not to be patented"). 
In copyright, the lack of teeth in the registration and new notice requirements, and the 
occasional vagueness with which infringement standards are applied, create two dangers: lack 
of warning to copyists, and a sometimes unwarrantedly large scope for a plaintiff's copyright. 
Occasional overbroad applications of the plaintiff's right to control derivative works also pose 
the latter danger. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988). As an example of this danger, consider Mirage 
Editions v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary 
judgment against defendant who purchased books and cut from them pictures that he then 
pasted on tiles). A deliberateness requirement is not meant to rule out all rights to sue for 
unauthorized derivative works but is meant to give courts a handle on conducting a sensible 
exploration into the breadth of such a right. 
. If this all seems an imprecise and difficult set of inquiries, it is: the subject matter compels it. 
The proper response to the difficulty is not to oversimplify the tort of malcompetitive copying. 
That is the current trend, and as a result of simplification, misappropriation has become a 
vague threat that chills potentially creative or otherwise useful applications of intangibles. See 
supra text accompanying g.otes 26-53. Should the institutional difficulties for a court appear 
overwhelming, the best response would be to forgo judicial action in favor oflegislative action. 
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identify the plaintiff's goal. 402 The plaintiff's stake and fairness to the 
defendant should be the primary criteria for choosing the level of gen-
erality, to be supplemented, when the data are available, by an eco-
nomic inquiry into the plaintiff's incentives and into her expertise in 
modes of developing (exploiting) the intangible. 
One final note: Requirement ( e) refers to the conditions under 
which the plaintiff created the work. It does not specify how the 
courts should treat claims by the plaintiff's successors in interest, 
whether corporate or personal. Further, with time the corrective jus-
tice claim of a creator will become attenuated, as will the incentive 
effects of any long-in-the-future award. Though specifying a cut-off 
point for protection is difficult, some specification should be incorpo-
rated into the tort, either separately or through this element.403 
7. Explanation of the &7Jemarcation" Requirement 
Unless the item is marked clearly in terms of its boundaries and 
ownership and provides some means by which the owner can be 
located, the user often will be unable to proceed through the market. 
Any successful lawsuit for payment necessarily involves compulsion. 
This compulsion might have been unnecessary had the creator pro-
vided demarcation. Encouraging the creator to mark the product is a 
402 For example, to identify Alexander Graham Bell's goal as "exploring ways to use 
mechanical and electrical devices for the reproduction and transmission of sound" is a more 
general statement of his goal-and a more appropriate one-than would be "exploring 
whether chemical solution X assists in producing the transmission of sound." To identify a 
publisher of case reports as having the goal of "producing usable compilations of legal 
opinions" is narrower-and more appropriate-than attributing to that entity the goal of 
"reaping as much money as possible from any conceivable use that might be made of its 
compilations." And, just as I would argue against the latter as too general, I would consider 
too narrow other descriptions of the publisher's goal: for example, if the goal were stated as 
"producing this particular complete sequence of opinions," that statement conceivably could 
prevent the publisher from complaining about anything short of a verbatim reproduction of 
the exact order of an entire set of case reporter volumes. A set of nonnative and empirical 
judgments, with which one certaiuly could quarrel, underlies this choice of generality level. 
For example, is it correct that the very narrow reading would undervalue plaintiff's apparent 
stake? Is it correct that the very broad reading would overvalue plaintiff's stake and impose 
surprise on some persons who reasonably would have imagined that their uses were permitted? 
One would hope there would be agreement on the choice of criteria to be considered. 
403 See supra note 381 (suggesting that the need for durational limits may favor the 
judiciary's ceding power in the area to the legislature). 
1992] Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse 257 
fair and cost-effective method of encouraging markets.404 Demarca-
tion would not be necessary under element (f) if the defendant had 
available by other means the knowledge provided by such marking. 
8. Explanation of the "Other Suitability" R.equirement 
Requirement (g) refers to the possibility that certain intangibles 
might be unsuitable objects for private claims.405 A growing literature 
addresses resources that are unsuitable for market trading because 
they should be treated either as incapable of sale (e.g., the law406 and 
some forms of bodily integrity407) or as inherently public (e.g., law 
and ideas408). This literature could provide useful starting points for 
the inquiry into ineligibility. 
Clearly, preservation of some arenas from commercialization has 
value. 409 In restitution cases, for example, nonprofessionals usually 
are not entitled to restitution for their efforts to rescue persons in 
peril. 410 This pattern may reflect a belief that motives of heroism pro-
vide more reliable inducements to rescue than do monetary incentives 
and that providing monetary incentives would decrease the likelihood 
ofheroism.411 Similarly, many scholars and artists are drawn to their 
work by its noncommercial aspects. Too large a right (and obliga-
404 Further, fairness and the societal arguments for demarcation parallel the arguments 
regarding knowing use (in requirement (a)) and defendant's ability to proceed through the 
market (in requirement (b)). Nevertheless, American copyright law no longer mandates 
notice. See Leaffer, supra note 25, at 110. 
405 General ideas, such as the use of perspective in art or the theory of relativity, may 
constitute one such class of ineligible intangibles, as might standards (e.g., the Celsius or 
Fahrenheit temperature scales). See Gordon, Equality, supra note 64, at 63-75. 
406 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) (works of United States government officials not 
copyrightable); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 719 
(1989); see also supra note 389 and accompanying text (discussing relation of this 
consideration to the legal duty requirement). 
407 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297, at 1090-93; Margaret J. Radin, Market 
Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849 (1987); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Symposium on Law and 
Economics: Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 932, 
948-49 (1985); see also In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396 (1988) (holding reproductive 
service not subject to valid contracts). 
403 See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 776-81 (1986). 
409 See, e.g., Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (1971). 
410 See Hope, supra note 174, at 35-36. 
411 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and 
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83, 93-100 (1978). 
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tion) of payment could erode these motivations (an economic argu-
ment) and could eliminate the very characteristics that make 
attractive the arena in which they use their skills (a harm argument). 
The nature of the suitability inquiry can be only intimated here. 
The inquiry is deliberately open-ended to embrace the normative 
issues implicated by each particular intangible. The prior elements in 
the list of minimum constraints accommodate only policies implicated 
by benefits in general; specific uses will require additional inquiry. 
C. Remedy 
Some necessarily tentative suggestions must be made regarding the 
remedy that would accompany the proposed tort. The first question 
is whether injunctive relief should be available. 
A strong argument commonly made in favor of injunctions in the 
intellectual products area includes the difficulty of pricing intangible 
goods412 and a reluctance to place such an inherently imprecise and 
potentially costly task on the judiciary. This argument strengthens 
the more generally applicable arguments in favor of injunctions, such 
as the likelihood that monetary measures will undercompensate plain-
tiffs413 or the desirability of encouraging use of the market by threat of 
injunctive "kickers,, because of the market's superiority over courts as 
a price-setting institution.414 On one level, injunctions might even 
seem particularly well-tailored for use with my hypothesized tort: 
because the instant right of action is available only to plaintiffs who 
are willing to serve the defendant's target market,415 giving such a 
plaintiff the power to enjoin a defendant's activity will not deprive the 
consuming public of a source for the contested good. Further, the 
412 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 47 (1991). 
This section was circulated separately. I am indebted to Doug Baird, Richard Epstein, 
David Friedman, Brian Kahin, Bill Landes, and Doug Laycock for comments on this section; 
Andrew Coleman's analysis of several recent copyright cases also was helpful. 
413 See Laycock, supra note 53, at 690 n.7. 
414 Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297, at 1126 (market-preserving "kickers" as an 
explanation for criminal penalties). Calabresi and Melamed's argument on injunctions is 
actually far from clear. Though they do a good job of explaining why a right to exclude may 
be invaluable in setting up consensual markets, they sometimes seem to imply that giving an 
injunction after a breach of such a right is equivalent to having prevented the breach in the first 
instance. 
41S See supra text accompanying notes 336-79 (suggesting that, to bring suit, plaintiff must. 
show actual or imminent competition between herself and defendant in the contested market). 
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threat of injunctions encourages use of the market, and one of the 
preconditions of this tort (asymmetrical market failure416) ensures 
that the tort can be invoked only when defendants have a market to 
which they can resort. 
On the other hand, injunctions bring with them the threat of 
overdeterrence because a defendant's product may mix inextricably 
the defendant's own resources with those of the plaintiff.417 Enjoining 
a defendant from using this mixed product effectively destroys the 
resources he has invested in it,418 the prospect of which may chill the 
production of desirable adaptations of plaintiff's work.419 An injunc-
tion's potential for affirmatively harming the defendant-taking more 
from him than he took from the plaintiff.-also poses fairness 
problems that are particularly important given the corrective justice 
foundations of the tort.420 Moreover, many intangibles involve works 
of expression, and it has long been a valued tenet of First Amendment 
law that prior restraints of speech should be avoided.421 
416 See supra text accompanying note 311 (suggesting that, to bring suit, plaintiff must show 
asymmetrical market failure and that showing that the defendant could have proceeded 
through the market is part of this requirement). 
417 Consider, for example, a movie that uses a novel's plot as the basis of its screenplay. 
418 One might argue, however, that the threat of injunction merely would lead to bargaining 
and that, as a price for not enforcing its injunction, the plaintiff likely will demand less than all 
of the defendant's profits. 
419 The extent of the chilling effect depends, inter alia, on the uncertainty of outcome 
virtually inevitable in any lawsuit; the less sure potential users are of what constitutes 
actionable behavior under the tort, the more otherwise desirable behavior is chilled. The 
complexity of the inquiry under my hypothesized tort (like the vagueness of the current 
misappropriation tort) makes the uncertainty problem substantial. See infra text preceding 
note 469 (the potential superiority of legislative boundary-setting over judicial boundary-
setting). 
420 See supra Parts I.B. & I.D. 
421 Historically this has been a tenet well-respected in all areas except intellectual property, 
an exception no court yet has explained adequately. The most likely reason why "prior 
restraint" language has not appeared in intellectual property cases is the doctrinal truism that 
"ideas" are not subject to propertization under the applicable federal statutes-primarily 
copyright and patent. It is assumed too easily, however, that because the doctrines say that 
only the particular expression of ideas can be restrained, no First Amendment problem arises. 
Numerous cases make clear that restraints on expression also can restrain the dissemination 
and evaluation of ideas and facts. For instance, the licensee of the Church of Scientology has 
attempted to use copyright law to enjoin a biography critical of L. Ron Hubbard. See, e.g., 
New Era Publications, Int'l ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.) (holding the 
biography an infringement, but declining to enjoin publication of the particular book because 
of laches), petition for reh'g denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 
(1990). 
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Most of the arguments in favor of injunctions lose their strength if 
the monetary remedy is strong enough to force potential defendants 
to use the market, thus substantially relieving the judiciary of the 
need to "make markets" or set prices. Yet most measures of mone-
tary recovery either will be so strong as to duplicate many of the 
injunction's dangers (e.g., the prospect of being deprived of all one's 
profits may "chill" creative uses as much as the prospect of an injunc-
tion) or will be so weak as to offer insufficient encouragement for 
defendants to seek out market bargains (e.g., the prospect of being 
made to pay fair market value if sued successfully is unlikely to 
encourage users to pay that same price voluntarily).422 
The tentative solution I proffer is to set plaintiff's recovery at the 
highest monetary amount that is a fair measure of what the defendant 
took.423 In many cases, this will be an amount equal to the highest 
price defendant would have paid had he gone through the market. 
The value of what the defendant copied can be conceptualized in 
three ways:424 the damage the defendant's use caused to the plaintiff 
422 See Iowa State Univ. Res. Found. v. American Broadcasting Co., 475 F. Supp. 78, 83 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (arguing that to limit defendant's liability to the same price it might have paid 
after consensual negotiation would remove motivation to obey the copyright law). 
423 It is important to recall that this "highest value" approach applies only to defendants 
who could have gone through the market. For those defendants who face market failure, this 
tort opts to impose no liability at all. See supra text accompanying notes 311-35 (discussion of 
reasons for the requirement of asymmetrical market failure). Were the misappropriation tort 
reformnlated to impose liability on persons who did face market failure, however, the 
appropriate measure of monetary recovery then would have to be tailored accordingly. Where 
imposing a "kicker'' would not encourage use of markets, an award of reasonable royalty set at 
the ab ante fair market value likely would provide a better measure of relief than would the 
"highest value" approach. See supra note 318. 
The nature of the choice between the two options of giving free use to defendants facing 
market failure, or of imposing on them a reasonable royalty, is more complex than the 
discussion here. For an introduction to this question, see Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 
1618-24 (discussing intermediate cases of market failure and alternatives to the grant of free 
use). 
424 In a given case, the most realistic high price would have included both reimbursement 
for expected loss and some share of the defendant's profits. So long as double-counting is 
avoided, the suggested remedy does not bar collecting under more than one heading. 
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in terms of lost profits in her current and anticipated425 markets;426 
the amount of money the defendant saved by using the plaintiff's 
work;427 or the amount of the defendant's profit that is fairly allocable 
to the contribution made by the plaintiff's work.428 A successful 
plaintiff should be awarded whichever is the highest of the three. 
425 Arguably, only damage to existing markets should be covered here, to avoid litigative 
speculation about the plaintiff's likely markets had the defendant not acted. In favor of such a 
position, it might be argued that even if the damage calculation omits future markets, those 
likely markets might not be iguored: they could be considered under a different heading. 
Because a defendant's profit in a new market is probably equivalent to what the plaintiff would 
have earned in the new market, the plaintiff's loss of such profit would be taken into account 
via the "allocable profit" measure. 
There may be cases, however, where this is not the case-where, for example, a defendant 
effectively saturates a new market so that the plaintiff cannot sell the work there, but the 
defendant does this so badly as to have no profit. A measure of damage open to proof ofloss in 
markets not yet entered therefore seems desirable, at least as a first approximation. 
426 This amount presumably will be the lowest compensation that the plaintiff wonld have 
accepted (i.e., her reservation price). 
I would exclude as irrelevant any damage resulting from causes other than substitution 
effects, for example, lost sales caused when a defendant's satiric use of a plaintiff's work 
changes the public's attitude toward the work. For my reasons for excluding such damage, see 
Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1633-34 & n.183; for a contrary position, see Fisher, supra 
note 29. I also would exclude from consideration damage to a plaintiff's noncommercial 
interests; shonld the defendant defame her or invade her property, such behavior should be 
actionable, if at all, under doctrines tailored to those interests. 
427 If the defendant could have used an alternative product, the price of that alternative 
wonld be one plausible measure of the money saved and thus of the benefit the defeudant 
reaped. If the price of the alternative good is higher than the price the plaintiff would have 
demanded, then the price of the alternative good nevertheless should be the relevant measure 
of "costs saved." (I recommend this approach in order to retain an incentive to prod 
defendants to ask permission for what they use.) 
The price of alternative goods will be roughly equal to the fair market value of the plaintiff's 
good only where fungible alternatives to the plaintiff's good are available for license. The cases 
often ignore the lack of fungible alternatives. For example, in Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. 
Ball, 39 S.E.2d 231 (Va. 1946), the plaintiff already had a tramway running across its land. 
When the coal company exceeded its easement by transporting more coal than the easement 
permitted, the (very expensive) alternative to using the plaintiff's land was running another 
tramway through someone else's land. The court, unfortunately, merely awarded the plaintiff 
an award equal to the fair market value of an expanded easement on land already having a 
tramway on it. Id. at 239. At least this was better than prior precedent, which refused any 
substantial recovery for nonharmful trespasses. Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. D. 439 (1883). 
428 Though there is much uncertainty in estimating allocable profits, the Supreme Court has 
suggested in a related context that it nevertheless may be workable. See Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1940). 
This overall approach-of pegging monetary recovery to the highest measure of what the 
defendant would have paid-is roughly consistent with what one finds today in the copyright 
and trademark statutes. In both copyright law, see 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1988), and federal 
trademark law, see § 35 of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff is entitled to recover both her damages 
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A monetary recovery equal to the highest value that can be placed 
on what the defendant took satisfies all the goals set forth above. 429 
and a share of the defendant's profit. In copyright there is, unfortunately, no clear entitlement 
to recover what the defendant saved by not paying for the plaintiff's work; this could lead to 
the anomalous result of freeing a copyright infringer of any obligation to pay. Such a result 
may both undercompensate the plaintiff from the point of view of giving the plaintiff desirable 
positive incentives and give a defendant a free ride not justified by the considerations surveyed 
elsewhere in this Article. 
Thus, the courts sometimes have been less than adept in implementing the statutory 
measures, and Congress has been less than adept in explaining their underlying theories. For 
example, compare Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Systems, 767 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding 
that costs saved by defendant should be taken into account in computing the damage award; 
court explicitly concerned with estimating the price defendant would have paid had he sought 
permission prior to copying) with Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group, 887 F.2d 
399, 406 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejeeting the relevance of costs saved by the copying on the ground 
that, at least given the availability of statutory damages for registered works, Congress was 
unconcerned with ''the fictive purchase price that [defendant] hypothetically chose not to pay 
[plaintift]" for use of an unregistered work). But cf. Sunset Lamp Corp. v. Alsy Corp., 749 F. 
Supp. 520, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (criticizing the Deltak approach). (I am indebted to Andrew 
Coleman for bringing these and related cases to my attention.) 
The Business Trends approach somewhat resembles the stance taken toward harmless but 
benefit-yielding trespasses in Phillips, a now largely disfavored remedies case that refused to 
award the plaintiff a significant monetary award despite any monetary benefit the defendant 
may have reaped by the trespass. Business Trends, like Phillips, may result in users paying 
nothing, despite cost savings. Even in Deltak, where the court is aware of the need to 
encourage compliance with the copyright law, see Deltak, 161 F.2d at 363 & n.3, the court 
does not require the defendant to pay the highest price he might have paid ab ante. A more 
explicit focus on searching for the highest price that the defendant would have paid, and 
explicit inclusion of a "costs saved" criterion, would provide better internalization of benefits 
and would encourage ab ante negotiation in most eases where copying is harmless to the 
plaintiff but beneficial to the defendant. 
Arguments from restitution should, however, be applied ouly cautiously to cases governed 
by statute. Plaintiff's failure to register the work with the Copyright Office may provide a 
justification for the Business Trends deeision on its particular facts. The Copyright Act has a 
complex administrative and remedial structure (including, in some circumstances, the 
provision of statutory damages) that as a whole arguably serves the goals I have outlined, and 
the Business Trends decision might be defended as bolstering an important part of that 
structure, namely, registration. (In addition, of course, it commonly is argued that copyright 
is premised primarily on public benefit considerations rather than on creators' reap/sow 
claims, which may lead to further differences between copyright and the malcompetitive-
copying tort.) Even in terms of my proposed tort, which is much simpler than any legislatively 
crafted scheme, the result in cases like Business Trends might be defended. A plaintiff's failure 
to register the work for copyright arguably might be equivalent to a finding (were this a case of 
malcompetitive copying) that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the deliberateness and 
high stake ordinarily evidenced by registration or had failed to give a defendant sufficient 
notice as to the scope of ownership claimed, and therefore had failed to satisfy the elements 
necessary to qualify the work for protection as an eligible intangible (see elements (e) and (f) of 
the proposed tort). 
429 See supra note 295 for further discussion of the merits of such a measure. 
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Because the defendant would have paid substantially less than this 
amount had he initially approached the plaintiff to seek a license or 
assignment, similarly situated persons will avoid the court-imposed 
measure of payment and instead will utilize the market. Because the 
measure is set at an amount that can be conceptualized as equal to the 
benefit the defendant reaped430 and because the tort is structured to 
enable defendants to protect themselves from surprise impositions of 
liability, requiring the defendant to pay this amount to a plaintiff is 
fair. Further, in many cases it will not harm the defendant affirma-
tively. For that reason, chilling effect should be small.431 
The question of remedy is complex and needs more investigation 
than provided here.432 For example, a full analysis should examine, 
430 One goal of corrective justice arguably is to "undo" transactions in a way that leaves 
both parties no worse off than they were; at first blush, this may appear inconsistent with 
intposing a monetary award on those defendants whose profits are less than the costs 
(damages) they have intposed on the plaintiff. Even a damage remedy, however, can be 
conceptualized as a measure of what the defendant reaped, for damages measure the monetary 
value of the opportunities he usurped from the plaintiff. 
It might be argued that the defendant at the moment of copying is taking a benefit (the 
opportunities otherwise open to the plaintifi) that the "damage" award sintply forces hint to 
disgorge. That this benefit turns out to be worth less to hint than it would have been to the 
plaintiff is unfortunate, but arguably not relevant to the issue of where corrective justice lies. 
(The latter contention leads directly to the issue of when a benefit should be measured. 
Compare the issue of erasable enrichment within restitution law.) 
431 Note that tlle prospect of paying damages probably will discourage those users whose 
expected profit is less than the amount of damage tlleir use will inflict. Such cases may occur 
often: a copyist frequently may be less skilled in packaging or presentation, or may have access 
to less efficient distribution routes, than will the original creator. Discouraging such 
undesirable uses is a proper result. "Chilling effect" refers to the prospect of discouraging 
desirable behavior. 
The remedy suggested here is intended to preserve positive incentives for those defendants 
whose uses of a work are economically desirable; conversely, uses that would intpose more 
costs than benefits should be discouraged. 
The requisites of fairness arguably are satisfied also in the cases where tlle costs inflicted by 
the defendant's behavior are greater than the profits it yields. In such instances, the choice is 
between tolerating an affirmative harm to the plaintiff Oeaving damages uncompensated) and 
causing an affirmative harm to the defendant (requiring hint to pay tlle damages). Restoration 
of both parties to the status quo ante is intpossible. Because the proposed tort includes 
constraints aimed at eliminating surprise to defendants and ensuring knowing choices, it seems 
fair to hold a defendant to his choice. Thus, even if one is reluctant to characterize the 
"opportunities seized by the defendant" as a proper measure of the defendant's gain, requiring 
hint to pay a judgment in an amount equal to the damage he inflicted may be consistent witll 
fairness. 
432 For example, including "costs saved" as an alternative measure of remedy has the virtue 
of providing compensation to creator-plaintiffs in cases where they suffer little loss from the 
defendant's activity and calculation of the defendant's allocable profit yields an uncertain or 
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among other things, the impact of information costs, varying enforce-
negligible amount. In such cases, plaintiffs can internalize some of the benefit traceable to 
their work by obtaining a judgment equal to costs saved. Such a judgment will be payable 
from any of the defendant's funds, including most notably the total profit (not merely the 
allocable profit) that the defendant's projeet yields. This is a prospect that seems responsive to 
the demands of the modified corrective justice model and should help create desirable ex ante 
incentives for creators. Yet there may be a problem with the "costs saved" criterion in regard 
to users' incentives, particularly when no equivalent to the plaintiff's work exists on the 
market. 
It is important to preserve the defendant's incentives to engage in economically desirable 
uses--typically uses where the defendant's project causes the plaintiff little or no harm 
(perhaps because it brings desirable publicity to the plaintiff's work) and where the defendant 
is a creative copyist, using or adapting the plaintiff's work in a way that the plaintiff herself 
could not. Yet there will be cases where a use is economically desirable, but it would not be 
undertaken if the defendant bad to bear the cost of making a work like the plaintiff's from 
scratch. 
In a world where perfect information and the other conditions of perfect competition were 
present, this prospect would not discourage economically desirable uses of the plaintiff's 
work-the threat of having to pay a judgment equal to "cost saved" simply would encourage 
the potential user to seek a license, and if his expected profit exceeded the loss the plaintiff 
expected to bear as a result of the project, there is a range within which the two parties should 
be able to reach agreement on a price. No resort would need to be made to the court in such 
instances: the defendant would not infringe, out of fear of having to pay a "cost saved" money 
judgment, and the plaintiff would agree to license, out of fear that it would lose its chance to 
obtain a license fee based on the profits waiting to be made. 
But in the imperfeet real world there is a danger that economically desirable uses would 
indeed be chilled; for example, various problems can prevent bargains from being reached 
{problems that may not amount to significant enough market failures to constitute defenses to 
liability), and if a bargain is not reached the prospect of paying to reinvent the wheel may be 
great enough to prevent the potential user from continuing with his project. Further, to the 
litigants it may be uncertain whether a court will classify a particular intellectual product as an 
"eligible intangible" or as something that belongs in the public domain; socially useful 
applications of intangibles that should be in the public domain may be discouraged if the 
potential users face a threat of having to pay a judgment equal to "costs saved" that is greater 
than profit to be earned. If cases of chill are frequent, it therefore may be advisable to cap 
judgment awards of "costs saved" at an amount equal to the defendant's total (not allocable) 
profits from the project. But inquiries into profit are often difficult and contestable. If cases of 
chill are not frequent, the transaction costs of allowing this additional inquiry may not be 
worthwhile. 
In addition, the cases where the "costs saved" measure will be useful are limited. They are 
instances where the defendant saved signifieant costs by using the plaintiff's product yet 
imposed little interference on the plaintiff's markets and earned little profit-cases, where, for 
example, the defendant used the plaintiff's product in an attempt to sell in the plaintiff's 
market that failed. There may be few cases of importance where the "costs saved" measure is 
in fact necessary to direct meaningful compensation to plaintiffs. For these reasons, it may not 
be worth the candle to make the "costs saved" measure an option. 
But in the end it is easy to overstate the difficulties. It is my expectation that these high-end 
remedies rarely would be invoked and instead would serve to spur market formation. 
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ment probabilities, judicial institutional limitations,433 and the availa-
bility of supplemental remedial regimes such as criminal enforcement 
and supplemental awards such as attorneys' fee assessments. In addi-
tion, the remedy proposed here is tailored for potential users whose 
objectives are pecuniary; it is not well-adapted for persons with pri-
marily nonmonetary motivations.434 Nevertheless, the usual remedial 
measures in the restitution cases435 do not respond well to the need, 
particularly sharp in the area of intangibles, to preserve both plaintiff 
and defendant incentives and to do so without overburdening the judi-
ciary. An inquiry into the maximum value fairly attributable to what 
the defendant took is a better starting point for inquiry than more 
standard measures. 
In sum, I tentatively recommend denying plaintiffs the option of 
receiving injunctive relieF36 (a recommendation that is particularly 
strong in cases where free-speech issues are implicated) and instead 
433 One relevant question would be the administrative cost of figuring a monetary award; at 
some point, use of injunctive remedies, or giving no remedies at all (e.g., fair use treatment) 
might be preferable. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1622-24 (using criteria of 
institutional expertise to compare the merits of judicial price-setting versus judicial grant of 
free use). 
434 For example, consider those cases where the defendant wants only to use the plaintiff's 
work (e.g., a satirist who is interested only in taking aim at the particular works he finds 
offensive) so that the concept of "money saved" is arguably irrelevant-there is no alternative 
resource for which he would have paid. In such cases, the measure of profit also may be 
irrelevant; expected monetary profit might be zero without dampening the user's desire to 
make the derivative work. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (author of book critical of the Warren Commission offered to pay all of his 
book profits to the corporation that owned the copyright in the Zapruder photos of the 
Kennedy assassination in order to obtain a license to use them, or drawings based upon them, 
in his book). 
Some users who lack commercial motivations will do things to which the plaintiff objects 
(e.g., the satirist). As to such users, the remedy problem is of minor importance; because the 
tort contains a requirement that the plaintiff be willing to serve the defendant's market, most 
such defendants could not be sued successfully. 
435 Even where a proportional measure of profit was used, the allocation was made on a 
basis that ignored the defendant's efforts, for instance, in discovering a cave, advertising it, and 
conducting tours through it. Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936). 
Note, however, that when a defendant misappropriates an item offiuctuating value, such as 
a share of stock, he may be required to pay that item's highest value. See Dobbs, supra note 
158, at 404. 
436 This is consistent with the Laycock position, for good reasons exist in the intellectual 
product area-such as the special importance of preserving creative defendants' efforts from 
being chilled-to refuse the plaintiff's choice of remedy. See Laycock, supra note 53, at 689 
(injunctions should be unavailable where good reason exists to deny that choice of remedy). 
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giving plaintiffs an award of monetary relief as defined above. This 
tentative recommendation should provide a useful place of departure 
for future discussion of remedy issues in the intellectual product area. 
IV. ON OWNING INFORMATION: APPLYING THE SET OF 
CONSTRAINTS 
To illustrate the operation of the set of minimum criteria, I apply 
them now to two cases involving claims in information. The first 
illustration involves the fact pattern of the misappropriation suit that 
serves as the fountainhead of much of the recent case law applying 
reap/sow principles. The second examines how the set of criteria 
would apply to the facts of a recent copyright suit. 
A. International News Service v. Associated Press 
To recapitulate briefly: misappropriation as an independent tort 
usually is said to have begun with the 1918 case of International News 
Service v. Associated Press437 in which the United States Supreme 
Court upheld an injunction barring one news service from copying 
news from another " 'until its commercial value . . . has passed 
away.' "438 The Court's decision had two primary bases. The first 
sounded in fairness: defendant INS endeavored to "reap where it has 
not sown,"439 helping itself to the "fruits" or "harvest" of AP's time, 
effort, and money. 440 The Court perceived this as unfair and unjust441 
and framed the rationale in arguably restitutionary terms. The Court 
called the plaintiff's news "quasi property,"442 as if referring to the 
unjust enrichment doctrine of quasi-contract and borrowed from the 
doctrine of constructive trusts the notion that one who has paid the 
price for property should have the benefit of its use.443 
The second basis for the opinion was economic. The Court 
observed that the defendant's copying interfered with the plaintiff's 
437 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
438 INS, 248 U.S. at 245 (quoting injunction issued by the lower court) (emphasis omitted). 
43~ Id. at 239. 
440 Id. at 239-41. 
441 Id. at 240. 
442 Id. at 242. 
443 Id. at 240. The Court here ignored the point that news does not begin as property. As 
noted earlier in this Article, the restitutionary rules regarding treatment of labor differ from 
those involving property. See supra notes 220-25 & 368-79 and accompanying text. 
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business "precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped,"444 
and that such practices would render "pro:fitless"445 any news-gather-
ing enterprise. From this viewpoint, the injunction protected a valua-
ble public service. 
As a narrow economic matter, the INS Court stood on potentially 
strong ground. Without a right of action, the two news services could 
face something similar to a classic prisoner's dilemma:446 each could 
suffer greatly if it continued to invest in news-gathering while its com-
petitor merely copied, yet there was the potential for mutual disaster 
if each copied and discontinued its own expensive news-gathering 
efforts, for there then would be no source for news. Prior to the dis-
pute that gave rise to the lawsuit, the two entities resolved this 
dilemma through a custom of taking nothing but "tips" from each 
other.447 When INS was barred from Europe,448 however, it could 
not obtain first-hand information about the war for its readers. The 
rewards from copying and the costs of not copying grew large enough 
to upset the prior balance. Once one news service began to copy, the 
other might engage in retaliatory copying out of self-defense; at that 
point, legal intervention may have been necessary to preserve the enti-
ties from a destructive cycle. If only AP were injured, a decrease in 
service to the public would result, for INS, having been barred from 
Europe, could not fill AP's shoes. 
The misappropriation doctrine currently applies in circumstances 
where no such disasters would follow from uncompensated use. 
Where the plaintiff and the defendant do not compete, there is no 
prisoner's dilemma problem; copying by one would create no immi-
444 INS, 248 U.S. at 240. 
445 Id. at 241. 
446 In a prisoner's dilemma game, each participant will gain if both cooperate, but either 
stands to gain even more ifthe other cooperates and he does not. Further, each stands to lose 
a great deal if he cooperates and the other does not. If neither cooperates, the loss to each is 
less than he would have borne had he cooperated and had the other not cooperated. As a 
result, when each party lacks the means to know or to influence the other's choice, both may 
decide not to cooperate, leaving both worse off than if each had cooperated. For a more 
precise description of this problem, see Davis, supra note 334, at 93; Charles J. Goetz, Law 
and Economics 12-17 (1984); Gordon, Prisoner's Dilemma, supra note 251. 
447 INS, 248 U.S. at 243. 
448 By one report, France prevented the Hearst Agency correspondents from obtaining the 
war news directly. Chafee, supra note 3, at 1310. By others, it was England that imposed a 
bar. Contemporaneous newspaper accounts spoke ofa ban by the British government in 1916. 
See Kitch & Perlman, supra note 13, at 28-29. 
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nent danger for the other. Yet, some courts give misappropriation 
relief in the absence of competition. 449 Instead of providing a remedy 
only in cases of extreme economic need where the demands of fairness 
are met, INS increasingly seems to serve as a precedent for a sort of 
natural right to property in the fruits of one's labor. Further, INS 
was decided before the advent of modem First Amendment doctrine. 
The majority clearly failed to consider adequately the free speech 
issues. 
A misperception of "unjust enrichment" is helping to stretch the 
case beyond its bases in both fairness and economics450 and is encour-
aging modem courts to follow the INS majority in giving too short 
shrift to free speech and related dimensions of the public interest.451 
Restoring INS to its restitutionary origins might generate a more lim-
ited and defensible cause of action. Applying the limits of the hypo-
thetical set of constraints outlined above would direct the courts 
toward considering the appropriate variables and thus would help to 
minimize the problems caused by, and to maximize the societal bene-
fits generated by, a right of misappropriation. 
The facts of INS illustrate both the application of the proposed set 
of minimum constraints and the need for additional limitations on the 
reap/sow principle. If the suit were brought today and the set of min-
imum constraints applied, AP could argue that the minimum require-
ments were satisfied in the following way: 
Requirement (a) (knowing use): AP would suggest that INS 
knowingly used its news. 
Requirement (b) (asymmetrical market failure): AP would sug-
gest that because it lacked a lever with which to compel INS to 
pay for what it took, whereas INS easily could pay AP, asym-
metrical market failure was present. 
449 See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983) 
(holding Dow Jones entitled to bar use of its average as a reference point for a futures-trading 
contract, despite its own lack of interest in so utilizing the average). 
450 Id. at 93 (Simon, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he majority is swayed by what it sees as 
'unjust' enrichment"). Justice Seymour Simon argued that to make out the tort of 
misappropriation, there must be a combination of both unjust enrichment and competitive 
injury. Id. 
451 For example, the Supreme Court cited INS as a basis for granting the United States 
Olympic Committee an injunction against the use of the term, "Gay Olympic Games." San 
Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 532, 541 (1987). 
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Requirement (c) (competition): AP would argue that it had suf-
ficient nexus with the contested acts because AP and INS were 
in competition, as were their respective affiliated newspapers. 
Requirement (d) (nonreciprocity): AP would argue that INS's 
use was substantial and not something AP likely would wish to 
do. 
Requirement (e) (plaintiff's stake): AP would suggest that it 
had gathered the news deliberately and with an intent to capi-
talize on it commercially. 
Requirement (f) (demarcation): AP would suggest that INS was 
proceeding despite AP's protests, thus establishing a satisfac-
tory substitute for demarcation. 
Requirement (g) (other suitability): AP would point to the fact 
that the two parties already were in the business of marketing 
news, thus establishing its suitability as an item of commercial 
exchange. 
In defense, INS likely would concentrate on a few selected avenues. 
Regarding requirement (c) (nexus and competition), INS first might 
contend that, although the two news services and their affiliated news-
papers competed in some aspects of their enterprises, AP did not in 
fact stand ready to serve INS's market. Subscribers to INS papers 
arguably preferred the point of view that those newspapers provided 
and would not find AP newspapers an adequate substitute. Even if 
the readers of INS papers would have been willing to switch to AP 
papers, INS might be able to show that "a large part of the readers" 
of the INS papers "were so situated that they could not secure prompt 
access to papers served by the Associated Press."452 INS would con-
tend that the two parties could be considered in competition only if 
AP were to sell its news to INS papers or to those papers' customers 
and that, unless AP were to find some means to do so, its claim 
should be barred. 
A related defense lies with the requirement of asymmetrical market 
failnre (requirement (b)). Even if INS conceded that AP faced a mar-
ket failure, it could contend that as a defendant it faced a market 
failnre as well: AP's likely unwillingness to license INS's use of the 
452 INS, 248 U.S. at 264 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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news. Conceivably, INS might be able to show that, if given an 
injunction, AP would refuse to license at virtually any price;453 AP 
might wish to use the power resulting from the injunction to impair 
INS's viability as a competitor,454 or perhaps AP's bylaws were so 
restrictive that INS papers would be unable to achieve membership.455 
If such a showing could be made, requirement (b) would be unsatis-
fied, for that constraint requires both that the plaintiff faced market 
failure and that the defendant did not. If the defendant faced market 
failure, the defendant would prevail. 
INS also would have an argument regarding requirement (g) (mar-
ket suitability). The requirement of market suitability underlines the 
open-ended nature of the additional inquiries that might be necessary 
in individual cases. INS might argue that news production clearly 
requires additional inquiry, for since 1918 news has come to be seen 
as implicating First Amendment values. 456 Furthermore, restricting 
the flow of news may harm third parties by rendering future genera-
tions less able to deal with their environment than predecessors had 
been. 457 The requirement of market suitability demands more than 
proof that the intangible has been traded or could be traded. Instead, 
it asks courts to address the normative and constitutional issues raised 
by imposing an obligation of payment in this context and for this kind 
of intangible. 
INS would argue that the court must distinguish between markets 
tolerated by the legal system because they evolved from existing legal 
and physical advantages that implicate no controversial normative or 
453 See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28, at 1632-35 (arguing that authors' 
antidissemination motives are a form of market failure). Under current law, such behavior 
might constitute an antitrust violation. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 14-
16 (1945). 
454 Cf. Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(allowing newspaper to use copies of TV Guide cover in comparative advertising to promote a 
competing publication). 
455 See INS, 248 U.S. at 264 n. i (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In fact, AP later was found to be 
in violation of the antitrust laws by improperly restricting both its membership and the 
dissemination of news by its members. See Ralph S. Brown & Robert C. Denicola, Cases on 
Copyright, Unfair Competition, and Other Topics Bearing on the Protection of Literary, 
Musical, and Artistic Works 547 (5th ed. 1990). 
456 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The courts are not 
always sensitive to the free speech dimensions of intellectual property problems, however. See 
Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 410-12. 
457 See Gordon, Equality, supra note 64. 
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constitutional issues,458 and markets that exist only if the legal system 
gives an explicit right in a given intangible. After all, tolerating mar-
kets requires a different decision than giving legal rights.459 The grant 
of an explicit right might implicate justice or the Constitution in a 
way that toleration of an existing market might not.460 Even if a news 
service successfully reaps profits by physically denying access to those 
newspapers that have not paid its price,461 the news may not be an 
appropriate subject for an explicit grant of legal rights. Thus, the pos-
sibility that news services may be able to exploit local physical exclu-
sivity or: lead-time advantage to obtain profits from selling news does 
not foreclose the "market suitability" issue.462 
INS and AP would be making arguments both about the facts and 
about the proper interpretation of the hypothesized set of constraints. 
Attention to such questions wonld have better served both the public 
weal and the foundations of the reap/sow principle than did the 
Court's too-quick assumption that one who pays the price shonld 
have the benefit.463 The issue of competition in the relevant market 
(requirement (c)) would have directed the Court's attention to the 
welfare of those third parties-subscribers to INS-affiliated newspa-
pers-who stood to be aftected adversely by granting AP a right over 
the news. This would have helped to widen the majority's field of 
vision beyond its narrow focus on only the two named parties, an 
458 See Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits, supra note 37, at 1400-05, 1465·69 (markets in 
intangibles evolve as byproducts of physical advantages). But cf. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia 153-60 (1974) (comparing historical principles and end-result principles of 
"patterned" justice). 
459 For example, it is lawful to bribe a noisy neighbor to be quiet even if one lacks a legal 
right to have a court or a policeman quiet him. In fact, it commonly is argued that it is 
important to allow persons to "bargain around" legal rules. Cf. Ronald H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
460 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964) (suggesting that 
judicial enforcement of private right of action for libel implicates issues of free speech). In 
some unusual contexts, attempts to enforce purely private consensual arrangements will 
implicate constitutional issues. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (denying state 
judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant on Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection grounds). 
46! "I will keep you from seeing the news I have gathered in a timely fashion unless you join 
my association or pay my fees." 
462 Copyright law is instructive here. Although the exact wording of a news item might be 
suitable for a copyright, the underlying substance of the news would not be. Cf. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) (1988) (copyright protection does not extend to ideas). 
463 See INS, 248 U.S. at 239-41. 
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aspect of the opinion that long has troubled commentators464 and that 
was one of the concerns that motivated Justice Louis Brandeis to 
dissent. 465 
Attention to asymmetrical market failure (requirement (b)) also 
might have served to bring Justice Brandeis and the majority closer 
together. Brandeis suggested that because the news implicated public 
interest considerations, any grant of rights in news might have to be 
conditioned upon a legislatively authorized compulsory license. 466 
Had the majority carefully considered the possibility that AP would 
refuse to sell INS a privilege to copy the news-the issue that INS 
would raise pursuant to requirement (b )-the majority also might 
have concluded that supervision of the AP-INS relationship would be 
necessary to ensure the public's continuing access to information 
about the ongoing war. This, in tum, would have led the Court to 
consider directly whether supervision of this relationship was an 
appropriate expenditure of judicial resources or whether a different 
branch of government could better manage the relationship. 
Attempting to "make a market" in war news was a possibility; a court 
could, for example, deny an injunction and set an amount of mone-
tary recovery to be paid regularly to AP as long as INS utilized the 
news.467 But such a course of action could burden the judiciary 
beyond the limits of its institutional competence.468 Explicit consider-
464 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 99, at 1159-60. 
46S See INS, 248 U.S. at 262-63 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
466 Id. at 266-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that a legislature might conclude that the 
proper remedy includes the recovery of fixed damages and might refuse to issue an injunction). 
467 Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (ruling that an 
injunction barring the defendant from operating a noisy and dust-emitting cement plant would 
be vacated if defendant paid permanent damages to neighboring landowners). Note that where 
the defendant faces market failure, award of a reasonable royalty (fair market value) may be 
appropriate, as may be a privilege of free use. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 28 (exploring 
both alternatives and cautioning that institutional limitations often have persuaded courts to 
prefer granting a liberty to copy rather than endeavoring to set prices). A monetary award of 
an amount equal to the highest price the defendant would have paid would be excessive when 
the defendant has no market alternative. Compare the discussion of remedy, supra notes 318 
& 412-36 and accompanying text. 
468 Commentators argue not ouly that restitution courts seek to avoid the extensive burdens 
that might be involved in overseeing such market-making, see Dawson, supra note 13, at 1418, 
but also that a desire to avoid valuation problems motivates them. See Levmore, supra note 
38, at 72; see also Wade, supra note 174, at 1186-90 (arguing that a measurable benefit or 
burden is required for the imposition of liability). 
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ation of the issue might have led the majority to share Justice Bran-
deis' conclusion that adequate resolution required legislative action. 
That the set of minimum constraints might lead to legislative rather 
than judicial resolution in certain contexts is a virtue rather than a 
flaw in the analysis. It demonstrates that the set of constraints can 
help courts identify where the reap/sow principle may be an unsatis-
factory basis for judicially granted rights. 
Adoption of the recommended set of constraints would, at a mini-
mum, have kept later courts from taking out of context the opinion's 
reference to "quasi-property"-a phrase merely restitutionary in ori-
gin that has been used to justify property treatment for informa-
tion.469 Use of the constraints would have focused the opinion more 
directly on the relevant variables and would have provided better gui-
dance for future cases. 
B. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central: 
Rights in Page Numbers 
Cross-citing across various published versions of case reports long 
has been a useful practice. For example, the Supreme Court reporter 
published by the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company tells the 
reader where to find particular language in the official United States 
Reports. When Mead Data offered to provide in its on-line LEXIS 
service cross-cites to the interior of judicial opinions appearing in 
West case reports, however, West sued.470 
Under conventional copyright principles, West had a copyrightable 
compilation in its volumes of case reports: West had arranged the 
judicial opinions, and though West had no copyright in the opinions 
469 In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the Court held that a reporter's use of 
his newspaper's prepublication information to make a profit for himself violated the mail- and 
wire-fraud statutes. Under the statutes then in force, simply showing that the reporter violated 
a "contractual right to his honest and faithful service" would not have resulted in conviction. 
Id. at 25. Rather, the violation of a property right was required. Id. Relying in part on INS, 
the Court deemed irrelevant whether the reporter's scheme "interfere[d] with the Journal's use 
of the information" or caused it monetary loss. It held that the newspaper had a property 
interest and the reporter had denied the paper the "exclusivity" that property should bring. 
Id. at 26-27. But INS does not establish a right to exclude; even if one accepts the reap/sow 
principle, the preceding analysis makes clear that the Carpenter opinion ignores the difference 
between a right to reward and a right to property. 
410 West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (affirming a 
preliminary injunction order against Mead Data's use of page cites in its LEXIS service), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987). 
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themselves, no one could copy an entire volume's arrangement with-
out infringing West's copyright. But nothing theretofore known in 
copyright law gave West a copyright in the page numbers themselves, 
nor was there clear precedent establishing that copying page numbers 
infringed on West's copyright. Nevertheless, West obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction against Mead Data. The following discussion briefly 
explores how a state court might have handled the controversy utiliz-
ing the approach this Article has outlined, assuming for the sake of 
argument that there was no copyright law or other source of federal 
preemption.471 After Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service 
Co.,472 such controversies may find their way to state court.473 
The fact pattern may satisfy the proposed set of minimum con-
straints. In the absence of a copyright statute, West well might argue 
that the set of constraints would permit compensating it for this com-
mercial use of its page numbers. Mead Data knowingly used the page 
numbers in competition with West in circumstances where it knew 
West claimed an ownership interest in them, meeting requirements (a) 
(knowing use), (c) (competition), and arguably (f) (demarcation). The 
use was substantial and not likely to be reciprocated, meeting require-
ment (d) (nonreciprocity). West arguably faced a market failure 
(short of being granted a legal right, it had no lever with which to 
block Mead Data's access to the page number information474 and no 
lever with which to obtain payment from customers who obtained 
West-generated information via Mead Data's LEXIS terminals), and 
Mead Data did not face market failure (it easily could have sought a 
license from West), possibly meeting requirement (b) (asymmetrical 
market failure). West produced the page numbers as a part of a delib-
erate productive effort for which it expected to be paid, possibly meet-
ing requirement (e) (plaintiff's stake). 
471 Note that West chose the page numbers in the West case reports. Nevertheless, the page 
numbers are facts, like addresses in a telephone directory, telling lawyers where to find 
particular judicial language. Had the Mead Data decision been decided after Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), quite possibly the Court 
would have reached a dtiferent outcome and would not have found a federal copyright 
infringement. 
472 111 s. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
473 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
474 I am assuming here that the usual public goods problems that afflict intellectual property 
will suffice to explain why West's "freedom" not to sell the reporters at all would not count as 
a usable lever. See supra notes 331-35 and accompanying text. 
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There are some discrepancies, however, between the Mead Data 
facts and the proposed set of constraints. Perhaps West did not 
"deliberately create" the page numbers within the meaning of require-
ment (e). West certainly cared about its page numbers after the dis-
pute arose, but prior to that time West probably was indifferent to 
which paragraph of a judicial opinion appeared on which page. 
The major problem with the Mead Data decision sounds in require-
ment (g): the decision may curtail a democracy's access to its own 
law.475 In the short run, Mead Data has the money to obtain a license 
from West, 476 but future law publishers may not. 
This problem has both economic and noneconomic dimensions. A 
complex economic analysis of the market structure prevailing at the 
time new publishers entered the field would be needed to determine 
whether West's ownership of its page numbers would restrain, or 
would help to achieve, value maximization.477 I suspect that owner-
ship would retard rather than promote allocative efficiency under 
most likely scenarios. If it did retard efficiency, West's ownership 
claim would increase the cost of access to law. Much admirable pro-
gress has been made in the opposite direction (increasing the ease with 
which the poor can use the law) over the past few years, and, in my 
view, this should not be reversed. 
Further, destructive synergies sometimes follow from pricing goods 
in which there is a high public stake. 478 Records of judicial opinions 
475 See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 406 at 809-13. 
Another problem with the decision arises under copyright law. Arguably, the court ignored 
the legislative boundaries that make copyright law tolerable. The Copyright Act protects only 
designated works of authorship; page numbers themselves are not works of authorship. At 
most, use of the page numbers gave access to West's protectable compilations, but the Act does 
not proscribe giving access to a copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (listing 
exclusive rights in copyrighted works). Yet the court ruled that there was an actionable 
infringement. The importance of boundaries to intellectual property may be a reason for 
favoring legislative over judicial resolution of intellectual product questions; it also is a reason 
for courts to hew closely to the existing boundaries. 
476 Patterson & Joyce, supra note 406, at 722. 
477 At first blush, giving ownership of page numbers to West may appear to increase the cost 
of access to law. But giving West this ownership enables it to collect license fees from Mead 
Data; although this transfer payment may increase the price a lawyer must pay for a LEXIS 
subscription, it may decrease correspondingly the prices that West charges its customers. The 
issue needs empirical investigation. 
478 For an interesting view, consider Rose, supra note 408, at 777-81 (arguing that 
"inherently public property" may be necessary if members of the public are to deal 
productively with each other). 
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are a form of law, and access to law unencumbered by intellectual 
property rights may be something that society values for its own sake. 
Many goods should not be traded commercially,479 and there are 
many possible bases for a belief that not all resources should be 
owned. For example, an egalitarian may believe that all are entitled 
to an equal chance to the "good life" and may believe that free use of 
certain goods (such as affection, air, law, and fundamental ideas) is 
essential to the good life. Or one might believe that, however much 
private parties should be free to exchange such goods among them-
selves on whatever terms they deem appropriate, the courts would 
create significant social tension by putting prices on these goods and 
enforcing these restrictions. Or one might believe that no one 
deserves ownership in something she makes out of the common heri-
tage unless she leaves "enough, and as good" for others; because there 
is little "as good" as air, law, and the fundamental tools of art and 
science, these things might be incapable of ownership.480 
Perhaps standards in general should be ineligible for ownership, 
whether they be West page citations, which have become standards in 
legal practice and scholarship, or computer user interfaces,481 golf-
handicapping formulae, 482 or stock market indices483 that have 
become standards in their respective fields. This limitation can be jus-
tified on several grounds. Designation as a "standard" grants addi-
tional economic value not attributable to the intangible's original 
merits: something may become a standard simply because of temporal 
priority and not because of excellence; once something is a standard, 
479 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 297, at 1111-15 (discussing inalienability). Sexual 
favors are the usual example of goods that should not be sold. Others might include air to 
breathe, the use of perspective in art, the theory of relativity in physics, or the form a 
symphony takes. Still another might be law. 
480 This argument, derived from Locke, is developed further in Gordon, Equality, supra 
note 64, at 19-24 (discussing the Lockean proviso); see also Hughes, supra note 374, at 296-329 
(discussing a Lockean justification for the ownership of intellectual property). 
481 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990) 
(holding copyrightable the user interface of Lotus 1-2-3). The court was unreceptive to 
defense arguments regarding standardization. Id. at 71. 
482 United States Golf Ass'n v. St. Andrews Sys., Data-Max, 749 F.2d 1028, 1040-41 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (refusing to enjoin the use of the plaintiff's formula for calculating golf handicaps 
and treating as a relevant consideration the formula's role as an industry standard). 
483 See Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983) (holding 
that plaintiff is entitled to bar use of its average as the basis for defendant's stock index futures 
contract). 
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there is nothing "as good" available;484 a standard, if owned, could 
have a quasi-monopolistic advantage in the market over its competi-
tors; intangibles do not become standards until they have long been 
successful, and, at that point, the producer's investment in research 
and development long may have been paid back; and the public begins 
to rely on a standard in a way that might give users a claim, analo-
gous to estoppel, 485 to employ the standard when substitutes are 
unavailable. 
My primary point here is not to argue for any particular content to 
the list of ineligible intangibles. Rather, I am illustrating that no resti-
tutionary right is complete without protection for the public interest, 
and arguing that no case as yet has fully worked out such protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts use "fruits of labor," "reap/sow," and other unjust 
enrichment arguments to bestow new wealth upon certain creators. 
Though restitutionary considerations long have played a role in 
Anglo-American judge-made law, in the last twenty years the restitu-
tionary impulse has acquired new force. The recent trend in intellec-
tual property rights finds that all appropriations are in danger of 
being treated as misappropriations and that the interdependence upon 
which our cultural life rests is on the verge of becoming a cash-and-
carry operation. I speculate that judges may feel no need to examine 
the trend because the restitutionary notion that one deserves to keep 
the "fruits of his labor" seems so evidently correct, so evidently in 
accord with traditional notions of corrective justice and traditional 
conceptions of the judicial role, that giving legal protection to intellec-
tual products appears to require no special justification. Yet, in my 
view, the traditional protections for intellectual products (copyright 
and patent statutes; trademark law limited to securing for consumers 
protection from confusion; and protection of trade secrets) likely pro-
vide sufficient incentives and structure to keep the intellectual product 
484 See Dreyfuss, supra note 63, at 418 (arguing if a trademark's use is "rhetorically unique 
within its e-0ntext," the trademark owner should not be permitted a right of action against its 
use in that e-0ntext). Consider also my interpretation of the Lockean proviso. See Gordon, 
Equality, supra note 64, at 19-24. 
48s Some have argued that reliance claims ean give rise to property. See Singer, supra note 
98, at 1026-31. The argument that something should be in the public domain and open for all 
to e-0py is equiv~lent to arguing that it should be the property of the public. 
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industries healthy, and the new protectionism chills more creativity 
than it induces. 
If corrective justice notions are the basis of the recent opinions, 
standing alone they do not bear the requisite weight. Protecting a 
current balance of community advantages and implementing commu-
nity norms should not lead directly to identifying all free riding as 
"wrongful gain." Such a prohibition is itself potentially destabilizing, 
and, though it may express one community norm, important contrary 
community norms exist as well. 
The largest possibility of disruption applies beyond the immediate 
parties to a given suit. Giving AP a right against INS can deprive a 
significant number of newspaper readers of the news; requiring an 
information producer to reinvent the wheel may prevent the making 
of a valuable new product.486 Any award of an intellectual property 
right likely will increase price and, consequently, decrease access to 
the work.487 All of these effects shift the direction of a society's effort. 
Most applicable norms caution against the unrestrained impulse to 
reward creators for the benefits they generate. Ask a lawyer about 
West's suit to restrain Mead Data from providing jump cites in 
LEXIS to the judicial opinions published by West in the standard 
reporter series referenced by all lawyers and judges daily. 488 Ask a 
computer professional about Lotus' suit to prevent others from using 
spreadsheet interfaces with elements similar to theirs. 489 Ask a comic 
book reader about Disney's suit to restrain a parody of Mickey and 
Minnie.490 Many members of the relevant communities will report 
that the plaintiffs have gone too far and that they are trying to control 
what should be free.491 
486 Cf. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of 
Facts, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1569 (1963) (arguing that the collection of facts such as newspaper 
articles should have narrower judicial protection than literary or artistic works in order to 
avoid "wasteful duplication of effort" by later authors). 
487 See Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 18. 
488 West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1070 (1987). 
489 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (plaintiff 
Lotus prevailed). 
490 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff Walt Disney 
prevailed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). 
491 On the West case, ask one's lawyerly self. On the Lotus cases, see, e.g., Activists to 
Picket Lotus Headquarters, InfoWorld, July 30, 1990, at 38; David Bunnell, The Software 
Inquisition, Macworld, May 1987, at 19, 22. On the Air Pirates case, see Stewart Brand, Dan 
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Unfortunately, these other norms are difficult to articulate, whereas 
"reaping and sowing" comes neatly to the tongue. Further, litigation 
contains a structural bias against the articulation of a community 
interest in free access, for the community as such cannot be a litigant. 
Against an articulate plaintiff who is enunciating what sounds like a 
moral interest in reaping what she has sown often stands a commer-
cially motivated defendant who may be an unsympathetic figure 
poorly situated to communicate what the community has at stake.492 
Spokespersons for the community interest in non ownership exist, 493 
but, given the likely structure of the relevant litigation, their voices 
may go unheard. 
Tue underlying theme here is the inherent contradiction in any 
legal principle that protects expectations for their own sake. Choices 
between interests and expectations continually must be made; frustra-
tion and change inevitably will result. This reality suggests that Jus-
tice Holmes was right in INS and his brethren wrong: if a reap/sow 
principle is to be advanced, it cannot rest on protecting what "is." 
I suggest an alternative conception of the reap/sow principle: a 
contextual and contingent outgrowth of the entitlement not to use 
one's labor. In restitution, courts have dealt with persons who have 
conferred their labor on others without preexisting obligation, much 
as intellectual property producers send the products of their labor 
into the world. Restitution's doctrines have alerted us to circum-
stances under which it might not be appropriate to grant rights to be 
paid for voluntary past labors. 
Tue approach has suggested some minimum requirements for 
bringing suit on restitutionary principles. One element extrapolates 
from restitution's concern that the provider of benefits not be offi-
cious-a requirement that the plaintiff have some good excuse for not 
having sought the beneficiary's advance consent. A linked element 
emerges from the policy that, however good the excuse, the laborer's 
O'Neill Defies U.S. Supreme Court: A Really Truly Silly Moment in American Law, 
CoEvolution Q., Spring 1979, at 4. On the use of community norms generally, see Weinreb, 
supra note 100, at 1161. 
492 See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change v. American Heritage Prods., 
296 S.E.2d 697, 706-09 (Ga. 1982) (Weltner, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority 
enunciated an overly broad right of publicity when the proper focus should have been the 
unconscionability of the individual defendant's behavior). 
493 See, e.g., Lange, supra note 10. 
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resort to the courts should not impose heavy burdens on the judiciary, 
such as overseeing the licensing decisions of an entire industry. Also 
among the relevant policies are the desire to ensure that a defendant 
truly will be benefited by the item conferred, that he will not suffer a 
net harm as a result of an obligation of payment, and that his auton-
omy will be respected. These considerations yield a set of suggested 
requirements. I suggest that a plaintiff be required to show, among 
other things, that she faced a market failure; that granting her a right 
of payment would motivate users to negotiate with her and persons 
like her and encourage markets to form; that she had marked her 
product in such a way that the defendant would know a charge for 
use would be imposed; and that the defendant deliberately used the 
product. In addition, I suggested that a nexus is needed between the 
producer and the particular use for which payment is sought. The 
producer's claim of entitlement should not extend beyond the benefits 
she foreseeably generated, or, alternatively, beyond the markets she is 
prepared to serve. This latter contention found its application in a 
requirement that the defendant and the plaintiff be in actual or 
expected competition. Further, I argued against the use of property 
nomenclature to describe the resulting rights. 
I stressed, however, that the normative concerns drawn from unjust 
enrichment law are not sufficient to protect the public interest when 
intangible products such as information are involved. Unjust enrich-
ment's normative concerns are both party-oriented (fairness) and eco-
nomic (administrative costs, incentives, and market preservation), all 
of which are relevant sets of issues for intellectual products. Intellec-
tual products, however, tend to have greater effects on the public and 
raise more complex normative questions than do the subject matters 
at issue in ordinary restitution cases. The search for boundaries to 
confine the reap/sow principle has yielded some results, but the set of 
constraints is necessarily far from complete. 
An inquiry into unjust enrichment cannot accomplish all things. 
Tue proposed set of constraints does not describe with specificity the 
particular acts that would constitute actionable copying of an eligible 
intangible, nor does it provide a list of those intangibles that would be 
eligible or ineligible for protection. Too many varying norms are 
implicated by the differences among particular intangibles to provide 
complete answers. 
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The resulting uncertainty may mean that socially desirable and 
potentially noninfringing creative uses of prior works could be chilled 
even if courts incorporated the restraints into their definition of mis-
appropriation. Conversely, lack of certainty about protection might 
dampen the positive incentive effects that such a cause of action might 
otherwise have for potential plaintiffs. Further, the uncertainty may 
mean that liability will take some defendants by surprise. Even a 
careful tailoring of remedy to avoid imposing a net harm on defend-
ants may not eliminate the resulting unfairness. These considerations 
reinforce the importance of advance specification of boundaries. Leg-
islatures likely will continue to be the best institutions for implement-
ing protection for intellectual products, even if the reap/sow principle 
proposed here were considered an appropriate and adequate basis for 
protection. 
My primary goal has been to illuminate some features of the wide 
crevasse that exists between a moral perception that reward may be 
due, and a legal regime implementing such rewards. Courts consider-
ing claims over intellectual products sometimes write as if "reaping 
and sowing" and "unjust enrichment" automatically give rise to abso-
lute claims, trumping all other considerations. Yet the judicial experi-
ence in the allied area of restitution has suggested that economic and 
other norms should, and do, condition the implementation of the 
impulse to grant reward for labor expended. 

